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ABSTRACT 
 
This research project, within the context of security risk management in general and 
aviation security in particular, aimed to explore the impact of the application of 
international and local air cargo security regulations on South Africa, with specific 
reference to the regulations of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), 
as well as the European Union (EU) and the United States of America (USA). 
 
In South Africa, since the early 2000s, the South African Civil Aviation Authority 
(SACAA) has been the lead agency for dealing with and managing the needs for air 
cargo security. This oversight by SACAA culminated in 2009 with the promulgation of 
the SACAA Regulation commonly known as Part 108. Accordingly the primary 
research focus was on the impact Part 108 has had on the air cargo industry in 
South Africa. In addition, it compared the South African regulations with those of the 
USA and EU regulations; explored the compliance of the various roleplayers; sought 
to understand the enforcement of the regulations; and examined the effectiveness of 
the available security and screening methods. Furthermore, the research attempted 
to determine whether these regulations had any effect on preventing or deterring 
crime in the air cargo sector. 
 
Key terms:  Aviation Security (AVSEC); Air Cargo Security (ACSEC); terrorism; 
international air cargo security regulations; South African Air Cargo 
Security Regulations; Part 108; South African Civil Aviation Authority 
(SACAA); cargo screening; air cargo crime. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This research project, within the context of security risk management in general and 
aviation security in particular, aimed to explore the impact of the application of 
international and local air cargo security regulations on South Africa, with specific 
reference to the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), as well as 
European Union (EU) and United States of America (USA), regulations.  
 
Since the events of 11 September 2001 (the so-called 9/11) bombing attacks, as well 
as the 29 October 2010 incident, referred to as: ‘The Cartridge Plot’, air cargo 
security has begun receiving some of the attention it actually deserves. 
 
Air cargo security has been referred to as ‘the ugly step-child’, hinting that Aviation 
Security (AVSEC) and air safety take precedence over Air Cargo Security (ACSEC) 
with the former somehow more important than the latter (Hoffer, 2008: 148). Air 
cargo security does not even have its own acronym. In this study the researcher 
coined the term ACSEC – Air Cargo Security – similar to AVSEC (Aviation Security) 
but still different, unique and specialised. Air cargo deserves this special treatment, 
since on one hand it contributes major revenues to the air industry, yet on the other 
hand, it presents various challenges with regard to its overall safety and security. 
 
Realising the potential challenges faced by aviation security in general and air cargo 
security in particular, ICAO formulated strict rules and regulations whereby each 
contracting state must establish a ‘civil aviation authority’ to handle each country’s 
aviation responsibilities, including aviation and air cargo security. 
 
In South Africa, since the early 2000s, the South African Civil Aviation Authority 
(SACAA) has been the lead agency for dealing with and managing the needs for air 
cargo security. This oversight by SACAA culminated in 2009 with the promulgation of 
the SACAA Regulation commonly known as Part 108. Part 108 of the Civil Aviation 
Regulations was operationalised as from the 1 July 2009. Part 108 places certain 
responsibilities and duties, in terms of cargo security on, “all personnel involved in 
the acceptance, forwarding, storage, and carriage of cargo by air” (South African 
Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA), 2009f). 
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Furthermore, from this date only so-called ‘known cargo’ would be allowed to be 
loaded for air transporting to foreign destinations by all recognised and licensed air 
carriers. ‘Known cargo’, is defined in Part 108 as “a consignment to which the 
[applicable] security controls, [as] prescribed by Part 108, have been applied”. This 
means that a Regulated Agent (RA) is the only person able to formally hand over 
and despatch a consignment of goods to an air cargo company and attest to the fact 
that all security as outlined in Part 108 have been applied to such consignment. In 
other words, a licensed forwarding agent who is the initial handler of the cargo 
assignment, is the only person from whom the licensed air carriers are allowed to 
accept ‘known cargo’. In addition, such acceptance is on the basis that the 
Regulated Agent has also applied the requisite security controls to the air cargo 
consignment before handing over such as ‘known cargo’ to an air carrier (SACAA, 
2009f). 
 
Part 108 also prescribes a further obligation to air carriers to “protect cargo whilst on 
the ramp prior to loading on board an aircraft [and] must also check that cargo 
consignments are visually inspected [in order] to ensure that they have not been 
interfered with” (SACAA, 2009f). 
 
This research, as a primary focus, explored and examined the impact Part 108 has 
had on the air cargo industry in South Africa. In addition, it compared the South 
African regulations with those of the USA and EU regulations; explored the 
compliance of the various roleplayers; sought to understand the enforcement of the 
regulations; and examined the effectiveness of the available security and screening 
methods. Furthermore, the research attempted to determine whether these 
regulations had any effect on preventing or deterring crime in the air cargo sector. 
 
It is imperative to explore, examine and understand the question of compliance and 
compare South Africa to other leading jurisdictions such as the USA or the EU. This 
is done in order to ensure that South Africa strives for international best practices 
and make sure the flying public is safe and secure in the air, as well as on the 
ground. 
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The researcher has been involved with aviation security for the past ten years. This 
allowed him unprecedented access to individuals, companies and government 
organisations due to his first-hand knowledge and experience in this specialised 
industry. 
 
The above points combined with the fact that this research is the first of its kind in 
South Africa, conducted specifically on the air cargo industry in South Africa, make 
this research project unique and keenly anticipated by the industry and the various 
roleplayers in the air cargo supply chain. 
 
This research focused on the act and following impact of the promulgation of air 
cargo security regulations in South Africa as directed by ICAO and shaped by other 
jurisdictions (USA/EU) experiences. Data was collected from various literature 
sources, as well as through one-on-one interviews with aviation and air cargo 
security professionals implementing Part 108 and combating any unlawful 
interference with civil aviation.  
 
The primary aims and objectives of the research were five-fold:  
 
 Examine and explore the extent and impact of new, as well as existing 
regulations, policies and laws on the air cargo industry in South Africa;  
 
 Explore the transformation that has taken place since the introduction of new 
air cargo security regulations in 2009 and to probe into future developments; 
 
 Analyse the application of screening methods and explore their effectiveness, 
as well as the overall security measures of the air cargo supply chain; 
 
 Evaluate the current situation of air cargo security in South Africa and consider 
the strengths and weaknesses of current security regulations and measures, as 
well as compare them to those or other leading states (USA and EU), in an 
effort to study its correct implementation, effectiveness and highlight possible 
improvements, and; 
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 In light of international as well as local regulations, to contribute to the 
industry’s and public’s knowledge and understanding of the different aspects 
which impact on the security of the South African air cargo industry. 
 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with responsible security officials and 
stakeholders in Gauteng, until information into the phenomenon investigated 
reached its saturation level (saturation level was reached at about 20 interviews, but 
for reliability and validity sake, 30 interviews were conducted to ensure the most 
accurate levels of data collection). It was established that Part 108 indeed had a 
profound and mostly positive impact on the airfreight industry in South Africa. 
 
Part 108 had indeed improved security levels, as well as heightened awareness 
levels in the air cargo security arena, leading to a safer and more secure 
environment. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION FOR THE RESEARCH 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The air cargo network is an intricate, multi-faceted system that handles a massive 
amount of goods, including express parcels and mail on-board commuter 
(passenger) and all-cargo airplanes. The air cargo structure is susceptible to various 
security threats. These typically comprise of credible strategies to place explosives 
on board aircraft; illicit consignments of harmful (including hazardous) materials; 
unlawful undertakings such as illegal trafficking and theft, as well as possible 
hijackings (of airplanes) and disruption by persons with access to these aircrafts 
(Elias, 2008: 1). 
 
Accordingly, several practical and technology-based enterprises to heighten air-
cargo security and discourage equally criminals and terrorists and unlawful risks 
have been implemented worldwide or are being considered for future 
operationalisation (Elias, 2009: 1). 
 
In November 1979, for the first time in the history of aviation, cargo was used as a 
delivery method for explosive devices. The American, Theodore Kaczynski, (the so-
called ‘Unabomber’) concealed a bomb in a mail parcel of the United States (US) 
Mail Service on board American Airlines Flight 444 enroute from Chicago to 
Washington, DC. Luckily the device failed to detonate (Price & Forrest, 2012: 52). 
 
In October 2010 there occurred the attempted bombing of airplanes by using 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) hidden in printer ink toner cartridges inside 
desktop printers. This incident highlighted the fact that terrorists continued to have 
an uncanny insight into critical flaws in the air cargo security chain. It was also an 
indication that they had grown more sophisticated in their attempts to smuggle IEDs 
on board commercial aircraft utilising diverse methods (Wolff, 2013: 36). 
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Cargo pilots and US officials strongly believe that America’s cargo industry is 
dangerously susceptible to such terrorist bombing plots. In November 2013 the US 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had issued a warning to state and local 
authorities that Al-Qaeda1 operatives could well be planning to commandeer cargo 
aircraft from abroad and fly them into the USA for the targeting of nuclear-powered 
plants, bridges and dams (Mendenhall, 2013: 1). 
 
Air cargo is an ideal vehicle for a terrorist bombing attack on aircraft for numerous 
tactical reasons. Firstly, it leverages the point that effective aircraft attacks have a 
substantial effect well beyond the direct loss of life. For example, many more people 
die per year from accidental shootings in the USA than were killed in the 9/11 
bombing attacks in the USA (Wolff, 2013: 36). 
 
Secondly, for cargo, a successful attack, and especially government agencies’ 
response to it, has the potential to impact severely on the flow of commerce and 
hence detrimentally affect the global economy. This in the context that airfreight is 
vital for the swift movement of goods and components in a ‘just in time’ (often ‘just in 
the nick-of-time’) economy that emphasises fast and effective delivery of imported 
goods and material to manufacturers and consumers (Wolff, 2013: 36).  
 
A 2010 Centre for American Progress report on air cargo security stated that: 
“[i]ntroducing a bomb in a commercial consignment via global supply chains is an 
apparent and achievable means to bring down an American airliner without having to 
board it or even enter the United States” (Juul, 2010). 
 
Terrorists and their surrogates have for many years shown themselves to be creative 
and innovative when it comes to ways and means to strike at selected targets. They 
have used airlines to transport explosives by concealing such in the shoes and 
underwear of passengers. Explosives have also been hidden in printer cartridges in 
laser printers that were consigned as air cargo. Furthermore, cargo containers sent 
by sea also offer terrorists a ‘Trojan Horse’ to deliver, for instance, weapons of mass 
                                                          
1
  A radical militant fundamentalist Islam terror organisation which claimed responsibility for the 11 
September 2001 (9/11) bombings in the USA. Alternatively spelt as ‘al-Qaida’ and sometimes ‘al-
Qa'ida’ 
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destruction to a target country. As the Harvard political scientist, Graham Allison, put 
it, a nuclear attack “is far more likely to arrive in a cargo container [in the US] than on 
the tip of a missile” (Nadler, Markey & Thompson 2012: 1). 
 
As economic disruption of the West is one of Al-Qaeda’s strategic objectives, a 
successful attack against air cargo (or attacks against mass transportation if they led 
to draconian screening methods that impacted on commerce), would have a more 
widespread economic impact than an attack via other threat means, such as 
passengers or baggage (Wolff, 2013: 36). 
 
Crowley and Butterworth (2007: 1), maintain that in the United States of America 
(USA) in particular and the world in general, in the five-year period following 9/11, 
due to the strong efforts by the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) cargo 
security professionals, air cargo security has distinctly upgraded and become more 
stringent in its application and implementation. However, it is not yet exhaustively 
‘adequate’. The US Congress, following up on the remaining recommendations of 
the 9/11 Commission continued annually to consider how to bolster air cargo security 
(Elias, 2010: 1). The effectiveness of all of the new measures, however, centre on 
the following question: Should the Transportation Security Administration ‘screen’ or 
‘inspect’ air cargo (Crowley & Butterworth, 2007: 1). That is the core focus of any 
implementation of air cargo security measures. 
 
As per Crowley and Butterworth (2007: 1), there is a distinction between the two 
terms ‘screen’ or ‘inspect’, (semantically speaking), but in reality is fundamental in its 
distinctions. One can inspect air cargo in a number of ways, namely:  
 
i) examine it physically, item by item; or  
ii) merely to screen the cargo consignment.  
 
By inspecting cargo piece by piece will assist in determining whether there are any 
explosives present. This manner of inspection, if correctly implemented, will establish 
that there is no threat present in the properly inspected cargo. In contrast, to merely 
screen cargo, means to only administratively inspect the records of a cargo 
consignment to check that the ‘paper trail’ is in order and only possibly do an 
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external inspection or only inspect a lesser part (an element) of the cargo freight 
itself and then only if there is probable cause to suspect that there might be 
‘suspicious’ or irregular/illegal/illicit insertions being smuggled in the cargo 
consignment.  
 
Unsafe or incorrectly inspected air cargo provides terrorists – and criminals for that 
matter to exploit such shortcomings for various criminal activities – an opening to 
bring down an airliner without having to board a flight or even cross a border. 
According to Crowley and Butterworth (2007: 1), constructing a bomb with a timing 
device can be quite easily accomplished by a university-level engineering student. It 
is therefore, as easy to place such an explosive device in a commercial cargo 
shipment on a passenger aircraft. In other words, a simple explosive with a timing 
device can potentially bring down an aircraft without the ‘bomber’ being on board. 
 
In October 2010, two bombs concealed within the ink toner cartridges of Hewlett-
Packard P2055 LaserJet desktop printers, made their ‘trip’ by Federal Express 
(FedEx) and United Parcel Services (UPS) from Sana'a, Yemen, to cargo hubs in 
Dubai and Britain. These two parcels travelled part of the way in the luggage holds of 
two passenger aircrafts, before being stopped (on an intelligence tipoff from the 
Saudis) in the UK just hours before their scheduled take-off for Chicago. This 
bombing attempt, which could potentially have turned into a devastating incident, 
served as a timely reminder of the vulnerability of air transport to acts of terrorism. 
Fortunately, there were no fatalities in this incident, but the ‘could-have-been’ 
consequences were sobering (Eisenberg, 2001: 1). 
 
According to Eisenberg (2001: 1), if successful, this attack could have led to the 
deaths of hundreds of passengers on board the targeted airplanes and many more 
on the ground if the aircraft had crashed into a heavily built up populated urban area. 
This attempt to blow up the airplanes might well have succeeded if the USA and 
Saudi Arabian intelligence services had not timeously discovered the threat. While 
the bombers failed in their attempt, they still managed to ‘grab the attention’ of the 
world and more specifically that of the air cargo industry.  
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Minnaar (2003: 11), mentions that over the latter half of 2002, levels of security at 
South African airports were elevated in response to a number of events and issues 
relating to or emanating from a number incidents that occurred globally, inter alia the 
11 September 2001 (commonly referred to as 9/11) attacks in the United States of 
America (USA). In addition, domestic developments impacted on security as well 
with reference to the application of the new South African Firearms Control Act 
(FCA); the implementation of the new South African Police Service (SAPS) National 
Firearms Programme; and the final drafting and acceptance (in May 2002) by 
Cabinet of the Border Police Procedure Manual. Furthermore, a number of other 
problems and incidents occurred which led to heightened security measures and a 
tightening of security procedures at all international ports of entry in South Africa. 
These included the efforts to prevent the theft of valuable cargo and the increased 
surveillance measures for combatting drug trafficking and smuggling at airports.  
 
The events of 11 September 2001 (9/11) were something of a watershed case in the 
lifecycle of aviation security. Much has happened since then to improve the 
industry’s understanding of the threats facing it and its ability to counter them. 
However, aviation security has also, perversely, become the object of criticism – 
mostly contradictory – namely: that it is too expensive, too intrusive and too slow to 
respond to critical situations as they develop. It is also often said that ‘there is too 
much or too little of it’ [security] or that it is ‘all too predictable or too inconsistent’. So 
more than twelve years on from 9/11, it is time to ask: If aviation and cargo security 
are not where one would like it to be, what needs still to be done? (Tompkinson, 
2011: 4). 
 
Taking into consideration the above facts and threats that air cargo is facing during 
these turbulent times, this research will be specific with reference to the introduction 
of international and local air cargo security regulations. These regulations have been 
put in place, as part of global efforts, to counter threats to civil aviation.  
 
The introduction of both international and South African air cargo security regulations 
led to major changes in aviation and air cargo security. Accordingly, this research 
aims to examine the impact these regulations had on the air cargo industry in South 
Africa. 
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Focus areas will include an evaluation of screening methods, a comparison between 
South African regulations and those in the USA and the EU, the financial constraints 
Part 108 had on the industry and various linked issues. 
 
Since crime is a major concern in South Africa and even though air cargo security 
specifically relates to any acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation, this 
research study will also seek to explore the potential impact the introduction of air 
cargo security regulations have had on criminal activities. This focus, even though of 
a secondary nature, will seek to establish whether there has been any impact 
(prevention and deterrence) on criminal activities in practical and reduction terms 
since the introduction of the air cargo security measures.  
 
Another area of intended research exploration in this study will be the level of co-
operation between the various government agencies and regulatory bodies operating 
at the airports, as well as their interaction with commercial entities. In this context, an 
examination will also be done on the aspect of whether there is a formal co-operative 
model in place and whether any information sharing is occurring.  
 
1.2 RATIONALE OF THE RESEARCH 
In a South African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA) press release of the 13 May 
2008, Captain Colin Jordaan, CEO of the SACAA and Commissioner for Civil 
Aviation, said that the SACAA was “very pleased that South Africa has reached the 
stage where cargo security regulations [could] be implemented”. Furthermore, that 
these “regulations have been in the making for a number of years, largely because of 
the challenges posed by cargo security”. He had additionally indicated that the time 
had arrived for “a decision to be made to start implementing them”. Moreover, 
Jordaan said that the air cargo sector had “nothing to fear from these regulations” 
(South African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA), 2008).  
 
Furthermore, this research aims to assist in informing and updating the air cargo and 
aviation security industries regarding the effectiveness and impact the new air cargo 
security regulations and policies have had on the industry. The researches also aims 
to provide an assessment of the implementation of current procedures, methods and 
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technology used, as well as to afford an in-depth analysis of the current situation in 
the air cargo security arena. 
 
Furthermore, the research findings will inform and impart on the industry valuable 
information regarding current and future threats, as well as best practice methods 
and available technologies to counter such threats. 
 
The research will also explore the attitude that the industry has exhibited towards the 
various state entities in charge of these regulations, primarily the SACAA and its 
effective operations and communications over the past few years. 
 
Another target aspect is the potential impact air cargo regulations had on crime 
trends and on potential terrorist attacks. 
 
1.3  RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES  
The research aims, objectives and purpose are to examine the impact air cargo 
security regulations promulgated in 2008, as informed by international standards and 
regulations and coming into force as from January 2009, had on the air cargo 
industry in South Africa. 
 
The debate about South African air cargo security regulations started in the early 
2000s, culminating in 2009 with the publication and promulgation of the regulations, 
also referred to as ‘Part 108’. The finalisation and development of these regulations 
had been announced on 13 May 2008 via a SACAA press release that stated the 
following: 
 
“The South African Civil Aviation Authority, (SACAA) has developed new 
regulations that will govern how air cargo is handled and managed. 
These regulations will come into force in January 2009, and will ensure 
that stringent measures are applied when handling air cargo so that 
aviation safety and security are not compromised. The SACAA is 
confident that once implemented, all weaknesses and deficiencies in the 
current system of handling air cargo will be adequately addressed” 
(SACAA, 2008).  
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The primary aims and objectives of the research being the following:  
 
 Examine the impact of new, as well as existing regulations, policies and laws 
on the air cargo industry in South Africa;  
 
 Explore the transformation that has taken place since the introduction of new 
air cargo security regulations in 2009 and probe into future developments; 
 
 Analyse the application of screening methods and explore their effectiveness, 
as well as the overall security measures of the air cargo supply chain; 
 
 Evaluate the current situation of air cargo security in South Africa and consider 
the strengths and weaknesses of current security regulations and measures, in 
an effort to study its correct implementation, effectiveness and highlight 
possible improvements, and 
 
 Contribute to the industry’s and public’s knowledge and understanding of the 
different aspects that impact on the security of the South African air cargo 
industry. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research questions this study seeks to answer will be:  
 
 What has been the impact of the changing international and South African air 
cargo security regulations on the South African air cargo transport industry?  
 
 How has the air cargo industry transformed since the implementation of air 
cargo security regulations? 
 
 What screening methods have been approved and how effective are they? 
 
 Do the South African regulations meet international standards and how do 
they compare to those of the USA and EU? 
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Ancillary research questions will deal with specific aspects relating to the changing 
regulations and standards in the South African air cargo environments:  
 
 The impact on opportunities for criminal and terrorist activities versus security 
measures and has there been a change in crime statistics and trends;  
 
 Tracing the changing modus operandi by exploiters of air cargo security 
shortcomings – has the nature of crime or potential terrorist act changed?; 
 
 Monitoring of air cargo security in South Africa as compared to other international 
jurisdictions – how does South African regulations compare to those of the USA 
and the EU?;  
 
 Extent of implementation and utilisation of policies, procedures, methods and 
measures to prevent unlawful interference in air cargo – does the industry apply 
best practice methods and risk based approaches to security?;  
 
 Review of new and/or improved air cargo security screening measures and 
methods;  
 
 Establishing the use of best practices by the South African air cargo industry to 
ensure air cargo security; 
 
 Explore the way state organs monitor and enforce the regulations, as well as how 
they co-operate, communicate and share intelligence in respect of air cargo 
security; 
 
 Enquire about training levels and are training levels adequate; and 
 
 Investigate the cost benefits of Part 108 and try to ascertain whether Part 108 is a 
necessary or unnecessary burden on the industry. 
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Since crime is a major concern in South Africa and even though air cargo security 
specifically relates to any acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation, this 
research study will also seek to explore the potential impact the introduction of air 
cargo security regulations have had on criminal activities. This focus, even though of 
a secondary nature, will seek to establish whether there has been any impact on 
criminal activities in practical and reduction terms since the introduction of air cargo 
security measures.  
 
1.5 GLOSSARY  
In this section the technical terms and key concepts most commonly utilised in the 
ACSEC industry and mentioned throughout this study, or are relevant to the 
understanding of the environment, are defined and explained. 
 
Acts of unlawful interference 
Acts of unlawful interference are defined as “acts or attempted acts such as to 
jeopardize the safety of civil aviation and air transport”, namely:  
 
“[the] unlawful seizure of aircraft in flight; …unlawful seizure of aircraft on 
the ground; …hostage-taking on board aircraft or on aerodromes; [the] 
…forcible intrusion on board an aircraft, at an airport or on the premises 
of an aeronautical facility; [the] …introduction on board an aircraft or at 
an airport of a weapon or hazardous device or material intended for 
criminal purposes; [and][the] …communication of false information such 
as to jeopardize the safety of an aircraft in flight or on the ground, of 
passengers, crew, ground personnel or the general public, at an airport 
or on the premises of a civil aviation facility” (International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO), 2011). 
 
Access control  
Access control refers to the: “security methods applied to confirm that only 
authorised persons, vehicles and items carried by such individuals or transported in 
such vehicles, are permitted access into the premises, area or zone being controlled” 
(SACAA, 2009). 
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Air cargo 
Air cargo (broadly speaking) includes any sort of merchandise, express post or 
courier packages and mail carried on passenger aircrafts and/or all-cargo aircraft 
(Crowley & Butterworth, 2007: 30). 
 
Airside 
This is the: “movement area of an airport, adjacent terrain and buildings or portions 
thereof, access to which is controlled” (ICAO 2011; International Air Transport 
Association (IATA) 2013). 
 
All cargo carriers 
Companies (such as UPS and FedEx) dedicated exclusively to the transport of 
cargo. These companies are frequently called ‘integrated carriers’ because they 
have aircraft dedicated to carry only cargo, and also fleets of trucks and vans that 
transport the cargo and parcels to their final endpoint outside of airports. In addition, 
some all-cargo airlines are divisions or affiliates of passenger airlines, such as 
Lufthansa Cargo (Crowley & Butterworth, 2007: 30). 
 
Background check 
A background check refers to the checking of a “person’s identity and previous 
experience, including where legally permissible, any criminal history, as part of the 
assessment of an individual’s suitability to implement a security control and/or for 
unescorted access to a security restricted area” (ICAO, 2011). 
 
Cargo 
“Any property [goods/packages/luggage, etc.] carried on an aircraft other than mail, 
stores and accompanied or handled baggage” (ICAO 2011). 
 
Certification 
Certification is the document production process which entails officials undertaking 
an: “…evaluation and confirmation by or on behalf of the appropriate authority for 
aviation security that a person possesses the necessary competencies to perform 
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assigned functions to an acceptable level as defined by the appropriate authority” 
(ICAO, 2011). 
Explosive Detection System (EDS)  
These are apparatuses that automatically detect explosives in un-opened baggage 
and cargo containers. EDS are certified by TSA as having high rates of detection of 
the “types, amounts and configurations of explosives” that can bring down an 
aircraft, while not surpassing a set rate of false positives. All the EDS equipment 
certified to date employ X-ray computed tomography (CT SCAN) technology. Most 
EDS were intended to be integrated with baggage conveyors and function at high 
speeds. Several, however, have been mounted as stand-alone systems in airport 
lobbies, where bags are manually fed into them (Crowley & Butterworth, 2007: 30). 
 
Explosive Trace Detector (ETD) 
These are devices that detect and categorise vapours and microscopic residues of 
explosives. Human operators gather samples, for example, by rubbing bags with 
swabs, which are then chemically analysed in the ETD to isolate any traces of 
explosives. ETDs are significantly less expensive than ETDs, but their operation is 
labour-intensive (Crowley & Butterworth, 2007: 30). 
 
Freight forwarder 
An individual or enterprise that acts on behalf of a shipper by dispatching or else 
organising space for shipments via ships, airplanes, trucks or rail. Sometimes 
referred to as international freight forwarders, they have the know-how that allows 
them to prepare and process the documentation and perform related activities 
concerning international shipments. From a regulatory perspective, they are often 
also Indirect Air Carriers (Crowley & Butterworth, 2007: 30). 
 
Human factors principles 
“Principles [that] apply to design, certification, training, operations and maintenance 
and which seek safe interface between the human and other system components by 
proper consideration to human performance” (ICAO 2011). 
 
Human performance 
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“Human capabilities and limitations [that] have an impact on the safety, security, and 
efficiency of aeronautical operations” (ICAO 2011). 
 
Known cargo 
With effect from the 1 July 2009, air carriers in South Africa were only allowed to 
accept ‘known cargo’ as consigned freight. ‘Known cargo’ further refers to a 
shipment that all the required security controls as prescribed by Part 108, have been 
applied. This means that a Regulated Agent (RA), see definition below) is the only 
person from whom the licensed air carriers are allowed to accept ‘known cargo’. In 
addition, such acceptance is on the basis that the Regulated Agent has also applied 
the requisite security controls to the air cargo consignment before handing over such 
as ‘known cargo’ to an air carrier (SACAA, 2009). 
 
Known consignor 
A ‘known consignor’ is the: “consignor who originates cargo or mail for own account 
and whose procedures meet common security rules and standards sufficient to allow 
carriage of cargo or mail on any aircraft” (IATA 2013). In other words a consignor is 
the person who hands over or delivers/transfers the cargo consignment to another 
party. 
 
In the South African context a ‘known consignor’ means the “originator of goods for 
carriage by air”, which has a “recognised business relationship with a Regulated 
Agent” on the basis of the required Part 108 security standards and who further 
“conforms with the [Part 108] criteria” for a known consignor. In addition these known 
consignors will be required to “pack and secure their cargo on secure premises and 
protect the cargo against unlawful interference. Cargo will be required to be sealed 
with tamper evident seals and personnel involved in the handling of cargo or cargo 
documentation will be required to undergo prescribed training and must be subjected 
to background checks” (SACAA, 2009). 
 
Known shipper 
The term ‘known shipper’ is used both in the United States and internationally, and is 
also a recognised part of the TSA’s security Programme. Becoming a known shipper 
is comparatively easy – it means achieving a reputation as an established company 
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in the shipping community, finalising an application, being vetted by TSA against 
commercial databases and providing supplementary documentation upon request by 
TSA, an airline or an Indirect Air Carrier (Crowley & Butterworth, 2007: 30). 
 
Regulated agent 
A ‘regulated agent’ is an: “…agent, freight forwarder, or any other entity that 
conducts business with an operator and provides security controls that are accepted 
or required by the appropriate authority in respect of cargo or mail” (ICAO 2011; 
IATA 2013). 
 
Regulated agent (South Africa) 
According to the South African Civil Aviation Authority, in South Africa, a regulated 
agent must appoint, as prescribed by Part 108, a ‘designated official’. This person is 
accountable, inter alia, for the: “…implementation, application and supervision of the 
security controls”. In addition, Regulated Agents must develop a Security 
Plan/Security Manual that outlines and clearly sets out how they will conduct their 
operations, including the: “….safeguarding cargo against acts of unlawful 
interference and applying security controls, which will include the screening of 100 
percent of unknown cargo and ten percent of cargo received from Known 
Consignors”. This Plan/Manual must also be approved by the CAA. Furthermore, all 
Regulated Agents’ staff involved in the “…handling of cargo or cargo documentation 
will be required to undergo prescribed training and must be subjected to background 
checks” (SACAA, 2009). 
 
Screening 
Screening is the: “…application of technical or other means which are intended to 
identify [and/]or detect weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices, articles or 
substances which may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference” (IATA 
2013). 
 
Security 
In the context of this study the term ‘security’ will indicate the: “safeguarding [of] civil 
aviation against acts of unlawful interference. A combination of measures and 
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human and material resources” will consequently achieve this stated objective (ICAO 
2011; IATA 2013). 
 
 
Security control 
“A means by which the introduction of weapons, explosives or other dangerous 
devices, articles or substances which may be used to commit an act of unlawful 
interference can be prevented “(ICAO 2011; IATA 2013). 
 
Security inspection 
A security inspection entails: “[an] examination of the implementation of relevant 
national civil aviation security programme requirements by an airline, airport, or other 
entity involved in security” (ICAO 2011). 
 
Security programme 
As an adjunct to the security inspection is the overarching security programme which 
contains the: “[m]easures adopted to safeguard international civil aviation against 
acts of unlawful interference” (IATA 2013). 
 
Security restricted area 
These are those zones of the airside of an airport which are: 
“…recognised as priority risk areas where, in addition to access control, 
additional security controls are applied. Such areas will generally include, 
inter alia, all commercial aviation passenger departure areas between 
the screening checkpoint and the aircraft, the ramp, baggage make-up 
areas, including those where aircraft are being brought into service and 
screened baggage and cargo are present, cargo sheds, mail centres, 
airside catering and aircraft cleaning premises” (ICAO 2011). 
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South Africa: Civil Aviation Technical Standards – Air Cargo Security (SA-
CATS-ACS)-Part 108-Air Cargo Security (known in short as ‘Part 108’)  
The document, South Africa: Civil Aviation Technical Standards – Air Cargo Security 
(SA-CATS-ACS), contains the standards, rules, requirements, methods, 
specifications, characteristics and procedures that are applicable in respect of the 
carriage of cargo by air. 
 
Part 108 of the Civil Aviation Regulations came into effect on 1 July 2009. Part 108 
applies to all individuals engaged in the acceptance, forwarding, storage and 
carriage of cargo by air. 
 
Under Part 108, “air carriers are required to safeguard cargo whilst on the ramp prior 
to loading on board an aircraft and must also check that cargo consignments are 
visually inspected to ensure that they have not been tampered with” (SACAA, 2009) 
 
1.6 VALUE OF THE RESEARCH 
The value of this research has many facets, since it is the first specific study into air 
cargo security in South Africa, as well as the first study to measure or explore the 
impact of a specific security regulation on a specific industry. 
 
This research will provide a valuable tool for air cargo security managers, since it will 
allow them to better understand the industry, offer an insight into the various facets 
discussed by this research project, as well as serve as a tool to educate others 
within the organisation, enabling them to better understand the threats relating to air 
cargo security. 
 
While seeking to compare South African regulations with USA and EU regulations, 
the researcher explored the benchmark South Africa fits into, evaluating if South 
Africa employs international best practices, this evidence can be used both by the 
SACAA and the industry to maintain and improve their compliance levels, ensuring 
South Africa remains in the forefront of global efforts to prevent any acts of unlawful 
interference with Civil Aviation. 
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The research also assessed the effectiveness of the SACAA in enforcing these 
regulations, as well as the compliance of various roleplayers, the examination of 
screening methods can also assist the industry and the SACAA in employing the 
best suitable air cargo screening methods.  
 
All these elements and various others dealt with in this research, will greatly 
contribute to a better understanding of the air cargo industry in South Africa, thereby 
adding great value to the SACAA and various companies taking part in the air cargo 
supply chain. 
 
1.7 RESEARCH PLANNING: DISSERTATION LAYOUT 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction and motivation for the research 
This chapter details the rationale for the study, the research aim and objectives, 
explains the various research questions, touches on the value of the research, as 
well as explain the main key operational concepts used in this research. 
 
Chapter 2:  Research Methodology 
This chapter explains the methodological exposition of the research approach, 
creates the framework for the research and details the way it was conducted, 
clarifies the research design and methods applied and used; it also describes the 
problems faced during the research process and justifies the information collection 
instruments utilised in the field. 
 
Chapter 3:  International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and international 
aviation security regulations 
This chapter consists of detailed literature review in respect of ICAO’s (International 
Civil Aviation Organisation) international aviation security regulations. 
 
Chapter 4:   United States of America (USA) and the European Union (EU) 
specific regulations and regulatory bodies for cargo security 
Chapter Four details the specific regulations in the USA and the EU, since the 
research compares these regulations with those of South Africa. It also explains the 
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regulating body in the USA – the Transportation Security Administration – which has 
become the driving force for AVSEC and ACSEC regulations worldwide. 
 
Chapter 5:  South African specific regulations on cargo security 
Chapter Five deals with the specific South African regulations regarding air cargo 
security, being Part 108, it also mentions the South African Civil Aviation Authority, 
its mandate and responsibilities, furthermore this chapter discusses the approved 
screening methods used in South Africa and touches of future methods, this chapter 
also mentions the current threats to the air cargo security industry. 
 
Chapter 6:  Research findings in respect of the direct impact of Part 108 on 
the air cargo industry in South Africa 
In this chapter the researcher explores the various findings, which had a direct 
impact on the air cargo industry as a result of Part 108 regulations, it details whether 
the impact was positive or negative, has it actually improve air cargo security in 
South Africa? Do companies comply with the regulations? Do they deploy best 
practice and apply a risk-based approach? It will also touch on the various methods 
or concepts as mandated by Part 108. 
 
Chapter 7:  Research findings in respect of the general impact of Part 108 on 
the air cargo industry in South Africa  
This chapter details the relevant findings emanating from the data collection and the 
analysis process, which are more general in respect of the application of Part 108, 
issues such as the possible impact of Part 108 on potential terrorist and criminal 
activities, the actual impact Part 108 had on reducing crime or changing its trends in 
relation to air cargo security, it also explores the financial burden Part 108 had on the 
industry, this chapter examines the screening methods used and their effectiveness 
as well as compare local regulations to the USA and EU air cargo regulations, it also 
deals with training matters and ends with exploring the possibility of creating a new 
dedicated forum. 
 
Chapter 8:  Recommendations and Conclusions  
The final chapter presents various recommendations based on the findings as per 
chapters six and seven. 
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The recommendations are divided in two portions; one is directed at the SACAA 
while the other is directed at the industry as a whole. 
Chapter 8 ends with final conclusions reached while examining the various 
recommendations as mentioned above. 
 
 
1.8  CONCLUSION  
This Chapter is intended to provide an introduction to the overall thrust of the 
research study; its aim is to provide the basic understanding of the subject at hand 
as well as the topics the research intends to explore.  
 
It further provided the rationale for the research and sets out the research aims and 
objectives as well as details the research questions. 
 
By detailing the key theoretical concepts this chapter assists in understanding the 
intricacies of the air cargo industry and provides the initial guide for the reader to 
navigate through these concepts. 
 
The chapter ends by giving an overview of the value of the research and outlines the 
whole dissertation layout.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The methodological exposition for this research will be discussed in this chapter. It 
creates the framework for the research, which allows the researcher to measure the 
impact of the application of international and local air cargo security regulations in 
South Africa since 2009 to the present. The impact of the introduction of new 
regulations also referred to as Part 108, will be explored, as well as future 
developments and the impact of these on the industry as a whole.  
 
This study was done mostly in and around OR Tambo International Airport (situated 
in Kempton Park, west of Johannesburg in Gauteng Province of South Africa). 
However, it is imperative to understand that the individuals interviewed, hold 
positions in national or at times international companies or organisations, hence their 
reply encompasses a national consideration rather than a Gauteng or ORTIA 
specific perspective.  
 
The study utilised the expertise of various experienced individuals working in the 
field of air cargo security, these individuals were carefully selected and chosen to 
proportionally represent the air cargo industry. Their background, experience, 
expertise, knowledge and willingness to participate were assessed and the final list 
was created accordingly. 
 
During the literature review process, it was noticed that there is a dearth of published 
research material broadly on aviation security and more specifically with regard to 
the impact of specific cargo or security regulations on the air cargo industry. The 
same problem was encountered in relation to the impact on crime statistics.  
 
This fact led to limited availability of quality research literature, leading the 
researcher to use similar sources at times. 
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2.2. RESEARCH APPROACH 
The research approach was investigative, and sought to study the impact of the 
application of new air cargo security regulations in South Africa, as well as the 
implementation of various security measures currently in place to counter acts of 
unlawful interference with air cargo. 
 
A qualitative research method was incorporated using interviews with key individuals 
within the airfreight industry in South Africa. This method was used as it seeks to find 
the meaning or reasons for a specific question, event or interactions from the 
researcher’s point of view – drawing as it did on the researcher’s experience, 
position and exposure to the air cargo security industry. Shank (2002: 5) describes 
qualitative research as “a form of systematic empirical inquiry into meaning.” Denzin 
and Lincoln (2000: 3) state that qualitative research comprises an “interpretive and 
naturalistic” approach, meaning that “qualitative researchers study things in their 
natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of 
the meanings people bring to them”. 
 
Creswell (1998:2) defines the approach or strategy as follows: “an approach to 
qualitative research that has a distinguished history in one of the disciplines and that 
has spawned …distinct methodologies that characterised its approach” These 
traditions of inquiry are also described as “strategies of inquiry” or mere “strategies”.  
 
This methodology also allows an in-depth and detailed study of the chosen topic, 
allowing the researcher to investigate and understand the information emanating 
from the data and information collected.  
 
By conducting one-on-one, in-depth interviews with various key air cargo industry 
roleplayers, the researcher was able to establish how the changes in the industry are 
experienced and explore what areas were impacted since the introduction of air 
cargo security regulations in South Africa. This approach was further enhanced by a 
comparative analysis between the international standards and local ones. 
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2.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The purpose of a research design is to assure that the information and evidence 
acquired, enables the researcher to answer the initial research question as 
unambiguously as possible. 
 
Fouche (2002: 271) claims that characterisations of research design from 
quantitative perspective are rather vague, the same is true for the qualitative 
approach. 
Obtaining relevant and reliable information or evidence necessitates specifying the 
kind of evidence required to answer the research question, to test a theory, to 
evaluate a programme or to correctly describe some phenomenon. When designing 
the research theory, the question was: what kind of evidence is required to answer 
the research questions in a convincing way?  
Qualitative research can be defined as a study whereby the “variables are usually 
not controlled, because it is exactly this freedom and natural development of action 
and representation [that the researcher wishes] …to capture” (Henning, Van 
Rensburg & Smit, 2004: 19). This type of research aims to understand and explain, 
by using evidence from the data and from the literature, what the phenomenon or 
phenomena [the researcher is] …studying [is all] about (Henning et al, 2004: 19). 
 
According to Donalek (2004: 24), “…[p]henomenological studies examine human 
experiences through the descriptions provided by the people involved. These 
experiences are called ‘lived experiences’. Furthermore, the purpose then of 
phenomenological studies is to: “describe the meaning that experiences hold for 
each subject. This type of research is used to study areas [wherein] little or no 
knowledge” exists (Donalek, 2004: 24). 
 
The way the researcher looks at phenomenology is the attempt to look at, explore or 
try appreciating and deciphering the significance of a phenomenon, like the 
application of air cargo security rules on an industry and its participants, explore how 
they experienced the changes and try understand the impact this action had on them 
and the industry as a whole Fouche (2002: 271). 
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Donalek (2004: 24), goes further and states that in phenomenological research your 
“respondents are asked to describe their experiences, as they perceive them. They 
may write about their experiences, but information is generally obtained through 
interviews” (Donalek 2004: 24). 
 
Since there is no previous research into the impact of air cargo security regulations 
in South Africa, this research is new and original in its nature; hence the 
Phenomenological Studies design fits such research. 
 
The researcher found that, as noted above, interviews are the best way to obtain 
quality, in-depth information.  
 
According to Creswell (1998:61), a case study can be regarded as “an exploration or 
an in-depth analysis of a ‘bounded system’ (bounded by time and/or place) or a 
single or multiple cases over a period of time”. A case study type of approach will 
therefore be used for this study, since the impact in 2009 of the introduction in South 
Africa of the new regulations (Part 108) will be explored, and should therefore be 
viewed as on on-going process. Babbie (2001: 285), points out that the “case being 
studied [can] refer to a process, activity, [an] event, programme, individual or multiple 
individuals”. 
 
The researcher ability to understand the topic due to his first-hand experience over 
the past 10 years, contributed to a better material obtained from the respondents. 
Since the researcher was an active participant in the air cargo supply chain and his 
experience and personal understanding greatly assisted the data collection process. 
 
2.4  RESEARCH METHODS AND DATA COLLECTION 
The research methods used to collect relevant and applicable data shall be 
described herein. 
 
2.4.1 Interviews 
Sewell (2001: 1) describes qualitative interviews as “….attempts to understand the 
world from the participant’s point of view, to unfold the meaning of people’s 
experiences [and] to uncover their lived world prior to scientific explanations.”  
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Berry (1999:1) suggests three basic approaches to conducting qualitative 
interviewing. The researcher found that the most suitable way for collecting the 
research information in this study was the general interview guide approach also 
known as the ‘guided interview’. When utilising this method for interviewing, a basic 
checklist, or schedule of questions are prepared beforehand to make sure that all 
pertinent subjects are covered. This type of interview approach is “useful for eliciting 
information about specific topics” (Berry, 1999: 1). 
 
The researcher conducted one-on-one in-depth interviews with selected 
national/international companies or organisations representatives based on a 
schedule of interview questions (see Annexure C). The majority of the interview 
questions used, were open-ended questions. 
 
The interview questions were developed over a time period and tested both with the 
research supervisors as well as with a selected group of respondents. 
 
The initial interview questions schedule contained over 60 questions, 13 were 
deemed not relevant when tested, while other questions were reworded several 
times until the desired outcome was clear. 
 
Several questions were changed or adapted as a direct result of input from 
respondents, where they suggested a related topic or a more detailed exploration of 
the topic. 
 
Once the schedule of interview questions was drafted, the researcher approached 
various, carefully selected, individuals to set up interviews with. 
 
Interviews across a range of relevant industries (to the broad industry of airfreighting 
and cargo security) took place with 30 individuals who were willing to volunteer and 
take part in this study. Some of these national/international companies and/or official 
organisations were: the Department of Transport; Civil Aviation Authority; Airports 
Company of South Africa; various airlines (e.g. South African Airways and 
Lufthansa); various freight forwarding companies, (e.g. Safcor Panalpina and 
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Swissport); a range of organisations, (e.g. Aviation Co-ordination Services); as well 
as various other companies relevant or having links to the industry. 
 
All interviews took place in Johannesburg, as all the above-mentioned companies or 
organisations head offices are based in Gauteng, close to ORTIA. The interview with 
the Department of Transport took place in Pretoria, however, the outlook and replies 
were relevant to the national footprint of these companies or state organs. 
 
2.4.2 Observation 
Bryman (2000: 96) states that: “for qualitative researchers, it is only by getting close 
to their subjects and becoming an insider that they can view the world as a 
participant in that setting”. 
 
The researcher has been an active participant in the AVSEC and ACSEC 
environment for the past ten years. As a consequence, his own experience and 
noting of the changes and the impact of the regulations were critical to the in-depth 
viewpoint and understanding of the replies and issues raised during the research 
process. The researcher’s professional relationship with most respondents allowed 
him closer and a more insightful and reflective point of view, which also led to more 
open and unguarded replies from the respondents. 
 
Participant observation also has a very long history in social science and humanities 
research and has been described as being fundamental to all research methods in 
respect of data collection. According to Denzin and Lincoln (2000: 673), participant 
observation is a “typical qualitative approach to data, which implies that data cannot 
really be reduced to figures”. During this research study most of the information was 
collected during interviews, amplifying the input from various respondents, as well as 
the experience of the researcher in this field. 
 
2.4.3  Field notes 
Emerson (1995: 155) defines field notes as “accounts describing experiences and 
observations the researcher has made while participating in an intense and involved 
manner.” The researcher took field notes at all times during the interviews; electronic 
  
26 
© University of South Africa 2015 
recordings of all interviews also took place. Field notes and recordings were referred 
to during the transcription process, ensuring authenticity and accuracy.  
 
2.5  POPULATION AND SAMPLING PROCEDURES 
This section describes the various ways in which the researcher dealt with the 
population and sampling process employed for the purpose of interviews and what 
had been the rationale for choosing these specific companies and individuals. 
 
For the interviews, a Non-Probability Sampling method was used and in particular, 
the Purposeful Sampling technique was applied. The researcher on three occasions 
also used Snowball Sampling, since, on those occasions, he was referred to another 
person via some of the respondents. 
 
According to Brynard and Hanekom (2003: 43), for the purpose of sampling, target 
population does not refer to the population of a country but to objects, subjects, and 
phenomena that the researcher wishes to study in order to establish new knowledge. 
 
As such, representatives of specific industries or organisation were carefully and 
selectively chosen as a ‘sample’ to represent the group or industry in which they 
operate. The individuals were all chosen carefully from various environments, in 
order that the study would extract the maximum amount of information from a variety 
of sources, ensuring it was all inclusive, covering state entities, local and foreign 
airlines, local and foreign ground handling companies, local and foreign freight 
forwarding companies. 
 
Denzin and Lincoln (2000: 370) point out that a “qualitative researcher seeks out 
individuals, groups and settings where the specific processes being studied are most 
likely to occur”. As such only organisations and companies involved in the air cargo 
security supply chain were sampled.  
 
Candidates for the interviews were carefully selected, based on their position in a 
specific industry sector, as well as their position in relation to their knowledge, 
experience and expertise in the specialised field of air cargo security. 
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The criteria for choosing these respondents were that they had first-hand, in-depth 
knowledge and hands-on experience in the selected field of research. Specific 
people were sought out since they had participated in the consultative discussions 
that had led directly to the formulation and implementation of Part 108 – the 
accepted term commonly used by those associated with this industry in referring to 
the South African ACSEC regulations. Other respondents were chosen due to their 
current positions as individuals who implement current regulations. Some of the 
respondents are also currently part of the structure overseeing the implementation 
and compliance with the Part 108 regulations. 
 
The researcher intentionally tried to gather as many people as possible from as wide 
a variety of industries – linked to the core industry of airfreighting/air cargo. This 
industry-focused selection (deliberate targeting) was also extended to other role-
players from the side of the State such as the Department of Transportation (DOT), 
SACAA, Airports Company South Africa (ACSA) and SAPS. From the various 
industries, airlines such as South African Airways (SAA) and Lufthansa, and freight-
forwarding companies and cargo-handling companies such as Swissport and Bidvest 
Panalpina, were included. 
 
The total sampled population was 30 individuals from the following cross sections: 
 
Training and/or service providers:    6 
Freight forwarders/Regulated Agents: 5 
Express couriers/Regulated Agents:  3 
Airlines/Regulated Agents:     6 
Ground Handling/Regulated Agents:  5 
State Organs:        5 
Total:        30 
 
2.6  PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED DURING THE RESEARCH 
In this section the researcher deals with the challenges encountered during the 
data/research information collection process, sharing some problems and the 
solutions applied to deal with such challenges. 
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Sensitivity of information, reluctance to be associated with certain answers 
In some cases, the researcher found a degree of reluctance by respondents in 
answering some of the questions. It appeared that several respondents/interviewees 
thought that the researcher might use direct quotes or opinions of individuals. In 
other words, they were under the impression that they could be identified by what 
was said by them to the researcher, which in turn might reflect negatively on them, 
the company for which they worked (or owned), the SACAA or their peers. 
 
The researcher then explained that unless specific permission is granted, no 
individual would be identified in the report. Their privacy would, therefore, be 
safeguarded throughout in this study. It was explained that all information is collated 
and general findings are reached by calculating the total response from all 
respondents and formulating the resulting findings into a conclusion, by supporting, 
rejecting or formulating an idea in relation to the questions asked. 
 
[Note that even the interview list at the end of the list of references is devoid of 
names or specific job titles, ensuring that their identities would be protected by 
applying the mentioned anonymity as outlined above]. 
 
Availability of candidates 
Most candidates were very accommodating and made themselves available upon 
being asked to participate. A few interviews were rescheduled due to operational 
reasons. 
 
A few candidates were very busy and it took several weeks to set up a date for the 
interview. On looking back, the researcher found the experience to be very 
rewarding. The researcher is therefore grateful to the respondents for giving their 
time and insight so openly and willingly. 
 
It must also be noted that all the candidates who were interviewed, were very keen 
to see the final report, stating that it may impact on their duties and on the industry 
as a whole. 
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Limited available data pertaining to the topic  
The researcher found very little available research data in South Africa about the 
topic and the application of International air cargo security regulations.  
 
There was also a lack of research data describing in detail various organisations, 
acts, conventions, or regulations. The best information sources for such data were 
the websites of the relevant organisations, such as ICAO, TSA or SACAA. Hence the 
researcher had no option but to make use of websites as a primary information 
resource and the references are therefore directly linked to those websites. 
 
There were several reports about air cargo security from various countries, yet very 
little about the impact on the industry, either in South Africa or elsewhere. Most of 
the data gathered were from open sources or from the few research reports that 
were obtained. 
 
The researcher being ‘too familiar’ with respondents  
The researcher found that at times his professional previous relationship with some 
of the respondents played a role in the interview process. In some instances, it 
allowed an unrestricted open discussion, where candidates allowed themselves to 
express their views and opinions very openly; being completely unreserved and 
trusting the researcher who they knew would not betray such trust. In other cases, 
such familiarity led to both the researcher and the interviewee, straying from the 
subject. This sometimes led to interviews taking much longer than expected. 
However, both phenomena are viewed in a positive light, as only positive results 
were derived from those interviews. 
 
Issues relating to ‘too much information’ and going off track 
At times, some respondents were ‘running’ with the information. Their train of 
thought led to them giving too much information and at other times straying from the 
research topic. During the first few interviews, the researcher found it difficult to bring 
them back to the topic. As the researcher became more proficient in conducting the 
interviews, he learnt how to control the flow and tempo of the interview, allowing 
some lee-way, but bringing it back on track without insulting the interviewee or 
detracting from the respondent’s answer. 
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It was a fine balance between being a supporting interviewer and an unsupportive 
one that only cares about data. The human interaction in such cases was critical and 
the researcher hopes that the right balance was found with most of the interviews. 
  
Problems in transcribing interviews  
The researcher found it difficult at times to ask a question, listen attentively to the 
answer and write field notes all at the same time. This took some practice and as 
mentioned above, the first few interviews were difficult, yet once a system and 
pattern were found, the process became much easier and the researcher worked 
more efficiently. 
 
Moreover, all interviews were electronically recorded, which helped in the actual 
transcribing at a later stage of the answers and putting the results into specific 
topics. The actual transcribing of the answers, collation of data and reaching a clear 
outcome, also took time at the beginning, but after several attempts, a system 
emerged and the process became easier and flowed naturally. 
 
2.7 DATA/INFORMATION ANALYSES AND INTERPRETATION  
Creswell (1998:142-165) supposes that the progression of data analysis and 
explanation is best symbolised as a coiled image, or as the data analysis coil. The 
researcher moves in a continual systematic circle as opposed to taking a direct 
methodology.  
One enters the collected data, in this case text and ideas and on the other end he or 
she gets a detailed account. Along the way the researcher traces various aspects of 
examination, while encircling around in an upward motion towards a final product or 
conclusion. 
Emanating from the above the following steps were followed accordingly during the 
data collection and analysis process: 
 
1. Collection and chronicling of data – while interviewing the respondents, the 
researcher developed a systematic method of cataloguing the information for 
easy retrieval and analysis. 
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2. Managing the data – all collected data was managed appropriately and 
transcribed into word document, and saved in electronic format, tied to the 
actual recording of the interview. 
 
3. Reading, memorising and transcribing – while reading the transcribed data in 
combination with field notes, the researcher made further notes and 
commenced with theme identification process. 
 
4. Describing, classifying and interpreting - Marshall and Rossman (1995: 114) 
claim that this is the most challenging, multifaceted, equivocal, imaginative 
and gratifying stage within the process. Creswell (1998:144) comments that 
classifying means breaking the text and the qualitative data into small pieces 
and exploring into which classifications, themes or scopes they all fit. This is 
where the actual analysis process takes place and the information is 
interrogated, broken into and put together again in a meaningful and clear 
manner. 
 
5. Representing in visual form – this is the last phase where the information is 
transformed into graphs, charts and tables for easy understanding and 
representation. 
 
According to O’Donoghue and Punch (2003: 78) triangulation is a “method of cross-
checking data from multiple sources to search for regularities in the research data". 
The respondents’ responses were triangulated, coded and computerised in order to 
categorise themes and ensure correct reading of results. At all times field notes were 
made during interviews, regarding respondents’ opinions. All interviews were also 
electronically recorded. Once transcribing commenced, the researchers compared 
his field notes, with the actual recordings made during the interviews, to ensure the 
validity and completeness of the information recorded and transcribed. 
 
Altrichter, Feldman, Posch and Somekh (2008: 147), contend that triangulation 
"gives a more detailed and balanced picture of the situation." Data triangulation was 
used on the data obtained during the interviews and correlating with literature review 
information.  
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When all data had been saved, codified and collated, it was then clustered into 
mutual subjects/categories fitting into and with literature review as well as interviews. 
Data collected from the different respondents was compared, as well as data gained 
as part of the literature review process with regard to international regulations, USA 
and EU regulations and authorities, comparison of screening methods and 
technology, best practice methods, procedures and regulations.  
 
The research approach was such that the researcher sought to come up with a 
scientific solution to the main research question of what was and still is the impact of 
the application of air cargo security regulations in South Africa. Accordingly, the data 
was analysed with the view of the possible impact of various factors on the air cargo 
industry, in terms of incidences or interference with air cargo, which have occurred in 
the recent past. The impact and effectiveness of various methods and forms of 
security technology were scrutinised and the relative effectiveness of various forms 
of cargo screening and security measures was also researched.  
 
A comparison was made between South African regulations to those of other 
jurisdictions, as questions were asked about the difference or similarities between 
the South African, USA and the EU efforts on security measures and regulations. 
The research explored whether such comparisons had any impact on current 
regulations. 
 
The findings are presented in the form of a report, illustrating the various dimensions 
of the study. The best way the researcher found to explain certain results, was to 
present such data in charts, either pie or column charts. This gives the reader both 
visual and explanatory results. The charts are coupled with detailed findings, reports, 
and recommendations, based on such findings. 
 
All the data collected during the research were collated, put into order, clustered into 
groups or information categories, and interpreted to make sense thereof. The data 
collected during interviews were coded and then entered into a Microsoft Excel and 
word programme for further statistical comparative analysis and data capturing. 
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All interviews were captured and recorded onto word documents without the name of 
the person interviewed mentioned. For each question, several key words/phrases or 
themes were identified and all relevant answers were grouped according to those 
key words/phrases or themes. Accordingly a pattern emerged from those answers, 
whereby the relevant data was then fed into an Excel Programme for further 
statistical analysis and simplified results were derived accordingly, allowing the 
mentioned charts to be created. 
 
The research target group  
 South African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA); 
 Department of Transport (DOT); 
 Airports Company South Africa (ACSA); 
 South African Police Service (SAPS) 
 South African Airways (SAA); 
 Aviation Co-ordination Services (ACS); 
 Various airlines (SAA, Lufthansa etc.); 
 Airlines associations (BARSA, AASA); 
 Various freight forward companies; and  
 Cargo handling companies. 
 
Note that the researcher sought permission from the SACAA to conduct this study. 
(Annexure A – Request from UNISA to the SACAA to conduct research). Approval to 
undertake and implement the research project was granted by the Director of the 
SACAA (see attached letter- Annexure B). Since the SACAA is the ultimate 
responsible state organ overseeing and controlling the aviation industry in general 
and air cargo security in particular, their approval to conduct this research has an 
overarching consent and therefore covers all companies and entities within the air 
cargo security industry. Once such permission was granted, all regulated companies 
within the industry, as well as all relevant state entities, the same overall consent 
was used as the basis for their voluntary participation as respondents in the study. 
For clarity sake, all Regulated agents and Known consignors, as well as screening 
companies, training companies and such are all regulated and under the SACAA 
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oversight, hence the SACAA approval is all the was required in terms or granting 
permission for this research project. 
2.8 VALUE OF THE RESEARCH AND ENSURING VALIDITY AND 
RELIABILITY 
2.8.1 Value of the research 
The value of this research rests with the fact that it will be an original study, the first 
study of its kind done on air cargo security in South Africa, as well as the first study 
to measure or explore the impact of a specific security regulation on a specific 
industry within the aviation security environment.  
 
While seeking to compare the South African regulations with USA and EU 
regulations, the researcher explored the benchmark that South Africa fits into, 
evaluating whether South Africa applies or makes use of international best practices. 
This research also examined the effectiveness of the SACAA in enforcing these 
regulations, as well as the compliance of various roleplayers. 
 
While exploring the impact these regulations had on the industry, various concerns, 
as well as positive comments were raised by the respondents. It is postulated by the 
researcher that these results and input will greatly assist the SACAA to evaluate its 
position and the effect the regulations had and are still having on the industry. 
Overall the research study provides a measuring tool or a benchmark, indicating 
where South Africa is currently positioned in respect of its air cargo security 
regulations. 
 
It is further put forward that all these elements greatly contribute to a better 
understanding of the air cargo industry in South Africa, thereby adding great value to 
the SACAA and various companies taking part in the air cargo supply chain.  
 
2.8.2  Ensuring validity and reliability 
Marshall and Rossman (1995: 143) observe that all research must correspond to 
standards, norms or canons that stand as criteria, against which the trustworthiness 
of the project can be evaluated. These canons can be phrased as questions to which 
all researchers must respond. 
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The prerequisites for internal validity and reliability, as considered by Welman and 
Kruger (1999: 100), were utilised throughout the research process. Every attempt 
was made to warrant that the study data gathered was authentic and precise at the 
same time as upholding all ethical matters.  
 
Significant attention was required in the choice of appropriate individuals to be 
interviewed. In this the Researcher followed the same approach as implemented by 
Schneider (200), namely:  
“The identical interview schedule of questions was utilised with each 
respondent without the interviewer (the Researcher in all instances) 
affecting the respondent's replies in any way, [either with] body language, 
pitch of voice or facial expressions or adversely communicated or guiding 
questions. [Moreover, efforts] were made to establish a comfortable 
interview setting whereby respondents were reassured to be candid and 
forthright in their replies. Every attempt was made to make the 
environment relaxed and non-confrontational (Schneider, 2005) 
 
Once permission to conduct the research was granted and the research 
information/data had been collected all the respondents’ information provided was 
crosschecked. Anonymity and confidentiality (protection of identity) of respondents 
were upheld at all times. The same standardised questions were asked of all the 
respondents. The questions were clear and understandable. In the interviews the 
researcher tried to avoid, as much as possible, the use of any biased and leading 
questions, inter alia by presenting clear and straightforward questions. All these 
factors assisted in ensuring the validity of the collected information. 
 
2.9  ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
The researcher obtained consent (permission) to undertake the research study from 
the relevant authorities, being the South African Civil Aviation Authority which in turn 
allowed all regulated companies to participate in this study, by virtue of the SACAA’s 
overall oversight role. The participation in the study was on a voluntary basis.  
All respondents signed the consent form (see Annexure D for the sample form). The 
researcher explained all pertinent issues as per form and all the respondents agreed 
to the content and returned consent forms in good time. 
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All the respondents were informed of the reason for the study and what it aimed to 
achieve. In the process, no respondents were harmed either physically or 
emotionally, since the researcher made sure to ask questions in a clear manner, with 
no judgments being made or any expressions of disputing or disagreeing with 
information provided by each respondent. All the information gathered was handled 
confidentially with the assurance of guaranteeing the anonymity of all the 
respondents. 
 
Once all the data was collected and analysed, the researcher wrote up the findings 
and recommendations as accurately and objectively as possible. 
The data collected was disseminated and collated without the person’s information, 
meaning the data was treated as in its “raw” form and then analysed accordingly. 
 
Another aspect of ethical considerations was the translation of data into percentage 
points rather than numerical representation by way of saying: ‘one or two responders 
out of 30 said….’. This was an extra measure ensuring complete anonymity of 
respondents. Since the industry is very small, that way of analysing or presenting the 
data may lead to wrong interpretation or possible mistaken identification of specific 
individuals based on such presentation of results, hence the use of percentages 
rather than specific numerical breakdown. 
The UNISA Code of Ethics was, as a matter of course, adhered to at all times in 
order to maintain the quality, confidentiality and anonymity. 
 
2.10  CONCLUSION 
This chapter dealt with the research methodology as used and applied by the 
researcher in the field. The research design and approach were discussed and 
explained. Data collection, the interviewing process, as well as the data analysis 
process were discussed in order to ensure validity and reliability. 
 
The researcher found the interview process to be very stimulating for both the 
interviewer and respondents, since several respondents commented that the 
questions asked during the interview, had made them re-think their strategies and 
measures currently in place.  
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The choice of a qualitative rather than a purely quantitative method was, in the 
opinion of the researcher, the correct choice with the in-depth, one-on-one interviews 
yielding detailed data and insights that would not be achieved by any other means. 
That fact that the researcher has a professional relationship with most of the 
respondents, as well as his professional background and experience in this field of 
expertise, greatly assisted to achieve the correct data input required.  
 
The fact that the researcher has been involved in the industry for the past ten years, 
also greatly assisted and simplified the process. The kind of information obtained 
and the unrestricted access and openness the researcher was granted, led to a 
better insight and an in-depth examination of the topic at hand. 
 
All challenges were handled in a timely and professional manner and in most cases, 
the simple solutions worked best and as the researcher became more proficient with 
the interview techniques, as well as data analysis, the process became more 
straightforward and quicker. Interview hints as per Seidman (1998: 63-77) and 
Holstein and Gubrium, (1995: 46-47) were considered and followed. 
 
The following three chapters emanate from parts of the literature review process and 
deal with the prevailing international legislation; Chapter 3 deals with the formation of 
ICAO and the establishment of ICAO’s various conventions and regulations. Chapter 
4 expands on the TSA as well as detailing USA and EU regulations. Chapter 5 then 
deals with the local South African regulations pertaining to air cargo security as well 
as explains in brief the threats to air cargo security. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (ICAO) AND 
INTERNATIONAL AVIATION SECURITY REGULATIONS 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will detail the foundation of the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO), as well as the development of its legal instruments, which impact on each 
member state. In the following chapters, the measures the USA, the EU and South 
Africa took to comply with such framework will be explored. 
 
The South African regulations, as well as the USA and the EU regulations will be 
examined and compared, thereafter the following chapters will also touch on some of 
the events that caused shifts in legislation. When both the international legal 
framework and the threats to AVSEC in general and those coming via air cargo 
security are understood, can the approach that South Africa took in promulgation of 
its own rules and regulations in respect of air cargo security be fully appreciated. The 
impact, which such regulations had and continue to have on the freight industry in 
South Africa, will then be explored. 
 
In order to fully comprehend the current international legal framework in relation to 
aviation and cargo security, the root causes that necessitated these international and 
national rules and regulations need to be explored.  
 
According to Buzdugan (2005: 3), in the wake of the 11 September 2001 (commonly 
referred to as 9/11) attacks on the USA, there occurred an “overemphasis on 
passenger air travel security, [with] …the air cargo system [potentially becoming] the 
prime focus for terrorists” because of the perceived ‘softer’ security measures 
applied to the latter. As a result governments have implemented both technological 
and operational actions using diverse regulatory methodologies. These methods are 
aimed at tackling the apparent security risks in the air cargo industry. 
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For example, an event such as the 11 of September 2001 attacks leads to changes 
and new develops in terms of such laws. An event in the USA or in South Africa will 
have a similar global effect on the approach that AVSEC experts take in drafting 
laws to counter such events from reoccurring. 
 
3.2  INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK  
Currently a number of international conventions and treaties regulate the various 
security measures and standards for the inspection of all cargo goods and the 
movement of air travellers. These are largely governed and overseen by 
international organisations affiliated to the United Nations (Minnaar 2003:12). 
 
For air ports-of-entry the applicable organisation is the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO). There are a number of conventions applicable to ICAO. These 
typically set out the compulsory regulatory frameworks and standards to which 
international airports must adhere to if they seek recognition and certification as 
international entry and exit points (Minnaar, 2003: 12). 
 
3.3  INTERNATIONAL AVIATION AND CARGO SECURITY  
According to Minnaar (2003: 12), governments have since the early years of air 
travel found international aviation security to be somewhat problematic. In 1910 the 
very first conference “for the creation of an international air code law” took place in 
Paris (Minnaar, 2003: 12). After World War I, aviation quickly advanced technically 
and the era of international air travel begun. However, governments soon realised 
that air travel needed to be planned and organised on an international level.  
 
According to Minnaar (2003: 13), at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference 26 of the 32 
Allied and Associated Powers supported the first International Air Convention. This 
Convention also established the International Commission for Air Navigation (ICAN) 
which was mandated to: “overseer developments in civil aviation”. However, after 
only slow growth in international air travel in the inter-war period World War II 
provided the impetus for renewed growth and development. In November 1944, an 
International Civil Aviation Conference was hosted by the USA in Chicago. It was at 
this conference that the Convention on International Civil Aviation (the so-called 
Chicago Convention) was drafted and endorsed by 32 states (Minnaar, 2003: 13). 
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This Convention was the first comprehensive international aviation regulatory 
framework dealing with “all aspects of civil aviation from passenger safety to 
technical aspects of flying” (Minnaar, 2003: 13). In addition, it put in place the 
permanent International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) which came into 
operation in April 1947. Furthermore, in October 1947 ICAO became a specialised 
agency of the UN linked to the Economic and Social Council (UN ECOSOC). The 
main objective of ICAO being to secure “international co-operation and the highest 
possible degree of uniformity in regulations and standards, procedures and 
organisations relating to civil aviation matters” (Minnaar, 2003: 13). 
 
3.4  INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANISATION (ICAO) 
According to Minnaar (2003:13) the early work of ICAO dealt mainly with “technical 
matters ranging from air traffic control to international air navigation, registration, and 
aeronautical maps and charts”. At a later stage aircraft and passenger safety 
became included in its technical responsibilities. With reference to this aspect was 
the “inspection of goods and baggage …required to protect aeroplanes in flight from 
carrying dangerous goods like explosives, which might pose a threat to air safety” 
Minnaar, 2003: 13).  
 
The International Standards and Recommended Practices, Security (Safeguarding 
International Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference) document, labelled 
as Annexure 17 of the Chicago Convention, specifies the safety processes 
necessary at any airport, inter alia “securing of the apron area, boarding gates and 
baggage handling areas, and baggage and passenger screening functions” 
(Minnaar, 2003: 13). 
 
As a signatory to the Chicago Convention, South Africa set up its own Civil Aviation 
Authority (CAA) making it the responsible agency to regulate all operators at any 
airport nominated as an international port of entry and ensure they comply with all 
Annexure 17 security requirements and safety measures. These standards apply to 
all airport users, namely: “airlines, maintenance and technical staff, caterers and 
agents or freight forwarders” (Minnaar, 2003: 13). 
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3.5  INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANISATION INITIATIVES 
The central aim of ICAO, as a specialised agency of the UN, is outlined in the 
preamble to the Chicago Convention, namely: “the future development of 
international civil aviation can greatly help to create and preserve friendship and 
understanding among nations and peoples of the world, yet its abuse can become a 
threat to general security” (Buzdugan, 2005: 15). 
 
According to Buzdugan (2005: 15) under the Convention, a major objective of ICAO 
is to “ensure the safe and orderly growth of international civil aviation throughout the 
world” and to “meet the needs of the peoples of the world for safe... air transport.” 
Accordingly, a core responsibility of ICAO is the international regulating of a variety 
of technical aspects of international civil aviation, particular providing support for the 
total safety and security of all air travel in the civil domain (Fitzgerald, 1976: 47 & 
52). 
 
At the 1944 Chicago Conference, those governments attending had also made a 
decision that technical standards needed to be harmonised internationally. As a 
result ICAO was duly authorised draft and set standards. For example: the licensing 
of aircraft, airworthiness certification, registration of aircraft, international operating 
standards, and airways and communications controls (Buzdugan, 2005: 15).  
 
According to Dr Michael Milde, former head of ICAO’s Legal Bureau, the Chicago 
Convention created ICAO as “an international organization with wide quasi-
legislative and executive powers in the technical regulatory field and with only 
consultative and advisory functions in the economic sphere.” (Milde, 1984: 119). 
 
Since its foundation, ICAO has implemented a number of International Standards 
and Recommended Practices (SARPS), standardising safety, security, and 
navigation in air transportation. The ICAO standards are obligatory, unless a 
signatory formally indicates their inability to implement them, and all are encouraged 
to act in accordance with these practices for their overall advantage for the optimal 
functioning of an international system of standards in civil aviation (Giemulla & 
Weber, 2011: 14). 
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According to Abeyratne (2010: 16), a number of additional conventions dealing in 
more detail with the more recent threats to aviation security, namely: hijacking and 
terrorism, were implemented under the auspices of ICAO. These are the Tokyo 
Convention (1963), The Hague Convention (1970); The Montreal Convention of 
1971, The Montreal Protocol of 1988, (which expands on the provisions of the 1971 
Montreal Convention) and the most recent one, the Montreal Convention of 1991 
(this one is most relevant to this study’s focus in that it lays out the instructions for 
the prevention of the “manufacture, possession and movement of unmarked 
explosives” (Abeyratne, 2010: 237). [All these will be discussed in more detail 
below]. 
 
Although these Conventions are seen as “major legal tools in addressing terrorist 
acts against aviation” they are only applicable to signatory member states. A number 
of the 188 ICAO member states have failed to ratify all of them, “particularly the 
convention on plastic explosives” (Abeyratne, 2010: 237). 
 
In the aftermath of the 1983 shooting down by Soviet fighter planes of Korean 
Airlines Flight 007, ICAO implemented Article 3bis. This article “prohibits the use of 
weapons against civilian aircraft as a codification of customary law” (Trapp, 2011: 
168).  
 
A major step forward in aviation security was the adoption in 1974 by ICAO of 
Annexure 17 to the Chicago Convention. Annexure 17 (usually shortened to Annex 
17) draw on several of the requirements of the Tokyo, Hague and (both) Montreal 
conventions. In addition, Annexure 17 made it obligatory for signatory states to set 
up a government agency for to regulate a “national civil aviation security program, 
with the aim to prevent the presence of weapons, explosives, or other dangerous 
devices aboard aircraft.” Annexure 17 requires, inter alia, the “checking, and 
screening of aircraft, passengers, baggage, cargo and mail” (Abeyratne, 2010: 217, 
230 & 237). 
 
A further comprehensive review of the above-mentioned conventions follows in the 
sections below. 
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3.5.1  The Tokyo Convention 
The Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft 
(branded as the Tokyo Convention since it was signed in Tokyo, Japan, on 14 
September 1963) and came into effect on 4 December 1969. This convention (ICAO 
1963) stipulates that “the state of registry is competent to exercise jurisdiction over 
offenses committed aboard an aircraft when it is in flight, on the surface of the high 
seas, or in any other area outside the territory of any state” (Alemán, 2008: 68).  
 
The Tokyo Convention was initially envisioned to address offences committed on 
board an airliner in general, and did not centre specifically on hijacking. The value of 
this Convention was to place the airplane (that might have been hijacked in another 
country) under the jurisdiction of the State where an airline is registered for any 
offences (including hijacking) committed on-board an aircraft wherever such offences 
are committed. Furthermore, according to Article 11 of the Tokyo Convention, the 
country in which a hijacked airliner is forced to land – if a signatory to the Convention 
– is obliged to “take all appropriate measures to restore control of the aircraft to its 
lawful commander”, to “permit its passengers and crew to continue their journey as 
soon as practicable” and then to ensure the safe return of the airplane and its freight 
to the lawful owners/company as soon as possible (Abeyratne, 2010: 217-221).  
 
However, the Convention applies only “to offenses committed by a person who is on 
board the aircraft, thereby omitting acts or offenses committed by persons such as 
saboteurs who remain on the ground” (Alemán, 2008: 68). 
 
According to Abeyratne (2010: 223) the Tokyo Convention fully recognised the 
difficulties of identifying all the threats to the security of an aircraft, but was criticised 
from various quarters for not having included a far more comprehensive approach to 
address all the potential threats to aircraft security. Nor did the Convention outline a 
clearer obligation by signatories to prosecute or extradite offender(s). Article 16 of 
the Convention also clearly stipulated that there was no duty or compulsion on a 
signatory state to extradite a hijacker. It was also notable that the Convention did not 
pronounce hijacking as an international crime/offence. 
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In addition, the Tokyo Convention's relevance is “limited to unlawful acts committed 
on board an airplane ‘in flight’, and covers only acts committed when all its external 
doors [of an aircraft] are closed following embarkation until the moment when any 
such door is opened for disembarkation” (Abeyratne 2010: 226). Accordingly implied 
in this omission is that an “act of sabotage that occurs prior to the departure of the 
aircraft does not fall within” the scope of the provisions of the Tokyo Convention 
(Abeyratne 2010: 227). Nonetheless, despite its limitations, the Tokyo Convention 
put forward the legitimate basis for ensuing inter-state agreements for dealing with 
incidents of air hijacking (Abeyratne 2010: 226-228). 
 
3.5.2  The Hague Convention 
The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (The Hague 
Convention), (ICAO 1970) which is also known as the ‘Hijacking Convention’, was 
signed in The Hague on 16 December 1970, and came into force on 14 October 
1971. In effect the Hague Convention was ICAO’s response to the spate of terrorist 
attacks against aircraft in the late 1960s. It was also an attempt to classify and define 
these as unlawful actions (international criminalisation) (Abeyratne, 2010: 230).  
 
The Hague Convention described the unlawful seizure of aircraft “as a separate 
offense.” It further obligates signatory states “to punish or to extradite offenders and 
also provides for coexisting jurisdiction over the offenses covered and makes these 
offenses punishable by severe penalties” (Alemán, 2008: 69). In other words joint 
jurisdiction for prosecution would reside in the country where an airline is registered 
and with the country where the offence occurred or the aircraft “with the offender still 
on board” landed (Alemán, 2008: 69). 
 
This Convention was a significant breakthrough in the combatting of aircraft hijacking 
while simultaneously making the “unlawful seizure of an aircraft by force or threat 
thereof or by any other means of intimidation …an international offense” [sic] – a 
term considerably ‘weaker’ than the inserter the term ‘international crime.’ However, 
the most significant new emphasis in the Hague Convention was that of making the 
prosecution or extradition of offenders a compulsory compliance for all signatory 
States (Abeyratne, 2010: 232). 
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In addition, the Hague Convention placed an additional three core obligations on 
signatory States. Firstly, they were compelled to make in their national legislation the 
offence – as defined in the Convention – punishable by “severe penalties”. Secondly, 
that signatory States had to formally claim their jurisdictional authority over the 
committed offence(s) since it was not automatically established by the Convention. 
Such jurisdictional authority was applicable only to the following States: “…the State 
of registration of the aircraft; …the State in which the aircraft lands with the offender 
on board; [and] the State of the principal place of business or permanent residence 
of the lessee of the aircraft” (Abeyratne, 2010: 232). Finally, if a signatory State 
makes a decision “not to extradite the offender, it must prosecute [the offender] in 
the same manner as it would for any offense of a[n equivalent] serious [criminal] 
nature within [such] State” (Abeyratne, 2010: 232).  
 
Abeyratne (2010: 236), also mentions that by compelling signatory States to either 
prosecute or extradite, the intention of the Hague Convention was clearly to 
encourage signatories to introduce criminal proceedings against hijackers, which 
would then thereby hopefully reduce the number of ‘safe haven’ countries 
(Abeyratne, 2010: 236).  
 
The Hague Convention has been criticised for its failure to unpack in greater detail 
the term ‘severe penalties’. In effect this would mean the application of differing 
penalties according to each signatory State’s internal legislation. Accordingly, the 
Convention was not able to set a uniform structure of offender prosecution and 
standard set of penalties or sanctions. In addition, the Convention did not deal with 
the issue of pre-flight acts of terrorism (Abeyratne, 2010: 236).  
 
3.5.3  Montreal Convention of 1972 and the Montreal Protocol of 1988  
In 1971, in an effort to remedy the identified shortcomings in The Hague Convention, 
as well as in response to the rise in acts of sabotage against aircraft, ICAO drafted 
and submitted to all signatory States the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (also known as the Montreal Convention or 
the ‘Sabotage’ Convention (ICAO, 1971). This particular Convention, signed in 
Montreal, Canada, on 23 September 1971, came into force on 26 January 1973. 
(Abeyratne, 2010: 237). 
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The Montreal Convention treaty deals with sabotage and armed attacks against 
international civil aviation facilities and compels signatories to comply to the same 
set of responsibilities and actions as for The Hague Convention stipulated offence/ 
international crime of hijacking, namely strict penalties/sanctions, extradition, 
jurisdictional competency) (Alemán, 2008: 69). 
 
Furthermore, the Montreal Convention of 1971 focuses on a number of issues 
regarding airport security and pre-flight sabotage of an aircraft, inter alia the following 
to be offences:  
 
 “Acts of violence probable to compromise the safety of an aircraft”; 
 “Destruction of or severe impairment to an aircraft or air navigation facilities”; 
and  
 “Communication of false information that threatens the safety of an aircraft” 
(ICAO, 1971) 
 
According to Buzdugan (2005: 20), in various matters, the Montreal Convention of 
1971 is comparable to the Hague Convention. For example, under both conventions, 
signatory States are compelled to severely sanction (punish with penalties) the 
offences as defined in this (and preceding conventions) and must take “such 
measures as are necessary” to establish their authority (jurisdiction) over the 
offenders and the punishable offence (Buzdugan, 2005: 20).  
 
The Montreal Convention, similarly to the Hague Convention, was criticised for its 
lack of clarity and for not distinctly describing the meaning, applicability and 
enforcement of the terms: ‘severe penalties’ that are stipulated for application to 
prosecuted and convicted perpetrators of aircraft hijackings (and other offences 
against civil aviation) (Buzdugan, 2005: 20). Furthermore, the use of the terms 
‘severe penalties’ did not in either of the Conventions imply compulsory prosecution 
or extradition, but rather only an “obligation to present the case to the appropriate 
authorities [and that they] …decide, at their discretion, whether prosecution is 
appropriate”. With reference to ‘prosecution of extradited offenders’ there was clearly 
no standardisation across the various signatory state jurisdictions. Furthermore, the 
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lack of a binding definition of the term ‘severe penalties’ has allowed, in some cases, 
certain States to side-step and not apply ‘severe punishment(s)’ to detained 
hijackers (Abeyratne, 2010:241). 
 
After a series of bombings that occurred at the Frankfurt, Tokyo, Rome, Munich and 
Vienna airports, ICAO adopted the ‘Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of 
Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation’. 
This addendum Convention further extended the provisions of the 1971 Hague 
Convention directly to the physical site of airports. This new Convention made it a 
punishable offence internationally of any sabotage or act of deliberate damage to 
facilities perpetrated at airport sites worldwide (Abeyratne, 2010: 242). 
 
3.5.4  The Montreal Convention of 1991  
Resulting from the bombing, caused by plastic explosives concealed in hold luggage, 
of the Pan Am Flight 103 that occurred over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988, the UN 
Security Council approved Resolution 635 of 14 June 1989. This UN Resolution 
called on ICAO “to intensify its work... on devising an international regime for the 
marking of plastic and sheet explosives for the purpose of detection” (Milde, 1995: 
157).  
 
Soon after this ‘ultimatum’ ICAO, in 1991, had submitted to its member States a draft 
of a new convention, the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the 
Purpose of Detection (ICAO, 1991). On 1 March 1991 this Convention was signed in 
Montreal, Canada, and on 21 June 1998. According to this Convention the signatory 
States were required to take “necessary and effective measures” to prevent the 
manufacturing of “unmarked” plastic explosives, and to implement the required 
controls “over the ownership and movement of such explosives and destroy current 
stocks”. The drafters of the Convention decided not to include a classification of 
‘plastic explosives’ in the main body of the instrument but to place such classification 
definitions in an annexure (Abeyratne, 2010: 253). Accordingly, the Montreal 
Convention of 1991 requires “each state to prohibit and prevent the manufacture of 
unmarked plastic explosives in its territory. Plastic explosives are to be marked 
during the manufacturing process by introducing any one of the four detection agents 
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agreed upon by the international air law conference and defined in the technical 
annexure to this convention” (Alemán, 2008: 69). 
 
This Convention signified an advance in terms of the advancement of international 
law, since it placed a clear obligation on ICAO member States not to produce 
unmarked plastic explosives unless they were ‘marked’ formally by a government 
representative at a registered manufacturing facility. Additionally, the Convention 
provided for a very adaptable method for amending the requirements inserted into 
the annexure while simultaneously recognising the sovereign rights of member 
States (Abeyratne, 2010: 257). 
 
Without denying its value for being the first covenant to regulate the manufacturing 
and export/import of plastic explosives, this Convention was criticised for not 
delivering an all-inclusive resolution to a very real risk and threat (use of 
unmarked/unregistered plastic explosives for bombing civilian aircraft) but did 
represent a first step enacting into international law a legal measure to combat this 
threat (Abeyratne, 2010: 261). 
 
3.6  ANNEXURES TO THE CHICAGO CONVENTION  
This section will discuss some of the additions, in response to certain subsequent 
events, to the 1944 Chicago Convention, in the form of the added specialised 
annexures to supplement the regulations of this Convention.  
 
3.6.1  Annexure 17  
The most significant legislative function implemented by ICAO was the creation and 
implementation of the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) for 
international civil aviation. These are assimilated into the eighteen (18) technical 
annexures to the Chicago Convention (Convention on International Civil Aviation). 
These annexures emphasise the “methods [to be used to avert] and suppress all 
acts of unlawful interference against civil aviation throughout the world” (ICAO, 
2011). In March 1974 the ICAO Council adopted the international aviation safety and 
security SARPs - titled ‘Safeguarding International Civil Aviation Against Acts of 
Unlawful Interference’ (ICAO, 2011).  
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The most comprehensive and important of the Safeguarding International Civil 
Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference SARPs was the annexure [17] 
designated simply as ‘Security’. The series of 1972 terrorist attacks on aircraft had 
prompted the ICAO Council to implement Annexure 17 (Buzdugan, 2005: 23). 
 
The primary purpose of Annexure 17 is to provide civil aviation authorities/agencies 
in member countries with an inclusive document detailing required standards and 
recommended practices and procedures dealing with all aspects of aviation security 
(Alemán, 2008: 69). 
 
3.6.2  Annexure 17: Air cargo security standards and recommended practices 
According to Milde (2008: 245), Annexure 17 reiterates and expands particular ICAO 
member state obligations and procedures as outlined in the Tokyo, Hague, and 
Montreal Conventions. According to this annexure, every Member State of ICAO 
must provide for the protection of passengers and crew in their own jurisdictions up 
until such aircraft flies out of the county’s airspace. Furthermore a member state 
must “detain any unlawfully seized aircraft that has landed in its territory, unless its 
departure must be permitted by the obligation to protect human life” (Milde, 2008: 
245). There is also an obligation that a member state should inform with immediate 
effect ICAO and the country where such aircraft is registered that it has been illegally 
seized. Any State whose citizens are also on board and may have been injured or 
killed or held hostage, must also be informed accordingly (Milde, 2008: 245). 
 
In addition, Annexure 17 recommends that member states implement all of the 
following: “precautionary procedures for aircraft, airports, passengers, baggage, 
cargo and mail… [and] …criteria and requirements for security personnel and 
responsive processes to acts of unlawful interference”. It also requires that each 
Member State has “as its primary objective the safety of passengers, crew, ground 
personnel and the general public in all matters related to safeguarding against acts 
of unlawful interference with civil aviation” (Milde, 2008: 247). 
 
Annexure 17 further imposes on all Member States the development of a National 
Civil Aviation Security Programme and the creation of a governmental organisation 
committed to aviation security. Such agency to develop and implement appropriate 
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regulations. In addition, Member States must develop “a security-training platform, 
share aviation threat information, and otherwise co-operate with other [ICAO 
Member] States on their national security programmes” (Milde, 2008: 247). 
 
In ICAO’s meaning ‘security’ represents “a combination of measures, both human 
and material resources intended to safeguard civil aviation against acts of unlawful 
interference.” (European Union (EU), 2008).  
 
Also, under its General Principles, Annexure 17 includes a heading: “Security and 
facilitation” containing a recommendation for each State to organise, “whenever 
possible, for the security controls and procedures to cause a minimum of 
interference with, or delay to the activities of, civil aviation, provided the effectiveness 
of these controls and procedures is not compromised” (Buzdugan, 2005: 24). 
 
3.6.3  Specific cargo issues as addressed in Annexure 17 
There are several standards and recommended practices focusing on air cargo 
security included in Annexure 17 specifically focused on “preventing explosives or 
incendiary devices from being loaded on board aircraft, either through concealment 
in otherwise legal consignments or through gaining access to aircraft via cargo 
handling areas”. Accordingly ICAO Member States are compelled to protect all 
“cargo, baggage, mail, and operator’s materials being moved within an airport” 
(Buzdugan, 2005: 24). 
 
Additionally, Member States are required to operate within an acceptable security 
framework in order to apply suitable controls for all “cargo, baggage, mail, 
…intended for carriage on passenger flights and to warrant that operators do not 
accept consignments of cargo on passenger flights unless their security has been 
accounted for by a ‘regulated agent’ or that they are subjected to other security 
controls” (Buzdugan, 2005: 24-25). 
 
According to Annexure 17, a ‘regulated agent’ is defined as “[a]n agent, freight 
forwarder, or any other entity that conducts business with an operator and provides 
security controls that are accepted or required by the appropriate authority in respect 
of cargo, courier and express parcels or mail.” (ICAO, 2011). 
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In order to provide practical guidance to Member States for the implementation of 
more national aviation security programmes, ICAO drafted comprehensive 
procedures for air cargo security that were simultaneously cost-effective and 
practical. These were based on three core principles, namely:  
 
1. “Imperative for aircraft to have secure operational conditions”. 
 
2. “The subjection of every consignment to security controls allied to optimal 
attention given to the screening of cargo that is not easily accessed (able to be 
opened or viewed) prior to being loaded onto a passenger aircraft”; and  
 
3. “Protection from interference of security-cleared cargo” (Trelawny, 2000: 22). 
 
The appropriate security measures may be divided into two categories: active 
procedures for cargo clearance (e.g., use of X-ray equipment, hand searches, 
various detectors and sniffer dogs to identify and find any explosive devices that may 
have been hidden in cargo), and preventive measures, aimed at eliminating the 
placement into cargo of any dangerous devices or prohibited (hazardous) materials 
(Trelawny, 2000: 22). 
 
The main reasoning for preventative security measures is that if the shipment was 
packed in a protected environment and is subsequently kept secure (protected from 
any interference), there is no need to examine it. That packing has occurred in a 
secure environment is usually accepted (certified) if done under the supervision of 
regular consignors, in conjunction with inspections by a regulated agent, that have a 
history of compliance with all the required Annexure 17 security measures 
(Trelawny, 2000: 22). 
 
ICAO recommends frequent monitoring of such security systems by both the airline 
operator and the regulated agent by means of unplanned checks and inspections on 
cargo that has been security cleared. This to be done particularly to establish 
whether the information specified in the cargo goods consignment documentation is 
correct. If any anomalies or inconsistencies are found, the consignment should then 
be comprehensively screened or be opened, and if necessary unpacked and 
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physically searched. How much cargo is to be searched at random would obviously 
depend upon the level of identified risk or perceived (Buzdugan, 2005: 26). 
 
While aircraft operators usually take responsibility for implementing cargo security 
measures this can be delegated (permissible under the ICAO Cargo Security 
Programme) to regulated agents. In addition, if such delegation occurs the regulated 
agents must also by monitored by means of inspections and supervision by the 
national civil aviation agency in a country. This implies that such regulated agents 
must also then in turn certify the security measures being practised by their clients 
(consignors) (Trelawny, 2000: 22). 
 
3.6.4  Air cargo facilitation standards and recommended practices:  
 Annexure 9  
Annexure 9 of the Chicago Convention sets out the recommended procedures for air 
cargo entering and exiting a country.  
 
A particular emphasis in Annexure 9 is the free (unrestrained and uninterrupted) 
movement of air cargo (i.e. facilitating interruption avoidance). Annexure 9 also 
stipulates that signatory States consult with air carriers and other parties involved 
when regulations and procedures are implemented or modified to ease and smooth 
the clearance of goods carried by air (Buzdugan, 2005: 27). 
 
There are three main categories or classifications with reference to clearance of 
cargo procedures and practices, namely: 
 
1. “Cargo inspection”;  
2. “A focus on information required by public authorities”; and, 
3. “Streamlining of customs procedures” (Buzdugan, 2005: 27). 
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3.7  SECURITY MANUAL FOR SAFEGUARDING CIVIL AVIATION AGAINST 
ACTS OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE  
The Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful 
Interference (Document 8973 – Restricted) provides guidelines for signatory States 
when implementing the Annexure 17 SARPs.  
 
This Security Manual, first released in 1971, was developed by an ICAO Secretariat 
study group drawn from various international organisations, namely: the International 
Air Transport Association (IATA); the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ 
Associations (IFALPA); the Airports Council International (ACI); and the International 
Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) (Alemán, 2008: 72). 
 
Both Annexure 17 and the Security Manual (Document 8973) are regularly evaluated 
and modified taking into account any new emerging threats, identified new risks and 
also technological developments that might impact on aviation security. 
 
The Seventh Edition of Document 8973 (2010), contains five volumes, namely: 
 
1. National organisation and administration 
Outlines steps for developing a national legal framework and supervision 
accountabilities with reference to aviation security, inter alia international 
collaboration; implementing national civil aviation security and quality control 
programmes; protocols for information sharing and protection an even the use of 
in-flight security officers and armed personnel;  
 
2. Recruitment, selection and training 
This volume deals with selection, recruitment, training development, training and 
certification of aviation security personnel as executed under a national training 
policy and a national civil aviation security training programme (included in such 
programmes is the selection and training of non-security personnel as well).  
 
3. Airport security, organisation, programme and design requirements 
This volume is applicable in terms of organisational requirements for airport 
operators (and any one responsible for the design of airport infrastructure).  
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4. Preventive security measures  
This volume describes how security measures are to be implemented by security 
personnel and security operators (of for example equipment) with regard to 
facility/building access control, passengers and cabin baggage security 
screening, hold baggage, cargo and mail and security measures extended to 
aircraft operators (it even outlines how to deal with potentially unruly 
passengers).  
 
5. Crisis management and response to acts of unlawful interference  
This outlines, for all accountable persons/entities (agency/authority, airport and 
aircraft operators), the plans in terms of disaster/crisis management and 
emergency response. This volume also offers advice regarding “threat and risk 
assessment, contingency plans, collection and transmission of information during 
an act of unlawful interference, [and for the resulting] review, analysis and 
reporting of any act of unlawful interference” (ICAO, 2011a). 
 
3.8 CONCLUSION 
This chapter described in some detail the global drive and initiatives taken over the 
past decades to protect civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference. Once the 
risks faced by the international air travel industry were clearly understood, various 
conventions, and practical guidelines were formulated and implemented. The 
realisation that terrorism could target citizens of every state, just by virtue of their 
location on a specific flight or airport, led to these global regulations. 
 
The global and far reaching consequences of a single successful attack also played 
a role in the drafting of these regulations. There was a sharp decline in travel after 
9/11 and similar such incidents, with the public reacting to the loss of life resulting 
from such attacks, by avoiding what was perceived as more risky air travel. 
 
These regulations are not final and are constantly evolving and being added to as 
risk and threat reviews are implemented by various agencies. The challenges all 
jurisdictions and agencies face are ever changing and the hope exists, that more 
proactive measures rather than reactive ones are put into place. It would appear that 
ICAO is rather slow in responding, and for lack of a better word, appear ‘soft’ in 
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creating or updating the various protocols. The more ‘aggressive’ approach that, for 
instance the USA or Israel employ, may be a better way to look at the appropriate 
countering of potential terror attacks, as it is more risk based. 
 
In the following chapters the application of these regulations will be detailed, since 
ICAO set the global minimum standards, which each state is allowed to exceed.  
 
The next chapter will also explore the regulations in the USA and the EU, as well as 
the co-operation between these two jurisdictions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA) AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) 
SPECIFIC REGULATIONS AND REGULATORY BODIES FOR CARGO 
SECURITY 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The following chapter will describe the initiatives, regulations and controlling 
agencies overseeing and implementing aviation and cargo security in the United 
States of America (USA) and the European Union (EU). 
 
Seen as the leading voices and trendsetters, the USA and the EU are in the forefront 
of the global fight against terrorism and acts of unlawful interference with civil 
aviation, as such they set strict rules and regulations which impact on the destination 
countries into which their airlines fly.  
 
In order to compare South African regulations to those of the USA and the EU, it is 
important to understand their respective regulations. 
 
4.2  AIR SECURITY REGULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES  
As a result of a number of civil/commercial aviation incidents, notably the bombing in 
1983 of Pan Am Flight 103 and 9/11, the United States emerged as the leading 
promoter for more stringent aviation and air cargo security measures (Buzdugan, 
2005: 60). 
 
These intensified concerns led, in 1990, to the passing of the US Aviation Security 
Improvement Act (Price & Forrest, 2008: 101). This law mandated the US Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA), which at the time was mostly accountable for 
oversight of civil aviation security, to undertake the investigation and analysis of any 
identified weaknesses in the whole US civil aviation system. With the additional 
focus on air cargo security the FAA also needed to formulate and find applicable and 
efficient methods of explosives’ detection by screening as much baggage and cargo 
as feasibly possible (Price & Forrest, 2008: 101 & 224). 
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The 1996 crashes of ValueJet flight 592 and TWA flight 800 had also initially led to 
the establishment on 22 August 1996 of the White House Commission on Aviation 
Safety and Security (known as the Gore Commission) to evaluate any identified 
vulnerabilities in commercial aviation (Buzdugan, 2005: 61). One of the proposals 
put forward in this Commission’s final report (released on 19 February 1997) was 
that the FAA implement an all-inclusive approach to tackle the threat of explosives 
and other potentially dangerous devices being placed in cargo. Allied to this proposal 
was that the FAA collaborate with the whole aviation industry in order to develop new 
initiatives for cargo security (for example, full body-scan machines). To assist and 
drive these initiatives forward the FAA established the Baseline Working Group and 
the Cargo Working Group, in order to study ways to improve air cargo security 
(Sweet, 2009: 284). 
 
4.3  THE AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT (ATSA)  
The disastrous terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on targets in the US re-
introduced national interest in aviation security and led to robust regulatory 
responses. In November 2001 The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) 
was passed. This Act removed responsibility for aviation security from the FAA and 
transferred it to the newly established agency, the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA). The Act more pertinently mandated a federal workforce (taking 
such responsibility away from local and state personnel) of security screeners to 
undertake all screening and inspections of incoming and outgoing airline passengers 
and their baggage at all US airports (Elias, 2009: 74). 
 
In terms of air cargo security, ATSA also mandated the TSA to screen all cargo and 
baggage taken on board any commercial passenger aircraft. In addition, ATSA 
stipulated that the TSA had to draw up a strategic security plan for the screening and 
inspecting of cargo carried on all-cargo aircraft (Elias, 2009: 93).  
 
This growing concern regarding all-cargo security was outlined in the strategic 
document, Vision 100. This strategy extended “armed federal flight deck officers 
programme to include all-cargo pilots” (Elias, 2009: 64). In addition, the National 
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 incorporated several stipulations focusing on cargo 
security, inter alia the setting up of a trial programme to test “the deployment of blast 
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resistant cargo containers, and for the encouragement of the development and use 
of improved more effective air cargo security technology” (Buzdugan, 2005: 62). The 
NIRA also required the US intelligence agencies to be involved in the analysis and 
intelligence risk appraisal of international air cargo threats (Buzdugan, 2005: 62). 
 
In May 2003, another significant development in terms of air cargo security, was the 
approval of the US Air Cargo Security Improvement Act by the US Senate (Price & 
Forrest, 2008: 26). One of the foci of this Act was passenger aircraft cargo security. 
This stipulation compelled TSA to draw up a strategy that would ensure the 
screening, inspection and securing of all air cargo going on board any flight, 
especially commercial passenger flights. Included in this strategy was the 
implementation of a “system of regular inspection of air cargo transport facilities and 
a security training of all persons handling air cargo”. Furthermore, “all cargo 
operators/carriers were required to have written” security policies that also had to be 
submitted to the TSA for certification (acceptance and approval) (Elias, 2003: 1).  
 
In November 2003, the TSA rolled out their new ‘Air Cargo Strategic Plan’. According 
to Buzdugan (2005: 62), this plan was a “multi-phased, risk-managed approach to 
[strengthen] air cargo security throughout the [entire] supply chain.” The Plan aimed 
at “the screening of all cargo shipments in order to determine their level of relative 
risk”; …working [closely] with industry and other federal agencies to ensure that [all] 
items that are [deemed to be] of high risk are inspected; …developing and deploying 
new information and technology solutions, [and] …implementing operational and 
regulatory programs that support heightened air cargo security measures” 
(Buzdugan, 2005: 62).  
 
In order to achieve these goals, the TSA’s strategy focused on four major 
components, namely:  
 
1. “Consolidating and strengthening the ‘Known Shipper Programme’;  
 
2. “Establishing cargo pre-screening procedures that allow [for the] identification 
of risk cargo through pre-screening and confirming that 100 percent of it is 
inspected”;  
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3. “Initiating “research and development programmes for air cargo”, and 
 
4. “Partnering with stakeholders to implement supplementary measures such as 
improved background checks on persons with access to cargo and new 
measures for securing aircraft between flights” (Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA), 2012). 
 
4.4  THE ‘KNOWN SHIPPER’ PROGRAMME  
The Gore Commission of 1996 was also delegated the task of developing the 
concept of a ‘known consignor’ (Buzdugan, 2005: 68). Accordingly the FAA had 
drafted a detailed ‘Known Shipper’ Programme that required air carriers and freight 
forwarders to check on the security measures of known recurrent customers. 
Included was the FAA Strategy for handling cargo from both known and unknown 
shippers. A known shipper was considered as a person having a “proven standing of 
compliance and thus is ‘known’ to the industry and to the FAA” (Elias, 2003: 1). 
 
The Known Shipper program made provision for an “air carrier or indirect air carriers 
(IAC, also known as freight forwarders) to transport a consignment from a known 
shipper with no extra screening [other than] an examination of the package exterior, 
while shipments from unknown shippers would be screened by X-ray or physically 
inspected before being placed aboard a passenger aircraft.” Freight forwarders were 
not permitted to simply, without doing all the security checks, accept consignments 
from unknown shippers. Instead, if they did not have a longstanding relationship with 
the shipper wanting to send off goods the regulations had to be complied with in 
order to ensure such shipper’s business was trustworthy (were compliant and 
followed the required security measures) (Elias 2003:38). 
 
Before the 9/11 attacks, a number of cargo security investigations had been done by 
the Department of Transportation Inspector General (IG). The IG had found that air 
carriers and indirect air carriers were not always fulfilling their legal obligations under 
the FAA’s Known Shipper Programme. In addition, there were considerable 
shortcomings in the FAA’s oversight functions (Elias, 2003: 38). 
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As a result the oversight function for the Known Shipper Programme was redirected 
from the FAA to the TSA but with the continued reliance by the TSA on a risk-based 
tool for the pre-screening air cargo. After 9/11 a number of regulatory modifications 
were instituted that affected the Known Shipper Programme. For instance, only 
cargo from known shippers to be accepted on passenger aircrafts, while cargo from 
unknown shippers was not accepted but redirected to all-cargo carriers (that fulfilled 
all known shipper requirements) (the latter being non-passenger flights) (Buzdugan, 
2005: 69). 
 
The way in which a shipper becomes ‘known’ was further facilitated by the setting up 
of a national database of known shippers. Within five years of its establishment the 
TSA estimated that at least a third of air carriers and indirect air carriers in the US 
had voluntarily placed themselves on this database (Elias, 2010: 7). 
 
4.5  THE CUSTOMS-TRADE PARTNERSHIP AGAINST TERRORISM (C-TPAT)  
Prior to 9/11 the customs authorities were largely responsible for the clearance of 
imported cargo but only after such cargo landed at the US border. But as a 
consequence of these attacks, the cargo security programmes subsequently 
established in the US laid the emphasis on the pre-shipment inspection of exports 
and the full inspection of imported cargo (Peterson & Treat 2008). 
 
The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) policy initiated by the 
US in November 2001, refers to the application of security measures along the entire 
supply chain. This new approach to supply chain security is firmly premised upon 
public/private co-operation in order to speed up the crossborder processing of 
correctly security cleared (lawful) consignments of goods. A core aim of the C-TPAT 
Programme being the ‘voluntary participation’ by all roleplayers in global supply 
chain ‘best practices’. (Buzdugan, 2005: 69). 
 
Initially participation in C-TPAT was limited to US passenger and cargo air carriers 
and certain foreign manufactures based in the US. But it was soon extended, on 
application, to selected manufacturers from Mexico, Europe, and Asia (Mento, 2004: 
21). 
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On application, companies must undertake to not only design but also implement a 
comprehensive security plan throughout their supply chain to specifically prevent un-
manifested consignments of goods entering their supply chain. This security on their 
supply chain systems includes allied security such as the physical security to 
safeguard all manufacturing sites, warehouse buildings and transport system (e.g. 
trucks and/or rail despatch yards). In particular there must be heightened focus on 
access controls at these sites to prevent any unlawful entry to the protected facilities 
(Buzdugan, 2005: 70). 
 
In addition, applicant companies must ensure that all employees (and new applicants 
security verified) undergo regular security background checks. Furthermore, such 
companies to institute security awareness programme to all staff members with 
security personnel in particular being incentivised in terms of their successful 
implementation of security. Overall the integrity of their supply chains must be 
ensured at all times to prevent the introduction of any unauthorised persons and 
material at any point in the supply chain system (Buzdugan, 2005: 70). 
 
To validate that all C-TPAT participants have effectively and efficiently implemented 
the security procedures as outlined in their submitted Security Plans, the US 
Customs authorities and a participant representative of the industry jointly conduct a 
validation process at participant company premises. Each validation is customised 
for the participant and usually involves an on-site appraisal of the participant’s C-
TPAT supply chain security profile. The results of the validation exercise are shared 
with the C-TPAT participant via a written report. While central to C-TPAT programme 
participation is the voluntary aspect of such partnerships, both parties have 
opportunities during the validation process to discuss issues of security but also to 
share any emerging best practices for the further safeguarding of the international 
supply chain (McNicholas, 2011: 118).  
 
One of the advantages of C-TPAT participation is the reducing of the number of 
required inspections of partners’ shipments (but only on the finalisation of the 
validation process and acceptance that implemented security measures are effective 
and secure) as well as the speeding up of the processing of partners’ consignments 
(McNicholas, 2011: 119). 
  
62 
© University of South Africa 2015 
 
4.6 THE CREATION OF TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION  
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act, approved by the 107th Congress and 
endorsed on 19 November 2001 (Sweet, 2009: 29), founded the TSA and 
necessitated the completion by the end of 2002 of more than 30 mandates which 
included the following: 
 
 “Assuming responsibility for all civil aviation security roles from the FAA”; 
 “Employing, training and positioning security officers for over 400 commercial 
airports from Guam to Alaska in 12 months”; and  
 “Providing 100 percent screening of all checked baggage for explosives by 31 
December 2002” (DHS, 2002). 
 
In March 2003, the TSA was transferred from the Department of Transportation 
(together with a number of other departments, for example Border Policing and 
Immigration) to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which was formally set 
up by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Price & Forrest, 2008: 112).  
 
In 2013, more than a decade since its formation, the TSA continues to make use of a 
“risk-based, intelligence-driven, multi-layered strategy to secure US transportation 
systems, working closely with stakeholders in aviation, rail, transit, highway and 
pipeline sectors, as well as partners in the law enforcement and intelligence 
community” (TSA, 2012). 
 
Furthermore, with reference to aviation security the TSA works towards enhancing 
its “layered approach through the use of constantly updated and improved 
technology, expanded data analysis capabilities and enhanced understanding of 
current intelligence” (TSA, 2012). 
 
In June 2010, John Pistole was appointed TSA Administrator. He subsequently 
directed the TSA to improve their focus on counterterrorism measures. The TSA 
accordingly launched an investigation of “what works well” in order to formulate 
improvements to the security chain as well as to screening practices at airports 
(TSA, 2012). 
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4.6.1  Layers of security  
The TSA makes use of the concept ‘layers of security’ for their implementation of 
transportation security. One of these layers of security is checkpoints at airports. 
Other layers of security in aviation security refer to “intelligence gathering and 
analysis; checking passenger manifests against watch lists, random canine team 
searches at airports, federal air marshals, federal flight deck officers, [and] 
supplementary security methods” (TSA, 2012a). 
 
Individually, each of the above security measures are capable of stopping a terrorist 
attack. But the multiplier effect of combining them adds immeasurably to the effective 
strengthening of security measures. A terrorist faced with such a combination of 
multiple security layers is more likely to either be deterred, pre-empted or foiled in 
their attempt (TSA, 2012a). 
 
 Figure 1: Layers of US aviation Security 
 
(Stewart & Meuller, 2011). 
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 The above figure illustrates the different layers of security employed by the TSA, 
ranging from intelligence, customs and border protection to hardened cockpit doors 
and various screening methods. 
 
4.6.2  Strengthening global supply chain security  
One of the primary stipulations of the Effecting of the 9/11 Commission 
Recommendations Act of 2007 (the 9/11 Act), is the 100 percent screening of all 
exiting the US cargo carried on passenger aircraft. This full screening corresponds 
with the screening of passenger-checked baggage and 100 percent of identified 
high-risk cargo on international flights destined for the United States (Sweet, 2009: 
134). 
 
The Container Security Initiative (CSI), launched in 2002 by the US Bureau of 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), now an agency within the Department 
of Homeland Security, is currently operational in 58 foreign seaports in 32 countries, 
categorises and screens US-bound maritime containers that pose a conceivable 
threat (TSA, 2012c). 
 
4.6.3  Innovation and technology  
The use of innovative and state-of-the-art technology assists the TSA to stay ahead 
of any new or emerging threats focused on harming the US aviation security 
infrastructure. This use of technology, combined with additional layers of security 
aims at reducing any existing vulnerabilities. Included in these measures is the 
gathering of information and intelligence analysis thereof. This is supplemented by 
regular passenger vetting making use of so-called ‘watch lists’ or ‘red flagging' of 
suspects. The use of biometrics, such as facial recognition programme, further 
assists the TSA in implementing more effective aviation security (TSA, 2012d). 
 
The utilisation of technology has developed significantly in the years since the TSA 
was delegated responsibility for all airport and aviation security in the US. Most 
people remember the walk through metal detector, which still performs a significant 
role at checkpoints. However, there is now a new crop unfamiliar machines at local 
airports. Below are some examples of the new technologies being deployed as part 
of aviation security: 
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 Advanced and new biometrics systems; 
 Bottle liquids scanners; 
 CastScope (the screening of casts and prosthetics); 
 Explosive detection systems (for the screening of checked or carry-on 
baggage); 
 Explosives trace detection (using small mobile machines to detect small 
traces of explosives); 
 Threat image projection; and  
 Imaging technology (at checkpoints) (TSA, 2012d). 
 
4.7  AIR CARGO SECURITY  
 This section will detail the TSA’s specific efforts aimed at securing and 
 safeguarding air cargo security in the USA and abroad.  
 
4.7.1  Overview  
TSA’s transportation security system for air cargo is divided into two distinct 
programme areas:  
 
1. “The Office of Security Policy and Industry Engagement Air Cargo Division”; and  
 
2. “The Office of Security Operations” (OSO). 
 
The Security Policy and Industry Engagement Air Cargo Division and the Security 
Operations sections are respectively charged with the “strategic development of 
programmes” and with “programme compliance”. The Air Cargo Division is 
responsible for working across TSA, Department of Homeland Security and other 
governmental agencies (domestic and international) to “develop air cargo 
regulations, technological solutions and policies that constantly improve the security 
of the air cargo supply chain while maintaining TSA’s commitment to ensure the flow 
of commerce” (Price & Forrest, 2008: 389). 
 
The TSA’s concept for air cargo security is the further development layered security 
allied to the use of intelligence gathering and analysis and technology-based 
  
66 
© University of South Africa 2015 
solutions (TSA, 2012e). In response to potential threats to air cargo security, the 
TSA employs a multi-layered methodology that includes: 
 
 “Scrutinising companies that distribute and transport cargo on passenger aircrafts 
to confirm they meet TSA security standards”; 
 
 “Creating a structure to enable Certified Cargo Screening Facilities (CCSFs) to 
actually screen cargo using appropriate screening approaches and technologies”; 
 
 “Utilising random and risk based assessment to classify high-risk cargo that 
necessitates increased examination”, and  
 
 “Reviewing industry compliance with security directives through the utilisation of 
TSA examiners” (TSA, 2012f). 
 
4.7.2  Programmes and initiatives within air cargo security  
On 3 August 2007, Pres. George Bush endorsed into law the Effecting of the 9/11 
Commission Recommendations Act of 2007 (9/11 Act) P.L. 110-53 (2007). This 
legislation stipulated that, within three years, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
was to establish a structure that would enable the aviation industry to screen 100 
percent of all cargo transported on airplanes. This screening to be on a par with the 
security screening already being implemented for all air passenger baggage (Sweet, 
2009: 33 & 134). In addition, the Act set a provisional target, to be reached within 18 
months of enactment of the Act, of a 50 percent screening of all cargo conveyed on 
passenger planes (TSA, 2012f). 
 
The effect of the 100 percent screening requirement meant that all cargo was to be 
screened using the piece-by-piece method before being loaded onto an airplane and 
then only in accordance with TSA approved processes and systems (TSA, 2012f). 
 
Among the TSA efforts to meet the 100 percent screening condition are initiatives 
throughout the supply chain to empower the industry to meet this requirement, 
including such initiatives as the “Narrow-Body Cargo Screening, [the] Certified Cargo 
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Screening Programme (CCSP), [the] Indirect Air Carrier Screening Technology Pilot 
Programme, [and expanding] [i]nternational [c]ollaboration” (TSA, 2012f). 
 
4.7.3  TSA proposal to escalate 100 percent screening  
In an effort to escalate the level of screening for air cargo carried in the USA the TSA 
instructed passenger air carriers to increase screening from 50 to 75 percent by 1 
May 2010 specifically to try and meet the 9/11 Act 100 percent screening 
requirement deadline of 1 August 2010 (Sweet, 2009: 33 & 134).  
 
But the deadline was not met and in May 2012, the TSA reset the deadline for 100 
percent screening(including the screening for explosives) by passenger air carriers 
to the 3 December 2012 (TSA, 2012g). 
 
4.8  CERTIFIED CARGO SCREENING PROGRAMME (CCSP) 
The 9/11 Act also stipulated that from 1 August 2010 all cargo shipped on passenger 
planes be screened for explosives (Sweet, 2009: 33 & 134). 
 
This requirement, together with the obligation for full 100 percent screening of all 
passenger baggage and air cargo, meant that every consignment of cargo 
transported on passenger aircraft, would have to be physically screened at piece 
level, before being loaded onto any passenger aircraft. Skids and pallets (onto which 
goods are packed) will have to be taken apart, screened and reconfigured. The 9/11 
Act particularly classifies the types of screening that would be acceptable, namely 
physical inspection and the use of various technologies (TSA, 2012h). 
 
To enable the industry to comply with the 100 percent screening requirement the 
TSA established the Certified Cargo Screening (CCSP) Programme (first phase pilot 
being launched in 2008). The Programme allowed for freight forwarders and 
shippers to pre-screen cargo prior to the delivery of the cargo at an airport, i.e. in a 
shipping agent warehouse and not specifically at an airport cargo receiving point. 
Most CCSP shipper participants have been able to speedily integrate physical 
screening into their shipping process at a trivial cost to their operation (TSA, 2012h). 
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Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP) Recertification 
The certification renewal process for initial CCSP program participants certified is well underway, 
with over 400 locations recertified. Participants in the CCSP, which enables Indirect Air Carriers 
(IACs), Shippers, and Independent Cargo Screening Facilities (ICSFs) to screen cargo across the 
supply chain at off-airport locations, are required to be recertified every 36 months. To date, more 
than 95 percent of facilities eligible for recertification have elected to have TSA recertify their 
screening operations for another 36 months.  
CCSP Program Participants, December 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For more information on the CCSP program visit http://www.tsa.gov/certified-cargo-screening-
program or email CCSP@dhs.gov. 
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Security Threat Assessment (STA) Renewals 
TSA has instituted an electronic STA renewal process in the Indirect Air Carrier Management System 
(IACMS) for Indirect Air Carrier (IAC) and Air Operators. A STA is required for individuals who need 
unescorted access to cargo,  screening air cargo, or perform security functions as provided in 49 CFR 
1540.201. A STA applicant is required to provide eligibility documents to prove identity and U.S. 
work authorization.  
Under Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 49 CFR 1540.203(J), a STA is valid for 5 years. Thus, STAs 
initially submitted in 2007, which represent the majority of the STA population, expired in 2012. A 
STA not renewed within 5 years will be no longer valid once it expires. TSA is no longer issuing STA 
approval letters.  STA status results are available to sponsoring IACs and air operators in the IACMS. 
To apply for a new STA, please contact your sponsoring IAC or Air Operator for more information on 
the application process.   
 
 
  
Air Cargo Updates  
Chart 1:  Certified Cargo Screening (CCSP) Programme participants: 
December 2012 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 1 above describes the demographic breakdown (in 2012) of the CCSP 
participants, where 47 percent are shippers, 45 percent are indirect air carriers and 
Eight percent are independent cargo screening facilities (TSA, 2013). 
 
4.9  THE EUROPEAN UNION  
This section will deal specifically with the EU’s efforts to counter terrorism and acts of 
unlawful interference with civil aviation. EU members took further the initiatives 
undertaken by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) by accepting, in 
the late 1970s two multilateral instruments, namely: the European Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism, and the Bonn Declaration of 1978 
 
4.9.1  The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 1977 
The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, specifies that hijacking 
is not to be treated as a ‘political offence’, and further aimed to enforce the 
extradition of hijackers and not allow States to deny an extradition request on the 
basis of “political grounds” (Elagab & Elagab, 2007: 583). In other words this 
Convention looks to ensure that “perpetrators of acts of terrorism do not elude 
prosecution and punishment by negating the power of Contracting States to invoke 
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the political offence with the exception in the case of hijacking and thus, refuse 
extradition of perpetrators” (Elagab & Elagab, 2007: 593-594). Furthermore, several 
offences are stipulated in Article 1 of the Convention that should not be considered 
as “political offences for the purposes of extradition.” However, in Article 5, the 
European Convention permits an extradition to be refused if such government has 
“substantial ground for believing that the request for extradition had been made in 
order to punish a person for, inter alia, his/her political opinions” (Buzdugan, 
2005:43). 
 
According to Buzdugan (2005: 44), some critics of the European Convention claim 
that it has various shortcomings. One being that Article 13, allows a State, “at the 
time of signing or ratifying the Convention, to reserve the right to decline extradition 
with respect to any of the offences listed in Article 1, if that State unilaterally believes 
the offence prompting the extradition request to be politically inspired” (Raven, 2004: 
8). Another one being that the Convention does not provide for an enforcement 
method other than the submission of disagreements to arbitration (Raven, 2004: 8). 
 
4.9.2  The Bonn Declaration on Hijacking of 1978  
On 17 July 1978, the heads of state of the G-7 issued a consensual declaration that 
outlined their governments’ resolve to take action against any nation refusing to 
accept their international responsibilities following a hijacking (Buzdugan, 2005: 43). 
This declaration statement of intent, though not a treaty per se, employed robust 
language echoing the signatory governments’ stated intent to “immediately terminate 
all flights to or from any State that fails either to return the hijacked aircraft or to 
prosecute or extradite a hijacker” (Alexander & Sochor 1990:103). 
 
The intended sanctions to be imposed by the Bonn Declaration signatories raised a 
number of legal issues. Firstly, there was a presumption that the obligation defined in 
the Tokyo and Hague Conventions to “return aircraft and to extradite or prosecute 
hijackers”, had become entrenched (precedent setting) in international law and thus 
binding on all States, irrespective of whether they are signatories (parties) to those 
specific conventions. At the time of the Bonn Declaration this assumption was 
considered contentious but in more recent times it has generally become 
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internationally accepted that “aerial terrorism is prohibited under customary 
international law” (Alexander & Sochor 1990:104). 
 
A further legal issue emanating from the Bonn Declaration was whether, by 
stipulating specific sanctions, the signatory governments (G-7 countries) would be “in 
violation of their international obligations under the Chicago Convention, the Transit 
Agreement, and any applicable bilateral air service agreements”. It follows then that 
if the G-7 states were to impose the Bonn Declaration sanctions that the State that 
did harbour an aircraft hijacker, would be permitted to “bring the sanctioning States 
before the ICAO Council under the dispute resolution provisions of the Chicago 
Convention” (Buzdugan, 2005: 45). 
 
In 1986 the G-7 countries had reaffirmed, in a joint statement, the principles of the 
Bonn Declaration, by condemning international terrorism and encouraging collective 
countermeasures against terrorism and those supporting in any way or funding any 
acts of terrorism anywhere in the world (Buzdugan 2005:46).2 
 
4.9.3  Regulatory measures regarding cargo security and facilitation  
In July 2003, the European Commission submitted to the European Parliament and 
Council a set of draft procedures for dealing with customs-related security issues. 
These measures were designed to underpin new security management model for the 
external borders of the enlarged EU (for example, a harmonised risk assessment 
system) (Buzdugan, 2005: 46). 
 
These new plans are aimed at tightening the security around any commodities and 
goods crossing EU borders by including more effective and target-specific 
inspections The new recommended methods aimed to address three core supply 
chain security issues, namely: “advance information on goods; recognition of the 
status of Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) to reliable traders [and] rewarding 
                                                          
2
 Interestingly, even though the Bonn Declaration had no legal international statutory enforcement 
powers it was subsequently used in the early 1980s to pressurise the South African government of 
the time, who had formally associated themselves with it, to act against a group of mercenaries 
(most from South Africa) who in 1981 had hijacked an airplane to escape from the Seychelles after 
their failed coup d’ état in that country (Buzdugan 2005: 46). 
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them with trade facilitation benefits; setting up a mechanism for developing uniform 
risk-selection standards for [computerised] control” [systems] (Buzdugan, 2005: 46). 
To assist in the implementation of these new systems the European Commission 
developed set of guidelines in the so-called Customs Security Programme 
(Buzdugan, 2005: 46). 
 
4.9.4  Monitoring of EU Regulations 2320/2002, 622/2003, 1217/2003 and 
1486/2003 
The EU Resolution 2320/2002 (on common rules in the field of civil aviation security) 
(approved in 2002) contains (in an annexure) detailed guidelines with reference to 
airport security, including access control and the requirement of 100 percent cargo 
screening, as well as screening of staff handling such cargo and other protection 
measures as applicable at any airport in the European Union (European Union (EU), 
2002). Annexure 1 of this Resolution, by focusing on the issue of “cargo, courier and 
express parcels”, reiterates the requirement that “all cargo to be carried on 
passenger or all-cargo aircraft” must undergo, prior to being loaded onto such 
airplanes, “security controls” in accordance with the “rules” outlined in Annexure 1 
(Buzdugan, 2005: 49). 
 
Furthermore Regulation 2320 also defines a ‘regulated agent’ as “an agent, freight 
forwarder or other entity that conducts business with an operator and provides 
security controls that are accepted or required by the appropriate authority in respect 
of cargo.” In addition, a regulated agent must be “designated, approved, or listed by 
the appropriate authority and subject to specified obligations as defined by the 
appropriate authority” (Price & Forrest 2008:120). 
 
In 2003 Regulation 622/2003 (on measures for the implementation of common basic 
standards for aviation security) was issued by the EU in support of EU Regulation 
2320/2002 to promote the harmonisation and implementation of standards contained 
in the latter Regulation. Regulation 622/2003 detailed a “National Civil Aviation 
Security Programme” for EU-wide civil aviation security implementation (EU, 2003).  
 
In 2003 the EU also issued the supporting Regulation 1217/2003 (on the 
establishment of National Aviation Security Programmes) to assist member states to 
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establish their individual National Aviation Security Programme, which also aimed at 
the integration of EU-wide required standards as stipulated in Regulation 2320/2002 
and 622/2003, implementation of which to be monitored by the establishment of 
National Quality Control Programmes (EU, 2003a). 
 
The EU regulation 1217/2003 detailed comprehensive requirements on how the 
National Quality Control Programmes were to be implemented and the procedures to 
routinely evaluate via the required monitoring measures the implementation of the 
National Aviation Security Programmes. Furthermore, also the procedures for 
reporting to the European Commission on the activities implemented by these 
programmes. According to this Regulation, member States must also provide the 
applicable authority with the required enforcement powers (EU, 2003a). In addition, 
National Quality Control Programmes to monitor and evaluate the following 
components: “organisational structure, responsibilities and resources, job 
descriptions and qualifications of all auditors responsible for carrying out the quality 
control programme, operational monitoring activities, deficiency rectification 
activities, enforcement measures and communications and reporting of undertaken 
activities relating to the aviation security requirements compliance” (Sánchez, 2009: 
337). 
 
All this implementation evaluation and monitoring of a National Civil Aviation Security 
Programme must be cognisant of risks and threats, as well as the “type and nature 
category and type of the operations, standard of implementation, and other factors 
and assessments which will require more frequent monitoring”. Finally the 
inspections of compliance can be either “announced or unannounced” (Buzdugan, 
2005: 54). A last implementation requirement being that “member States must inform 
the Commission of best practices with regard to quality control programs, audit 
methodologies and auditors and the Commission must share this information with 
the other member States” (Buzdugan 2005:54). 
 
Actual assessments of the aviation security programmes take place in accordance 
with EU Regulation 1486/2003 which designates and outlines how EU Commission 
inspectors are provided access to all EU airport facilities. But the EU Commission 
inspectors must, however, provide a minimum of “two months’ notice of an intended 
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inspection to the appropriate authority in whose territory the inspection is to be 
conducted [and] within six weeks of completion of an inspection, the Commission 
must communicate [the findings of the inspection in] a report to the appropriate 
authority”. Furthermore, if the report identifies shortcomings at the inspection site the 
relevant EU member agency must submit a written report with an Action Plan 
outlining “actions and deadlines to remedy any identified deficiencies”. Finally, if a 
site inspection has revealed a “serious deficiency, which is deemed to have 
significant impact on the overall level of civil aviation security in the community, the 
community members must immediately inform the appropriate authorities” 
(Buzdugan 2005:54-55). 
 
4.10  CHANGES TO THE EUROPEAN AND UNITED STATES AIR CARGO 
SECURITY PROGRAMMES 
4.10.1 US and EU alignment of cargo security rules 
On 1 June 2012 the US Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the 
European Commission approved the recognition of each other’s air cargo security 
rules (Carey, 2012: 1). Under the terms of this agreement, which took effect on 1 
June 2012, there occurred the reciprocal recognition of each other’s set rules on the 
screening of cargo and supply chain security for all air carriers and freight shippers 
flying cargo and mail into or through the European Union and the USA (Clark, 2012: 
1). 
 
As a result of this joint recognition arrangement, industry was able follow a single set 
of security rules in moving air cargo through the 27 member states of the European 
Union, the USA and Switzerland. The agreement removed any duplication of 
procedures by harmonising and standardising them. At the time Siim Kallas, EC Vice 
President for Transport, had stated that it was “a big step forward and will have a 
major business impact …” and would furthermore, save “several tens of millions of 
euros per year” (Carey, 2012: 1). Kallas, was also cited as saying that by: “[c]utting 
out the duplication of security procedures will mean huge savings for cargo operators 
in terms of time and money” (Clark, 2012: 1). 
 
Up to that time, only five of the 27 members of the EU, namely: Great Britain, 
Finland, France, the Netherlands and Ireland, had endorsed the air cargo security 
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agreements with the US (Clark, 2012: 1). Pistole, the TSA administrator, had at the 
time also noted that the parties’ commitment to share information would further 
improve security while the agreement with the EU and Switzerland would “ease the 
burden on industry and allow for the free movement of goods and commerce 
between our nations” (Carey, 2012: 1).  
 
At the time of the reciprocal agreement shippers were annually transporting “more 
than one million tons of cargo by air” between the EU and the USA with a value €107 
billion ($133 million). This was “27 percent of the value of all goods exported by air” 
from the EU, with security costs being put at from “one to four percent of turnover, 
depending on the carrier’s profile” while the duplication of the required security 
measures “for transatlantic freight account[ed] for up to one-fifth of that amount” 
(Carey 2012:2).  
 
The USA-EU cargo security arrangement meant that all air carriers flying out of the 
EU and Switzerland would continue to apply all EU security measures but they 
would, by the reciprocal agreement, be in full compliance with US law. 
Correspondingly, cargo flying from the US into the EU and Switzerland would not be 
subjected to any added EU security measures at USA airports since these are now 
equally recognised as applicable (Anon., 2012: 1). 
 
Prior to the reciprocal agreement the USA had mandated that cargo screening to 
take place at the final point of departure before arriving in the country. For example, 
USA-bound cargo screened in Budapest, Hungary but transferring in Frankfurt, 
Germany had to undergo re-screening in Frankfurt. In October 2010, the Al-Qaeda 
had attempted to send explosives enclosed in printer cartridges from Yemen to the 
USA via Dubai and the UK. Fortunately this had been thwarted by the authorities, but 
as a result the EU had implemented new rules requiring supplementary security 
controls in the cargo source country before any such cargo entered the EU (Carey, 
2012: 2).  
 
On 31 May 2012, the USA and Canada had also agreed on reciprocated recognition 
of their respective air cargo security measures, including the screening of cargo at 
the point of origin destined for any passenger airplane (Carey, 2012: 2). 
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At the time of the agreements the International Air Transport Association (IATA) 
indicated that they represented the culmination of a seven-year effort by regulators 
and industry stakeholders to align all international air cargo security measures. Tony 
Tyler, IATA Director General and CEO also stated that: “[w]e [IATA] hope that this 
agreement [US-EU] is the cornerstone for further alignment, especially for 
passenger security” (IATA, 2012). 
 
4.11  CONCLUSION  
This chapter detailed the rules, regulations and organisations charged with 
overseeing and enforcing AVSEC and ACSEC in the USA and the EU. The chapter 
also discussed the mutual recognition of air cargo security measures between the 
USA and the EU as agreed upon in 2012.  
 
Since the USA and the EU have been on the receiving end of various terrorist acts 
and plots over the past several years, both set strict regulations to combat such 
terrorist efforts and plans. This research (reported on later in this dissertation) will 
explore the comparison between the USA and EU regulations versus those in South 
Africa, and seek to learn whether the South African regulations are on par or 
higher/lower than the US/EU regulations.  
 
The following chapter will detail the South African local regulations, which have been 
implemented throughout South Africa and demonstrate the extent of compliance with 
ICAO and international standards.  
 
A further comparison, which will be discussed in Chapter 6, will be made between 
the USA, EU and South African regulations. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
SOUTH AFRICAN SPECIFIC REGULATIONS ON CARGO SECURITY 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an overview of the designated state agency, namely: the 
South African Civil Aviation Authority, which was established by the South African 
government to oversee all matters of civil aviation in the country. 
 
This chapter also details the current and specific South African aviation security 
regulations, with an emphasis on the relevant air cargo security regulations, 
requirements and screening methods. It will conclude with the most recent threats to 
air cargo security globally including the potential risks in South Africa accordingly. 
 
5.2  THE SOUTH AFRICAN CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY (SACAA) 
5.2.1  Establishment and organisation of the SACAA 
The South African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA) was established on the 1 
October 1998, with the enactment of the now repealed South African Civil Aviation 
Authority Act No. 40 of 1998. As a signatory to the Chicago Convention, South Africa 
is obligated to comply with all its stipulations and its establishment was in line with all 
the international developments of aviation security. The CAA was mandated to play 
the “key oversight role for aviation in South Africa in the areas of aircraft, airports, 
airspace, and personnel… [and monitors and supervises] the procedures followed 
[at] airports for the screening of passengers and baggage, for access control in 
terms of fencing and lighting and for the handling, packaging and documentation of 
hazardous substances” Generally, the CAA’s role is to oversee and ensure that 
“personnel and standards meet international [security] levels” [of competency] in the 
field of aviation safety and security (Minnaar, 2003: 20). 
 
Prior to 1998, the Directorate Civil Aviation (DCA) reported under the Department of 
Transport (DoT). (Minnaar, 2003: 20). The formation of the CAA is consistent with 
international developments in regulating civil aviation safety. According to Minnaar 
(2003: 20), the impact of ICAO, IATA and other international bodies’ security 
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requirements on the implementation of airport and air-cargo security in South Africa 
should not be underestimated.  
 
The new CAA had a Board of Directors appointed by the Minister of Transport and 
governs the operations of the Authority. The Board is representative of industry, 
management and business expertise (SACAA, 2008b). 
 
Furthermore, the SACAA was delegated, among others, the role of: “…oversee[ing] 
[the] standardis[ation of] civil aviation safety and security, in line with international 
standards” (SACAA, 2009a). 
 
As an agency of the Department of Transport (DoT) the SACAA’s activities are 
directed by a performance contract signed between the Board of Directors and the 
Minister of Transport. Its directive, defined more fully in the South African Civil 
Aviation Authority Act No. 40 of 1998, can be summarised as follows: 
 
“The Authority is mandated with promoting, regulating, supporting, 
enforcing and continuously improving levels of safety and security 
throughout the civil aviation industry. The above is to be achieved by 
conforming to the International Civil Aviation Authority (ICAO) Standards 
and Recommended Practices (SARPs) whilst considering the local 
context. This mandate relates to aviation safety and security oversight of 
airspace, airports, aircraft, operations and personnel” (SACAA, 2009b). 
 
The administration of the SACAA has been organised along three primary 
responsibility levels, namely:  
 
i) Strategic Management (Executive Management); 
ii) Project Management (Senior Management); and 
iii) Operational (structured according to technical departments) (SACAA, 
2009c). 
 
The main function for the Executive level is the strategic direction of the organisation 
as well as the co-ordination of policy design. The Executive’s role is to cultivate and 
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support positive relations with the industry and to co-ordinate the SACAA’s 
international affairs with other bodies such as the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), the African Civil Aviation Commission (AFCAC), ICAO, and 
other national CAAs. The Project Management level co-ordinates the technical 
undertakings of the key areas of supervision. For example, the Accident and Incident 
Investigation, Aircraft Safety, Aviation Security, Air Safety Infrastructure, Air Safety 
Operations Risk and Compliance. Operational level is where technical departments 
account to the areas of oversight applicable to their particular activities. This means 
that dependent on the activity, a technical department may report to a different 
oversight area. Within each area of oversight, the key accountabilities are to set, 
monitor, and enforce standards, as well as to promote safety (SACAA, 2009c). 
 
5.2.2 SACAA areas of oversight 
The functions and obligations of the CAA revolve around the following six areas of 
oversight: 
1. Accident and Incident Investigation (AIID) 
The AIID “scrutinizes accidents and incidents to determine the probable cause of 
such accidents. The investigation philosophy will eventually result in the 
necessary corrective interventions being undertaken in order to prevent the 
repetition of similar aircraft accidents. It is important to remember that 
investigations are not meant to assign blame or legal liability” (SACAA, 2009c). 
 
2. Aircraft safety  
“The Aircraft Safety Division [ensures that] all aircraft that fly in [South Africa] 
airspace are airworthy… [responsible for the] upkeep of the civilian aircraft 
register, …that civilian aircraft are maintained in accordance with requirements, 
oversight of Aircraft Maintenance Organisations, …the approval of aircraft 
modifications and Supplementary Type Certificates… [and to determine that] 
maintenance engineers adhere to the applicable regulations” (SACAA, 2009c). 
 
3. Aviation security 
This refers to “…security of airports, air operators, cargo, and the safe 
transportation of dangerous goods, as well as the oversight of aviation security 
training organizations” (SACAA, 2009c). 
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4. Air safety infrastructure 
The Air Safety Infrastructure Division of the SACAA monitors and ensures that 
South African “airports, helistops, heliports, and airspace are safe… [and] off-
airport structures that may affect the safety of air navigation [comply] with all 
safety standards as required by the Regulations”. The “approval of flight 
procedures and the licensing of Air Traffic Controllers…[and] …the provision of 
aeronautical safety information to the industry” also fall within this Division’s 
responsibilities (SACAA, 2009c). 
 
5. Air safety operations 
This division oversees “regulatory compliance and safety oversight of all Air 
Operators, Aviation Training Organisations, Designated Flight Examiners, 
Designated Aviation Medical Examiners, and Aircraft Maintenance Engineers” 
and is responsible for “[f]light Inspections, Maintenance of Examinations, Testing 
Standards, and Aviation Medical Standards” and the certification “technical safety 
compliance of Aviation Navigation Aids” (SACAA, 2009c). 
 
6. Risk and compliance 
“Enterprise Wide Risk Management …and risk assessments focused on the 
areas of Strategic Core Operational and Support Service related risk” fall within 
the management competencies of this SACAA Division, as well as “Client 
Services, Aviation Personnel Licensing and Examinations, [and] Information 
Management” (SACAA, 2009c). 
 
5.2.3 SACAA training and certification 
The AVSEC Division of SACAA, in compliance with Part 109 (which deals with the 
training standards and certification of training organisations) and Part 110 (outlines 
the required certification of screeners) of the ICAO regulations, established a new 
department charged with overseeing and regulating the personnel training and 
certification for Aviation Security in South Africa, as per the set standards in Part 108 
and Part 109, as well as certifying screeners under Part 110 of the ICAO regulations. 
Historically there has been a gap in that this sector was not suitably controlled and 
training from an Aviation Security standpoint has been disjointed (SACAA, 2009g). 
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5.2.4 The National Safety Committee (NASC) 
The National Aviation Security Committee (NASC) is a consultative body to the 
Minister of Transport with respect to any safety- and security-related aviation issues. 
This body is sanctioned by the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations of 1981, regulation 
3(1) which stipulates that the Minister shall establish a Civil Aviation Safety 
Committee (SACAA, 2009h). 
 
One of the ICAO's main objectives was the creation of International Standard and 
Recommended Practices (SARPs) as contained in the various Annexes to the 1944 
Chicago Convention (and subsequent conventions). As a signatory to the 
Convention South Africa is compelled to uphold and maintain these SARPs. 
Annexure 17, Paragraph 3.1.6 stipulates that each signatory State to set up a 
suitable authority to inaugurate means of co-ordinating undertakings amongst the 
departments, agencies and other organisations of the State involved with or 
accountable for diverse aspects of the National Aviation Security Programme 
(SACAA, 2009h). 
 
Accordingly, the NASC’s outlined objectives are to: 
 
 “Co-ordinate the development and application of aviation security measures 
and procedures”; 
 “Recommend and reviews the effectiveness of civil aviation security measures 
and procedures, commensurate with the threat”; [and]  
 “Ensure that both the CAA and other pertinent agencies in the aviation 
industry are represented to advise on security policy”, (SACAA, 2009h). 
 
The following government departments, organisations or parastatals have 
representation on the Committee: 
 
 South African Police Service; 
 South African National Defence Force; 
 South African Secret Service; 
 National Intelligence Agency (changed to State Security Agency: SSA); 
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 Department of Transport; 
 Department of Provincial and Local Development; 
 Air Traffic and Navigational Services Company Limited; 
 Airports Company South Africa; and  
 National Intelligence co-ordinating Committee (SACAA, 2009h). 
 
5.2.5 The National Aviation Security Programme (NASP) 
The Civil Aviation Safety Regulations of 1981 Section 4(1) stipulates that the Director 
Civil Aviation Safety shall draw up an all-inclusive safety plan.  
 
The applicable authority for security must oblige operators delivering service from 
the state to implement a security programme that meets the requirements of the 
state's National civil aviation security programme. To verify that an operator’s 
programme does meet these requirements, operators are required to present a 
written copy of their security programme to the Civil Aviation Security Department for 
evaluation and endorsement by the Minister (SACAA, 2009i). 
 
5.2.6 The National Aviation Safety Plan 
The National Aviation Safety Plan to provide for the following: 
 
 “The establishment of a central control centre to establish communication with 
airport management's and air carriers”;  
 “Liaison with international organization concerning matters of civil aviation 
security”;  
 “Liaison with government departments concerning matters of civil aviation 
security’’;  
 “Involvement of airport management's and air carriers in the application of a 
comprehensive aviation security committee”;  
 “Efficient methods of communication between all bodies responsible for civil 
aviation security”;  
 “Preventative measures in general to prevent occurrences jeopardising civil 
aviation safety”; [and]  
 “The integration of safety plans drawn up by airport management and air 
carriers in such comprehensive plan” (SACAA, 2009i). 
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5.2.7  International and regional involvement 
In 2003 South Africa was chosen as a member of the ICAO Council, a move that 
sees the country participating at the principal forum with regards to international 
aviation matters. The SACAA has also been the regional leader in setting the 
benchmarks for management of civil aviation security issues on the continent. Since 
1994 the SACAA has presented and hosted numerous regional meetings and 
seminars in the efforts to standardise aviation regulations and improve levels of 
aviation surveillance, in particular in the SADC region (SACAA, 2008b). 
 
5.3  LEGISLATION  
For any entity to be organised and recognised by other institutes, either legal or civil, 
there must be a specific system of control or by-laws to administer and direct, as well 
as inform those entities about innovative and current developments in that field of 
operation. 
 
5.3.1 Annexure 17: Security 
Annexure 17, deals broadly with the “security of airports, airlines and aircraft 
facilities to safeguard them against acts of unlawful interference”. As a signatory to 
the Chicago Convention (and all its subsequent expansions in annexures), South 
Africa, therefore is obliged to implement all the ICAO international instruments and 
related standards. Accordingly, Annexure 17, as the foundational document on 
aviation and cargo security, was been integrated into South African Legislation as 
Technical Standards in terms of Section 22A of the Civil Aviation Act of 1962 (DoT 
2008).  
 
5.3.2 The South African Legislation  
The South African National Aviation Security Programme (NASP) was developed to 
comply with the Annexure 17 Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) as 
well as being aligned with all the other aviation security provisions found in other 
annexes. Accordingly the South African NASP has legal standing by virtue of South 
African common law (as applied to situations impacting on civil aviation). In 
accordance with the five ICAO legal instruments, South African legislation was 
developed to give national legal standing for implementing the international SARPs 
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outlined in the ICA documents. The following, in terms of aviation security relevancy, 
are the primary South African aviation security-related laws and regulations: 
 
South African Civil Aviation Act (Act 13 of 2009)  
This Act provides for the setting up of the South African Civil Aviation Authority 
(SACAA); stipulates how the ICAO legal instruments are to be implemented in South 
Africa and the SACAA to oversee the control and regulation of all civil aviation in 
South Africa. SACAA falls under the jurisdiction of the Department of Transport. This 
new Act repealed and consolidated the following legislative Acts:  
- Aviation Act 74 of 1962; 
- Civil Aviation Offences Act 10 of 1972; and  
- South African Civil Aviation Authority Act 40 of 1998) (DOT, 2011). 
 
Civil Aviation Safety Regulations, 1981 
Although this Act is mainly aimed at safety, it also regulates the implementation and 
functioning of a National Aviation Security Committee; the appointment of the Chief: 
Civil Aviation Security by the Minister of Transport, as well as the appointment of the 
Airport Security Officer and it outlines his/her responsibilities (DoT, 2004). 
 
Civil Aviation Regulations, 1997 as amended (SA-CATS) 
In this Act the following technical standards have impacted on AVSEC and contains 
the “standards, rules, requirements, methods, specifications, characteristics and 
procedures which are applicable in respect of all South African Civil Aviation 
Standards”, including the following: 
 
- “Dangerous Goods - the conveyance of dangerous goods in terms of ICAO 
Document 9284. 
- Accident and Incident Investigations - aviation accident and incident 
investigations.  
- Air Cargo Security - protecting air cargo from acts of unlawful interference” 
(DoT, 2008). 
 
Other Acts of Parliament which impact directly on civil aviation security are the 
following: 
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 The Criminal Procedure Act (Act 51 of 1977), [with specific reference to] 
“procedures on search, seizure, forfeit, arrest, detention, witnesses, evidence, 
and criminal proceedings in general” (Ministry for Justice and Constitutional 
Development, 1977). 
 
 The South African Police Act (68 of 1995), provides for the police to maintain “law 
and order in South Africa”(Department of Police, 1995). 
 
 The Defence Act (Act 44 of 1957), stipulates that the country’s armed forces are 
mandated for the “protecting and providing stability within South African borders” 
(Department of Defence, 1997). 
 
 The Private Security Industry Regulations Act (Act 56 of 2001), regulates “all 
legal entities providing or performing security services” (including airport security 
services) (Ministry of Safety and Security, 2001). 
 
 The Explosives Act (Act 15 of 2003), “deals with the manufacture, marking of 
explosives, storage, sale, transport, import, export, and the use of explosives” 
(Ministry of Safety and Security, 2003). 
 
 ‘The Extradition Act (Act 67 of 1962), “lays down the procedures to be followed 
when South Africa receives a request from a foreign State for extradition, as well 
as where extradition of an individual is requested from a foreign State to South 
Africa, for the purpose of trial or sentencing” (Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development, 1996). 
 
 The Firearms Control Act (Act 60 of 2000) “aims to control legal firearms and to 
reduce the proliferation and availability of illegal firearms. In terms of this Act, all 
international and domestic air carriers in South Africa must apply for a licence to 
transport/handle firearms, i.e. provisions for lawful carriage of firearms” (Ministry 
of Safety and Security, 2000). 
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 The Immigration Act (Act 13 of 2002) “regulates anyone who enters, or remains 
in South Africa in contravention of this Act, or any illegal foreigner who fails to 
depart when so ordered” (Department of Home Affairs, 2000). 
 
 The National Key Point Act, as amended (Act 102 of 1980), “deals with the 
minimum requirements of any installation (including airports) which is of strategic 
importance to the wellbeing of South Africa; the aim is to minimise total loss and 
severe damage that would critically impair the reputation, or the economy of 
South Africa” (Ministry of Safety and Security, 2007). 
 
 The Post Office Act (Act 44 of 1958), “regulates the authorised Postal Company 
to handle mail in terms of the Chicago Convention (1944)” (Department of 
Telecommunications, 1997). 
 
 The Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related 
Activities Act (Act 33 of 2004), “contains measures to effectively deal with the 
prevention, investigation and combating of terrorist and related activities” 
(Ministry of Safety and Security, 2004). 
 
5.4  AIR CARGO SECURITY  
The primary purpose of international civil aviation security is to ensure the:  
“safety and protection of passengers, crew, ground personnel, the 
general public, aircraft and facilities of an airport serving international civil 
aviation, against acts of unlawful interference perpetrated on the ground 
or in flight” (SACAA, 2009e). 
 
Furthermore, this is done by means of a variety:  
“measures and the positioning of various human and material resources 
at the international and national airport levels. The implementation of an 
aviation security policy is based upon the requirements of the aviation 
security programmes at each of these levels, for both the administrations 
and operators in the area of air transport. Aviation security shall be in 
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conformity with the principle that the level of security measures is 
proportionate with the assessed threat” (SACAA, 2009e). 
 
5.4.1 Part 108 and SACAA regulations of 2009 
Part 108 of the ICAO Civil Aviation Regulations was adopted by South Africa in 2008 
and came into effect in South Africa as from 1 July 2009. Part 108 regulates all 
individuals involved in the acceptance, forwarding, storage, and carriage of cargo by 
air. 
 
With the SACAA implementation of Part 108 on 1 July 2009, in terms of cargo, “air 
carriers will only be allowed to upload ‘known cargo’” and can only receive such 
cargo from a Regulated Agent (RA) who has applied the appropriate security 
controls and hands the cargo over to the air carrier as ‘known cargo’ (SACAA, 
2009f). Furthermore, in compliance with Part 108, “air carriers are obliged to protect 
cargo whilst on the ramp prior to loading on board an aircraft and must also check 
that cargo consignments are visually inspected to ensure that they have not been 
interfered with”. (SACAA, 2009f). 
 
The SACAA Regulations, following Part 108, insisted that Regulated Agents are in 
possession of “a certificate of approval issued by the Civil Aviation Authority [and] 
Known Consignors (KC) must also be possession of “a certificate of accreditation 
issued by the Civil Aviation Authority” (SACAA, 2009f). In pursuance of the SACAA 
regulations for the implementation of the Part 108 requirements a Regulated Agent 
had to “appoint a Designated Official (DO) …accountable for the implementation, 
application, and supervision of the security controls.. [and Regulated Agents were 
obligated to draw up and obtain SACAA approval of a “security manual that sets out 
the approach in which such regulated agent will operate” (SACAA, 2009f). 
 
Included in the duties of a Regulated Agent was the “safeguarding [of all] cargo 
against acts of unlawful interference… affecting security controls” (inclusive of the 
100 percent screening of) “unknown cargo [and] …ten percent of [known] cargo 
received from Known Consignors”. There was the further requirement that 
“[p]ersonnel involved in the handling of cargo or cargo documentation …to undergo 
prescribed training [and must be] subjected to background checks (SACAA, 2009f). 
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Accordingly Known Consignors had to “pack and secure their cargo on protected 
premises and safeguard the cargo against unlawful interference [with the cargo 
consignment] …sealed with tamper evident seals” (SACAA, 2009f). 
 
By the end of 2009 approved Regulated Agent sites had passed the 150 mark with 
continued growth in entities obtaining Known Consignor status (SACAA, 2009f).  
 
On 1 September 2012 Part 108 was extended becoming more stringent and 
onerous, with new technical standards being set for X-Ray machines, as well as for 
the sniffer dog (K9) services; training standards and various other issues. The 
amended Act also gave the SACAA more power to enforce these regulations. 
 
5.4.2  SACAA approved screening methods  
This section will describe the SACAA approved screening methods. In South Africa, 
similarly to the US and EU jurisdictions, there are several approved screening 
methods as per Part 108 regulations. These are the only approved screening 
methods, which are also audited and approved by the SACAA, namely:  
 
 Hand search or physical check; 
 X-ray screening; 
 Simulation chamber;  
 Technical or bio-sensory screening, using an ETD to detect explosives’ 
vapour or traces of it; and 
 the use of sniffer dogs/K9s. 
 
Previously another ‘method’ used, referred to as screening by delaying the cargo or 
‘maturing‘ it. Here the idea was to delay the cargo for a period of 24 hours, hence 
rendering it ‘safe’. This concept was based on 1970s thinking and was no longer 
relevant, and was taken off the approved list (Department of Transport (DOT), 2008). 
 
5.4.3  Current technology-based screening solutions 
There are two principal classifications into which explosives detection technologies 
fit, namely: trace and bulk inspection.  
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Both types of inspection technology are presently in use or permitted for use, as 
communicated by the various civil aviation authorities and are discussed in this 
chapter.  
 
According to Neeman and Banerjee (2011:34) trace detection is “based on the 
physical transport of explosives particles or vapour from the source to the inspection 
system, allowing the detection of the existence of explosives, without indication of 
size or quantity”. But using technologies such as “Non-Computed Tomography 
Transmission X-Ray and Explosive Detection Systems” allows for the remote bulk 
detection sensing of the “physical (or chemical) composition of an object [by] 
indicating the type and amount of explosives” present (Neeman & Banerjee 
2011:34). 
 
Electronic Metal Detection is a “bulk inspection technique that does not identify the 
presence of explosive substances at all, but rather looks for metal components of 
improvised explosive devices (IED)” (Neeman & Banerjee 2011:34). 
 
In addition to the US, EU and South Africa, other governments and countries have 
also approved the use of these technologies (as outlined above) and use them for air 
cargo screening purposes. 
  
According to Roder (2007: 8-9):  
While passengers may endure (if not support) security measures, the 
same cannot be said of the air cargo industry. Cargo carried on 
passenger flights is packed in the same hold as passenger luggage and 
is subjected to the same environmental influences as checked baggage. 
It is therefore only common sense that aircraft are equally susceptible to 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in either cargo or checked baggage. 
However, this does not mean that checked baggage and air cargo should 
be subjected to the same security measures. Aircraft vulnerability to an 
IED may be the same, but cargo and checked baggage have various and 
different characteristics, and must therefore be processed very differently 
(Roder 2007:8-9). 
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Only ten percent of air cargo transported on passenger flights is security checked - 
notwithstanding the fact that it denotes 70 percent of total air cargo. Accordingly the 
industry as a whole needs to tackle this self-evident shortcoming and potential 
disaster situation. But the solution is not merely a blanket 100 percent physical 
screening, which is essentially counter-productive, not cost effective and far too 
simplistic a solution. Instead the industry needs to initiate an intelligent threat 
assessment response that utilises intelligence information from a variety of sources 
that is analysed in order to build cargo profiles that can be used for pre-emptive 
screening (i.e. as early as feasible). Furthermore, the industry needs to ensure that 
the maximum levels of screening are focused on cargo that has been evaluated as 
highest risk, comparable to the profiling methods that support passenger security 
programmes (Fernandez, 2011: 1). 
 
Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) 
ETD is possibly the most prevalent worldwide of the screening technologies for air 
cargo used by airlines and freight forwarders. But in South Africa it is not as popular 
as in the rest of the world. With ETD, “samples of particles are collected from the 
[unpacked] pieces of cargo being screened…[they are then] …analysed for traces of 
explosives or vapours which explosives may give off” (Neeman & Banerjee 2011:34). 
 
ETDs are comparatively reasonably priced in comparison to other more expensive 
and advanced technologies even though they are not manufactured in South Africa. 
Their operations are also quick with results being obtained within a few seconds 
even if the whole process is labour intensive (ETDs are relatively small units and can 
be used in either a fixed installation or as part of a mobile operation) and takes time 
to apply to cargo goods being inspected (i.e. they have to be unpacked and 
individually scanned by the machine). Other time consuming activities associated 
with the ETD machines being that due to the sensitive technology used in the 
machines, they need to be frequently re-calibrated and are also sensitive to 
changing environmental conditions (e.g. variations in humidity and air pressure) 
(Neeman & Banerjee, 2011: 34). 
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Non-Computed Tomography Transmission X-Ray (Non-CT X-Ray)  
X-ray technology is widely accepted and there are many ‘off-the-shelf’ solutions 
readily available for purchase. Currently, there are 60 systems available from seven 
different original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). X-ray technologies in South 
Africa are the largest but also most diverse (in terms of equipment, machines and 
technologies) among the TSA-approved cargo screening devices/systems commonly 
used in South Africa. One of the advantages of using X-ray machines are their 
versatility in processing multiple pieces of cargo simultaneously in a processing 
chain/belt scanning method. By using x-ray machines it does not mean that the 
cargo pieces being scanned need to be unpacked. In other words a whole pallet of 
packed and diverse goods can be scanned by an x-ray machine big enough to 
accommodate the whole pallet. So it speeds up throughout in terms of quantities of 
cargo able to be scanned in a continuous scanning operation (although the bigger 
machines are more expensive). (Neeman & Banerjee 2011:34). However, efficient 
operation of an X-ray machine is affected by operational needs where the bigger 
machines typically require 2-3 operators as well as the Part 108 and Part 109, 
stipulation that a screener may only operate an X-ray machine for a maximum of a 
20 minute stretch at a time with an enforced 40 minute layoff, hence the need for a 
minimum of three screener operators per eight hour shift.  
 
Other drawbacks of using X-ray machines being their fixed siting in a specifically 
designated operational area (i.e. only the smaller machines being mobile or able to 
be wheeled/pushed to different locations). Another important restriction is the density 
of any materials being screened and high density materials may not provide an 
accurate or an x-ray image of good quality. Given this drawback in penetrating 
certain high density materials, X-ray technology is fully suited for screening all types 
of air cargo. Objects such as metal machine parts or having a high water content – 
which could possible generate ambivalent images that could pose difficulties for a 
human screening operator and could increase the false alarm rates – may therefore 
require screening by alternative screening technologies. In this context for optimal 
screening using current X-ray systems the specialised training of the operators is 
critical, since their interpretation of the images improves with practice and 
experience (Neeman & Banerjee 2011:34). 
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5.4.4  Non-technology current screening solutions 
Technological advances in explosives detection have made significant progress over 
the past few years and there is much ongoing research and development in this 
area. However, there are two popular non-technological methods that will be 
discussed below, namely: physical inspection and screening by trained explosives 
sniffing dogs (technically referred to as canines (and abbreviated as K9s)). 
 
Physical search 
People trained to detect improvised explosive devices (IEDs) play an important role 
in the additional screening of air cargo, both in primary screening, as well as in alarm 
resolution processes. This method is labour intensive and requires careful physical 
inspection of the contents of air cargo shipments. In primary screening, physical 
inspection can be a viable alternative to technological solutions, particularly in 
settings where few and/or large pieces of cargo need to be examined. Aside from 
upfront and recurring training costs no further investments are needed and the 
deployment such trained security personnel is highly mobile (Neeman & Banerjee 
2011:34). 
 
Search by trained sniffer dogs/K9s  
Trained dogs can effectively detect – oftentimes more efficiently than some of the 
ETD technologies – the scent (vapours) of explosive materials. Sniffer dog teams 
(handler with a dog) are extremely mobile and are also capable of quickly and 
competently screen large volumes of cargo – provided the different pieces can be 
reached (i.e. easily accessible) by the sniffer dog. In order to sustain their full 
detection capabilities trained dogs need to take repeated breaks resulting in 
continuous screening periods of 20 to 40 minutes at the most. Environmental 
conditions (e.g. temperature and humidity) can also impact of the effectiveness of a 
sniffer dog on duty. The costs of a sniffer dog programme are also quite substantial 
(primary and recurrent training, maintenance, trainer-related costs, etc.), but they are 
essentially an excellent adjunct to technological systems that might be affected by 
electricity load-shedding and other malfunctions periodically (Neeman & Banerjee, 
2011: 34). 
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5.4.5  Emerging screening technologies  
The urgencies and requirements for explosives’ detection in air cargo may vary 
between countries and governmental organisations. The above-mentioned 
technologies used to detect explosives in air cargo consignments are not only 
accepted and in use in the US, EU and South Africa, but also find extensive 
application elsewhere. In addition, several other technologies and methods presently 
not accepted for use of air cargo screening in many countries have been developed 
and – in some cases – are used by other countries for the purpose of explosives 
detection in air cargo, including South Africa (Neeman & Banerjee, 2011: 34). 
 
Remote Air Sampling for Canine Olfaction (RASCO) 
RASCO is a high-tech amalgamation of technology and application dog use. In 
comparison to conventional screening by sniffer dogs, this method takes advantage 
of the acute sense of smell and detection ability of dogs. In contrast to the 
conventional sniffer dog screening, the sampling takes place remotely, at the cargo 
site, while the analysis by the dogs takes place at an analysis centre. Using small 
filter air samples gathered from closed cargo volumes, such as containers, trucks, 
unit loading devices (ULDs) or wrapped pallets. The filter collects all cargo smells 
and is consequently presented to dogs specifically trained in explosives’ detection. 
The practice is comparatively rapid, non-intrusive and allows the screening of 
consolidated consignments without the need to unpack the goods (i.e. break it 
down). It is predominantly suited for the screening of large volumes of cargo and is in 
use at various airports both in Europe and South Africa. To achieve full potential of 
the system, larger and regular cargo flows are needed, since the analysis room 
requires a certain structure and needs to be set up on site. While the analysis room 
could be remote (i.e. away from where the cargo samples are taken) this would then 
require the transport of air samples from the cargo site to the analysis room which 
then need to be factored into efficiencies, quick turnaround time and costs (Neeman 
& Banerjee, 2011: 34). 
 
Vapour sampling technology 
The explosives detection technique via ETD technology outlined above relies on the 
sampling of elements that adhere to and contaminate surfaces. Alternative form of 
trace detection relies on the analysis of vapours, rather than particles. Vapour refers 
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to the gas-phase particles emanating from the explosive´s surface (solid or liquid). 
While much of the analysis technology is the same as that used with ETDs (usually 
Ion Mobility Spectrometry), the sampling techniques for vapour detection are 
different to those applied in particle detection. Rather than wiping the exterior of the 
article in question, sample collection is conducted by means of air suction from an 
article's surface or through holes (sometimes drilled into a cargo container), chinks, 
and slots in its body. Sample analysis is conducted in a comparable manner to 
explosives particles gathered. The commercially available handheld vapour sampling 
apparatuses are small, extremely portable, easy to use and comparatively 
economical, since they work without the use of consumables (Neeman & Banerjee, 
2011: 34). 
 
Speaking at a Lufthansa-sponsored security conference, R. John Hansman, 
Professor of Aeronautics, Astronautics and Engineering Systems at Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT), proposed a "Swiss cheese" model to encourage a 
more comprehensive approach to cargo security. It is a layered methodology using 
diverse techniques; whereas one screening technique might be 80 percent efficient, 
it can be 99 percent+ effective when coupled with other measures/methods that 
have different weaknesses but also different strengths. In other words, by adding 
‘layers’ or ‘slices’ to an air cargo security system, it will become almost be practically 
impossible (unfeasible) for offenders to find any loopholes in it (Hoffer & Beadling, 
2009: 1). 
 
5.5  THE CURRENT THREAT 
As mentioned in the introduction of Chapter 1, the current threat to air cargo security 
is real and current. The terrorist bombing attempt in October 2010 created the 
necessary international awareness of the very real and/or potential threats to cargo 
security. Described below is an account of the events. 
 
5.5.1 How safe is the cargo on passenger flights?  
In reference to cargo security on passenger flights and in the aftermath of 9/11, as 
early as 2005. Connecticut Republican Representative in the US Senate, 
Christopher Shays, who co-sponsored the legislation to improve and tighten cargo 
security, is quoted as saying: “This [threats to aircraft via explosives planted in cargo] 
  
94 
© University of South Africa 2015 
is a disaster waiting to happen. We are checking luggage but not cargo? It only takes 
a pound or two of explosives to blow up a plane.” More than twelve years after the 
9/11 terrorist attacks on the USA, detractors such as Shays, as well as industry 
groups, say maladministration, a multibillion-dollar price tag and pressure from 
airlines and shippers are hindering the US government from applying stricter air-
cargo inspection regulations (Bliss, 2005: 1). 
 
The very real possibility of explosives hidden in aircargo became a reality in October 
2010. Early on the morning of 29 October 2010, the call came through to the London 
Metropolitan Police bomb squad. Set aside at East-Midlands Airport in central 
England was an UPS parcel shipped from Yemen. Inside there was a laser printer 
that Saudi intelligence suspected to have been turned into a bomb. Before sunrise, a 
bomb squad arrived on site. The plane had checked in and departed again at 4:20 
am, but without the parcel, identified by its waybill number as a laser printer. Police 
officers examined the printer and lifted out the ink toner cartridge but discovered no 
explosive device. According to security sources, they also brought in specially 
trained bomb-sniffer dogs, as well as putting the printer through an X-ray scanner. 
Neither methods of examination were able to detect any explosives in the laser 
printer (Cruickshank, Robertson & Shiffman, 2012: 1).  
 
This lack of detecting any traces of explosives was, in itself, a matter of great 
concern based on the provided intelligence information and also pointed to possible 
shortcomings in both detection methods used. The security ring around the area 
where the laser printer had been isolated was lifted. But Saudi counter-terrorism 
officers appealed to British authorities to re-examine the printer. When they did, they 
discovered 400 grams of the highly explosive PETN concealed within the ink toner 
cartridge. The device had been scheduled to explode hours earlier. But the bomb 
squad had unintentionally neutralised the device earlier when they had lifted the 
printer cartridge out of the printer, disconnecting the explosives from the timing 
device. On the same day at Dubai Airport in the United Arab Emirates another 
similar printer ink toner cartridge bomb been discovered hidden in a printer. 
Responsibility for both explosive devices was claimed by the terrorist group, al 
Qaeda. Both printer ink toner cartridge bombs found were some of the most 
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sophisticated explosive devices discovered emanating from al Qaeda (Anderson, 
2012: 20). 
 
See Picture 1 below for a combined photo collage showing the contents of a USA-
bound package exhibited by police in the Gulf emirate of Dubai. Powerful explosives 
attached to a mobile phone detonator were exposed inside the printer’s and its 
cartridge (Cruickshank, Robertson & Shiffman, 2012: 2). 
 
Picture 1:  Composite picture showing the contents of a USA-bound parcel 
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The 29 October 2010 bomb discoveries shocked many Western governments. Not 
only had these devices gone through security screenings at a number of airports 
without being detected. Of more concern, the devices had also been transported on 
passenger aircraft on the first legs of their respective journeys. But most disturbing of 
all, the explosive devices went unnoticed by bomb specialists in two countries, 
notwithstanding being right in front of them, albeit ‘hidden’ in seemingly innocuous 
printer ink toner cartridges inside a laser printer. 
 
A few weeks after these two incidents, US Senator Susan Collins queried 
Transportation Security Administration chief, John Pistole, on whether the devices 
would have been discovered by existing security systems being used at US airports. 
Pistole’s response to this query was a cryptic: “[i]n my professional opinion, no” 
(Cruickshank, Robertson & Shiffman, 2012: 1). 
 
While extensive security efforts at airports are expended on the screening of 
passengers and their checked bags, about half the hold on an average passenger 
flight consists of freight cargo. In fact, according to the US Department of 
Transportation, in 2010 over a third of cargo by volume that arrived in the US came 
in on passenger airplanes. The US DoT estimated that proportion (a third) 
represents 3.7 billion tons of cargo while an additional 7.2 billion tons of air cargo 
came in on all-cargo aircraft (Cruickshank, Robertson & Shiffman, 2012: 2).  
 
The screening obligations for such cargo are not as stringent as they are for 
passengers and their checked bags. If it took experts in Britain and Dubai hours to 
uncover a device that was right in front of them, what are the odds of discovering 
such devices amidst the millions of tons of air cargo flying into the United States 
each day? 
 
What were the devices used? 
The bomb found in Dubai on a FedEx flight from Sana'a, the capital of Yemen, was 
crafted in a “professional manner” and exhibited the hallmark of terrorist groups such 
as Al-Qaeda. According to the Dubai police, it was concealed in the toner cartridge 
and case of a commonplace office computer printer and comprised of explosives and 
an electrical circuit connected to a mobile phone SIM card, which could have acted 
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as the detonator. Pictures show the cartridge of the printer laden with pentaerythritol 
tetranitrate or PETN, a potent plastic explosive that is colourless, odourless and is 
not easily detected. Sally Leivesley, a terrorism expert, said the Dubai bomb seemed 
to be "sophisticated" and of a scope that could have resulted in "devastation.” 
(Sawer, Barrett, Rayment & Hennessy, 2010: 1-5) 
 
The device discovered at East Midlands airport was similar. It had arrived on a plane 
belonging to UPS, the parcel carrier, in a container that had also originated in Yemen 
(Sana'a). Similarly the UK-discovered device also contained PETN and the printer 
had “cleverly hidden" cellular phone components in it (Sawer, Barrett, Rayment & 
Hennessy, 2010: 1-5) 
 
5.5.2  The weak spot in air security: Cargo screening  
Of the approximate 7.3 billion tons of cargo carried annual on US passenger flights, 
about 42 percent of it comes aboard flights entering the US from overseas. Foreign 
governments and airline companies make use of a variety of screening techniques, 
“involving X-rays, chemical testing and human and canine [dog] inspections, to 
screen cargo” in order to prevent any bombing attempts. However, all these different 
methods are not equally comparable in terms of systems compatibility or 
standardisation of effective results (Calabresi, 2010a: 1). 
 
For a number of years US Federal security officials have issued warnings concerning 
the potential risks of ineffective or ‘poor’ screening being done on aircraft coming 
from abroad entering the US. These warnings appeared to became a reality when, 
on 2 February 2004, three men landed at Miami International Airport on board an all-
cargo airplane having bypassed the screening in a foreign country. This incident was 
a worrying (for US authorities) repeat of an event in 2003 where a man had shipped 
himself in a box on an internal (US) cargo flight. Commenting on the 2004 incident, 
Paul Rancatore, a security expert for the Coalition of Airline Pilots Association, said 
that "[t]his is more disconcerting evidence that without actual inspection of cargo, our 
security system will remain vulnerable" (Donnelly, 2004: 1). 
 
While the US Transportation Security Administration (TSA) takes the word of other 
governments about the level of screening being conducted in their countries, a US 
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Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, released in June 2010, revealed 
that the TSA had little knowledge of how much definitive screening is being done by 
foreign governments. The 2010 GAO report found that: "[i]f a country requires that 
100% of its cargo be screened, [the] TSA counts all the cargo coming from that 
country as [having been 100 percent] screened" (Calabresi, 2010b: 1).  
 
The TSA in August 2010 missed a Congress imposed target date, set three years 
prior, for the commencement of the screening of all cargo freight coming into the US 
on passenger flights. In late June, John Sammon (of the TSA) had testified at a 
Congressional hearing that the TSA would miss this imposed deadline since most 
enforcement of international screening requirements "ultimately” depended “on 
foreign government cargo programs and inspectors”. At the same inquiry, a GAO 
regulator confirmed that the TSA had only commenced gathering information on 
foreign screening practices earlier that month (June) (Calabresi, 2010b: 1).  
 
Philip Baum of Green Light Aviation Security states that the present 'known 
consigner' system is extremely administrative and relies worryingly on trust. In other 
words, the shipper trusting the material specified to him by the business tendering 
the parcel. And the procedures in place in the UK and US are restricted to flights 
taking off from those countries; commodities on incoming flights, like the package 
from Yemen headed to the US would not have gone through these controls (Lighton, 
2010: 1). 
 
The GAO report did discover certain areas of development by the TSA: national 
cargo is now 100 percent screened, and the TSA asserts that at least 65 percent of 
inbound cargo from overseas is also screened. Further, TSA administrator John 
Pistole said, "Even before this incident, 100% of identified high-risk cargo on inbound 
passenger planes was being screened." TSA officials declined to say whether the 
devices, which were in printers intended to reach the Chicago synagogues from 
assumed Yemeni educational institutes, qualified as ‘high-risk cargo’ by TSA 
definitions (Elias, 2010: 4-5). 
 
It is not certain just how secure so-called screened cargo really is. British officials 
maintain that all freight reaching their shores has been screened. TSA officials 
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concede that the printer bomb that landed in East Midlands, England, could have 
been accepted on a US-bound passenger aircraft as screened cargo (Calabresi, 
2010:1).  
 
The subject of screening has been a prickly one for the TSA, Congress, and the air-
cargo industry. Brandon Fried, executive director of the Air forwarders Association, 
says conforming to the congressional mandate to deliver 100 percent cargo 
screening has cost "hundreds of millions of dollars.” A great deal of the domestic 
screening undertaken to conform to the mandate has been done voluntarily by the 
air-cargo enterprises and by freight handlers (Elias, 2010: 4-5).  
 
The TSA has created other programmes internationally and is attempting to increase 
the international standards for screening air cargo. But the GAO report found that the 
TSA still "has not yet determined how it will meet the screening mandate as it applies 
to inbound cargo." At the hearing in June 2010, the TSA said it would require time 
until at least 2013 to meet the congressional mandate. Doing so just became a lot 
more vital (Elias, 2010: 4-5). 
 
There is a huge gap in aviation security, a gap so vast about one billion pounds of 
freight fly right through it every year, cargo on passenger aircrafts coming into the 
USA that never gets scrutinised. Stephen Lord, director at the Government 
Accountability Office told CBS News, : “[t]o the extent it is not screened, we believe 
that represents a potential vulnerability" (Keteyian, 2010: 1).  
 
Lord authored an enlightening report on air cargo security published in June 2010. 
He found "a significant percentage" of inbound cargo on passenger aircrafts is "not 
required" to be screened. The report also recorded: There remains "no technology 
approved" to screen bulky pallets and containers in a way that meets federal 
standards. While the TSA approximates 65 percent of inbound freight is screened, 
the report found that estimations "are not based on actual data" (Keteyian, 2010: 1). 
 
 
The above describes international experiences and opinions mainly relating to the 
USA, since the USA is often the preferred target and therefore one of the leading 
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voices in respect of AVSEC and ACSEC regulations. South Africa faces the same 
threat in principle, as an American airline, namely ‘DELTA Airlines’ fly directly 
between the USA and South Africa, several other American companies operate in 
South Africa and our own national carrier South African Airlines also has direct flights 
to and from the USA. 
 
These factors and the threat of global terrorism places South Africa and many other 
states in danger from potential terrorist groups, a fact that amongst others led to the 
establishment of Part 108. 
 
5.6  CONCLUSION  
This chapter detailed the establishment of the SACAA, its functions and 
responsibilities. It is imperative to understand the governing laws that the cargo 
industry must comply with as most respondent’s replies are directly related to these 
regulations. 
 
This chapter also furnishes the correct context in relation to this research and its 
findings. Firstly the international framework (chapters 3-4) that informs the local legal 
framework (chapter 5) in South Africa must be understood, as one is directly derived 
from the other. The various measures other countries implement and the expectancy 
that South Africa has to comply with their standards should be understood, without 
which, any country could not send cargo into those countries. Each state also audits 
South African regulations to ensure compliance. Those matters will also be 
mentioned and explored under research findings. 
 
The above-mentioned legal framework and the international focus on South Africa by 
the various EU countries and the USA, coupled with our own local regulations have a 
direct impact on our local air cargo industry. This issue is exactly what this research 
aims to explore. 
 
One also needs to understand the air cargo threat, as many people know about 9/11 
or the liquid plot, but how many people are aware of the ‘cartridge plot’ of October 
2010?  
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Air Cargo Security (ACSEC) was labelled by one expert as the ‘the ugly step child’ of 
Aviation Security. It is not in the ‘limelight’s’ enough and it is correct that a cargo 
bomb has not been used to successfully bring down an aircraft, however, that does 
not mean it could not happen in future. 
 
The attempt in October 2010 was viable and was only avoided with the hard work by 
various intelligence networks in place worldwide, but it was clear that the current 
screening methods totally failed, the parcels travelled on several aircrafts and even 
though the police were informed, the methods they used were inadequate to detect 
the explosives. 
 
In the following chapters the actual findings of the research will be discussed in 
detail, as well as an analysis will also be given of current SA approved screening 
methods with an analysis of their pros and cons.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
RESEARCH FINDINGS IN RESPECT OF THE DIRECT IMPACT OF PART 108 ON 
THE AIR CARGO INDUSTRY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will detail the specific findings as derived from the interviews and data 
analysis process. All the answers were collated and analysed, the total number of 
answers or replies per developed theme were calculated and a percentage 
representing such reply or theme was calculated accordingly for each question. The 
findings are depicted in a graph or pie chart format and each finding is then 
discussed and explained in detail. The same question was asked of all respondents 
and the total replies then constituted the total (100%). Based on each reply, a 
formula was used to calculate the percentage of each segment. 
 
The researcher felt that percentage rather than the number of replies will be a more 
appropriate way of delivering a clear result. (The reasons for this choice are also 
mentioned in Chapter 2) 
 
The findings are divided into two chapters for ease of reading and follow the rational 
and schedule of interview questions asked during the interviews process. 
 
This chapter will explore the direct impact areas affecting the air cargo industry in 
South Africa. The next chapter will explore ancillary research areas; the flow of the 
chapters follows the rationale of the questions asked of the respondents. 
 
6.2  GENERAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION ABOUT THE RESPONDENTS  
This section will detail some biographical information about the respondents, as the 
researcher deemed it important to show the depth of knowledge that the group of 
respondents exhibited, as well as describe the reasons for choosing these specific 
respondents as the sample group, representing a typical cross section of the air 
cargo industry in South Africa. 
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The first few questions centred on respondents’ background and history. The 
following questions were asked: how many years had they been involved in the air 
freight industry; how many years had they been in their current position; what were 
their roles and responsibilities, as well as when was their first introduction to Part 
108.  
 
Question 1:  Please Describe in brief your current position in your company? 
(including role, duties and responsibilities). 
Most of the respondents hold senior positions in their respective organisations, from 
MDs and CEOs, to security managers, GMs, and similar management positions. All 
respondents have first-hand knowledge and experience in air cargo security at 
various levels. 
 
Some of the respondents were on the committees drafting the regulations; some of 
them represented airlines or are part of the airlines themselves; others were from 
cargo handling companies or freight forwarding companies. They were all registered 
and regulated under Part 108. 
 
It was found that most of the respondents had been tasked with implementing Part 
108 for their organisations, from drafting Memorandum of Procedures (MOPs), 
testing and choosing screening methods to evaluating and developing processes 
and access control systems and in general running the day to day operations in 
compliance with Part 108. Some of the respondents are providing services to the 
various Regulated Agents, such as screening services, training or Designated 
Official (DO) services, while others are part of the various state entities, in charge of 
overseeing the correct adoption of Part 108, auditing and inspecting the various 
companies. 
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Question 2: Please detail how many years have you been involved in the air 
cargo industry? 
 
Chart 2:  Years of experience in the industry  
 
 
 
It was found that all of the respondents had at least five years of experience or more, 
there were no respondents with fewer than six years of experience. The researcher 
noted that all people interviewed also had prior experience in the field of security. It 
would therefore seem that the companies specifically recruited individuals with 
relevant experience when employing security managers. 
 
It was found that 13 percent of respondents had between 6-11 years, a further 60 
percent, the majority of respondents, had had between 12-30 years of experience, 
leading to a wealth of knowledge and expertise. They can attest to the benefits these 
regulations have had on the safety and security of the industry and most of the 
respondents, if not all, agreed that Part 108 is a great assistance in this regard.  
 
A further 27 percent of the respondents had over 30 years of experience in the 
industry. These are the pioneers and ‘grandfathers’ of the industry. They have 
experienced it all. Their input has been invaluable, detailing the transformation of the 
cargo industry from its infancy to its current state.  
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Question 3: Please detail how many years you have been in your current 
position at your company?  
 
Chart 3:  Years in current position 
 
 
 
It was found that at the time of the interviews, 43 percent had been in their current 
position less than five years and a further 43 percent had been in their current 
position between 6-11 years. These positions only became available during 2008/9, 
hence the relatively low number of years in their current position. 
 
The balance of 14 percent had been in their current positions between 12-25 years. 
These are mainly respondents within the state organs or long standing companies 
that existed in a different form prior to Part 108 taking effect. 
 
Question 4:  Please detail when was your first introduction/interaction with 
Part 108? 
It was found that 60 percent of respondents were introduced to Part 108 around 
2008-2009, just before it was promulgated. However, 20 percent, had been involved 
with Part 108 previously and took actual part in the drafting the regulations. This 
input and perspective came across in the interviews, since these respondents had a 
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deeper understanding and were actually part of the whole process from inception. A 
further twenty percent of the respondents were introduced to Part 108 as it was 
enacted in 2009, or later as they were recruited to their current position from other 
fields. 
 
6.3  WHAT IS PART 108 AND HOW DOES IT IMPACT ON THE INDIVIDUAL’S 
DUTIES AND COMPANIES’ OPERATIONS? 
This section will describe the respondents' understanding of what Part 108 mean to 
them and begin explore the impact Part 108 had on the air freight industry in South 
Africa. 
 
As described in Chapter 5, point 5.4 detailing Part 108 regulations and obligations of 
regulated agents and known consignors, below is a short recap of these regulations. 
 
Part 108 of the Civil Aviation Regulations was implemented on 1 July 2009. Part 108 
applies to all persons engaged in the acceptance, forwarding, storage, and carriage 
of cargo by air. 
 
As from 1 July 2009, in terms of cargo, air carriers will only be permitted to upload 
known cargo’. ‘Known cargo,’ means a shipment to which the appropriate security 
controls, approved by Part 108, have been applied. Basically an air carrier must 
receive cargo from a Regulated Agent (RA) who has applied the applicable security 
controls and hands the cargo over to the air carrier as ‘known cargo’ (SACAA, 
2009f). 
 
Under Part 108, “air carriers are required to safeguard cargo whilst on the ramp prior 
to loading on board a plane and must also check that freight shipments are visually 
scrutinised to ensure that they have not been tampered with” (SACAA, 2009f). In 
addition, “egulated Agents are required to draw up a security manual that sets out 
the manner in which such regulated agent will operate. The Civil Aviation Authority 
must approve the security manual” (SACAA, 2009f). While the “duties of a Regulated 
Agent will include safeguarding cargo against acts of unlawful interference and 
applying security controls, which will include the screening of 100 percent of 
unknown cargo and 10 percent of cargo received from Known Consignors. 
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Personnel involved in the handling of cargo or cargo documentation will be required 
to undergo prescribed training and must be subjected to background checks” 
(SACAA, 2009f). 
 
Question 5:  Please detail your understanding of Part 108? 
 
Chart 4:  Respondent’s understanding of Part 108? 
 
 
 
One of the answers from the respondents to this question was: ‘We just make sure 
the cargo is safe to fly at the same level passengers and their belongings are’. 
 
All passengers know what processes and procedures they must go through to board 
an aircraft, some passengers even know that their bags go through a similar 
process. After the 1988 Pan Am 103 disaster over Lockerbie, Scotland (Crowley & 
Butterworth, 2007: 1), the hold luggage undergoes several levels and layers of 
screening, referred to as the HBS (Hold Baggage Screening) process. Since that 
process takes place away from the public eye, very few passengers envisage and 
realise that while they fly, just a few meters below them, in the hold of the aircraft, 
there are actually several tons of cargo.  
Twenty-five percent of the respondents agreed that Part 108 in essence, is a series 
of measures; set to ensure that the cargo in the hold of the plane is safe. A further 19 
percent said the same thing in different words, In other words, Part 108 is there to 
protect the air cargo supply chain. 
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Seventeen percent felt that the main reason that Part 108 was in place is to get 
South Africa in line with ICAO regulations. Another 13 percent felt that Part 108 is 
actually a measure to counter terrorist’s attempts from using cargo as a delivery 
method. Ten percent felt that it is in reaction to the various global incidents, while 
another 10 percent felt it is actually a measure to streamline the supply chain. 
 
According to the respondents’ interpretation, Part 108 is actually the application of 
various security measures or controls, designed to ensure that the cargo is safe to 
be loaded into the hold, It places the whole supply chain in a position to ensure that 
the cargo they are sending is safe. 
 
From background checks of all employees, to different levels of training; from access 
control and Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) to X-ray, K9 and ETD, from ‘known 
cargo’ stickers to seals on the trucks, there are many measures and procedures to 
apply. It may seem like a lot of work and it is. Initially there was resistance to the 
regulations and many companies were worried about costs, delays and such. Today, 
however, they concede that the process actually helps their functions; it also raises 
pride within the organisation. Part 108 is sometimes used as a marketing tool. In 
other words, the view of: ‘see how safe and secure we are’ and also the feeling that 
‘you can trust our company to handle your cargo safely’. 
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Question 6:   Please explain how does Part 108 impacts on your individual 
duties?  
 
Chart 5:  Impact on individual duties 
  
 
 
It was found that 31 percent of the respondents commented that Part 108 meant a 
lot more work; a further 17 percent mentioned that Part 108 meant a lot more 
responsibilities in their role and function; 24 percent felt that Part 108 signified a 
major change in their role within the company, while 14 percent claimed it 
represented limited change since they always operated in a similar fashion. The last 
group at 14 percent commented that it ‘raised pride levels’ as a change. They 
experienced their success in implementing Part 108 at their company, as a source of 
pride. 
 
In summary, the role of a security manager at a freight company has grown 
substantially; his/her areas of responsibilities and the importance thereof have 
undergone a significant change since the introduction of Part 108. 
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Question 7:  Please explain how does Part 108 impacts on your company’s 
operations? 
 
Chart 6:  Impact on company’s operations 
  
 
 
It was found that 24 percent of the respondents felt that there had been a major 
change, which impacted on the company operations and a further 23 percent felt that 
the major change is mostly in the operational manner in which the company 
operates. 
 
A further 20 percent mentioned that Part 108 had actually resulted in better, more 
streamlined and structured operations. Ten percent mentioned an actual change in 
the warehouse layout, which again lead to a more streamlined operation, while 
another 13 percent mentioned the extra workload that Part 108 had brought about. 
According to the respondents the outcome is therefore a better operation with high 
security levels. Further ten percent claimed limited change, since they operated in a 
similar fashion beforehand. 
 
Some of the respondents answered that without Part 108, they actually do not have 
a job, or even a company to run, as Part 108 did present some opportunities for new 
companies to provide much needed services, such as aviation and cargo security 
training, screening services, Designated Officials (DO) services and general 
management of the Part 108 process. Where a cargo company is not a security 
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company, they do not have the skills, infrastructure or will to handle security, they 
rather concentrate on their job and sub contract these aspects to the experts. 
 
Most respondents remarked that Part 108 had a major impact on their position and 
responsibilities. It changed many aspects of their duties and even the actual layout of 
some warehouses, their access control, their recruitment procedures and such. 
 
Part 108 had both an effect on the individual functions of the security managers and 
department, in most cases it necessitated more people, more hardware, more 
processes and more work of course. 
 
It also had a drastic effect on the company processes and procedures; however, the 
general impression was that those changes are for the better. 
 
Part 108 also placed a financial burden on some companies. They had to spend vast 
amounts of unbudgeted CAPEX (Capital Expenditure), investing in screening 
equipment such as X-ray machines, upgrading access control measures and CCTV 
infrastructure, spending on training and various others costs in order to comply with 
Part 108 regulations and requirements.  
 
It also allowed some early adopters to use their Part 108 accreditation as a 
marketing tool in order to gain new business. 
 
6.4  WHAT HAS BEEN THE DIRECT IMPACT OF PART 108 ON THE AIR 
CARGO INDUSTRY IN SOUTH AFRICA?  
This section details with the actual impact which Part 108 had on the air cargo 
industry in South Africa. 
 
This section explores if Part 108 contributed to heightened security and details the 
positive and negative impact of Part 108 on the air cargo industry in South Africa. 
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Question 8:  From your own experience, has Air Cargo Security (ACSEC) 
become an increasingly important issue in South Africa?  
 
Chart 7:  Is air cargo security becoming an important issue in South Africa? 
 
 
 
There was unanimous sentiment that air cargo security is indeed becoming an 
increasingly important issue not only in South Africa but also in the rest of the world. 
Most respondents cited the events of 9/11, as well as the ‘cartridge plot’ of October 
2010 as mentioned in Chapter 5, as ‘mile-stones’. They took note of those events 
and referred to them as key events that actually and eventually ‘woke people up’. 
 
It was found that 60 percent of the respondents stated a simple yet emphatic ‘yes’ to 
the above-mentioned question, however, the balance of 40 percent was more 
enthusiastic in their reply where 27 percent said ‘Definitely yes’ and a further 13 
percent stated it had become ‘very important’. 
 
Looking at the watershed changes that took place in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
culminating with the events of 9/11, which was undoubtedly a turning point, a 
defining moment, affecting all AVSEC matters, as well as air cargo security.  
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According to the 9/11 Commission Report, government officials experienced a 
‘failure of imagination’ that excluded the possibility of the conceivable threat of 
terrorists using planes as guided missiles. Even more ominous is the fact that 
various previous incidents demonstrated the intention among Islamic radical 
terrorists to carry out this kind of attack. The AVSEC industry should have known 
from history and from intelligence that the use of planes as missiles was a possibility. 
Thus, when it comes to the future of aviation security, perhaps the most insistent 
question is this: What will the ‘failure of imagination’ of tomorrow be? The hope is 
that it would not be a cargo bomb (Forest, 2008: 115). 
 
Some respondents mentioned that the world powers, led by the USA drafted lengthy 
and tough regulations, all ICAO state members had to comply. The SACAA took this 
seriously and drafted its own local regulations, referred to as Part 108. These 
regulations have at last placed air cargo security high on the agenda of airlines, 
freight companies and of course each civil aviation authority in all ICAO Member 
States.  
 
The researcher was told by many respondents that looking at the air cargo industry 
prior to 2009 and even prior to that, before the ‘known shipper’ concept, that it was a 
‘free for all’ type of ‘cow-boy’ operation. Some respondents recalled stories of 
persons sending wine, beer, meat and such, between airports, using aircrafts as 
their private shuttle service. They felt they owned the airport and basically could fly 
anything, anytime, anywhere.  
 
The respondents claim that this has changed somewhat as the industry has become 
more professional in the early 2000s, yet was still naive somewhat. The idea that if 
you know and work with someone, makes him trust-worthy, as the ‘known shipper’ 
old concept, seems almost derisory today. 
 
Even though SAA and the major airlines have always had X-ray machines, access 
control, CCTV and such, it was in place but did not seem to have the importance and 
legal power that exists today with Part 108. These companies have done so since 
they already were international and were more exposed to the dangers. Most of the 
companies outside the airport continued operating without these measures at all. 
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All respondents were unanimous in their opinion that indeed cargo security has and 
is still increasing in its importance in South Africa. The events of 9/11 have indeed 
changed the approach most people have towards AVSEC and more so the 
dedicated people at the relevant authorities worldwide. 
 
Respondents declared that since 9/11 events, the world and AVSEC experts 
understand the lengths a terrorist organisation, such as Al Qaeda, is willing to take, 
the dedication, years of planning, sacrifice of life etc. to target and harm civil aviation. 
The use of cargo as a delivery method of explosives is actually easier, simpler and 
potentially without or with limited danger to the perpetrators, as was evident in 2010 
where two viable IEDs were sent from Yemen, on FedEx and UPS aircrafts and even 
flew part of the way in passenger aircrafts (See Chapter 5). 
 
These devices were highly sophisticated and escaped detection, even after 
authorities had them in their hands. The lack of imagination as to the design and 
type of explosive led to them not being able to determine that those were indeed 
IEDs, leading some to question screening methods in several countries (Vinsik, 
2011: 1). 
 
The sentiment the researcher received was that Part 108 started by a decision to get 
‘something’ in place and improve it as the industry moves along and grows. It was 
met with resistance at first, due to ignorance and lack of understanding, but after 
9/11 and the 2010 cartridges incident, as well as ICAO and SACAA regulations, the 
attitude changed as most companies fully support Part 108 and it continues to grow 
and will do so for many years to come.  
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Question 9:  In your position, since the introduction of Part 108 regulations, 
what has been the greatest positive impact on the air cargo 
industry in South Africa?  
 
Chart 8:  The impact: Positive 
  
 
 
It was found that 31 percent of the respondents sensed that security levels as a 
whole are better now. The combination of all the measures, such as background 
checks, access control, CCTV, screening and so on, all contributed to much higher 
and stricter security controls, leading to a safer environment. 
 
A further 25 percent of respondents felt that the awareness levels have improved. 
Where ignorance was cited as one of the main culprits, leading to accidents and 
incidents, better awareness was viewed as a major positive impact factor. 
 
Another 15 percent of the respondents cited better or faster processes. This means 
that the regulations actually forced the companies to re-structure operations and the 
warehouse lay out, leading to better and more streamlined operations. Faster and 
better processes mean more cargo moving through the warehouses. 
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A further 12 percent of the respondents noted stricter regulations, mainly closing 
loopholes and forcing companies that tried in the past to take an easier route, now 
are forced to follow the correct route. The strict notion was also noted in referring to 
the SACAA, which now has actual powers to punish when needed and yield a 
‘bigger stick’, which was viewed as being very positive. 
 
Another nine percent of the respondents cited higher-level regulations, feeling that 
South Africa is now at a higher, internationally accepted, level.  
 
A further nine percent of respondents also stated that the training issues have been 
addressed and corrected to a better degree. This has a huge positive impact on two 
levels. First it curbed the ignorance discussed earlier and made sure that more 
people in the industry understand the risks and second, it ensured that security 
personnel are trained to a higher level.  
 
Question 10: In your position, since the introduction of Part 108 regulations, 
what has been the greatest negative impact on the air cargo 
industry in South Africa?  
 
Chart 9: The impact: Negative  
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On the negative side, a large number of respondents, almost half, at 48 percent, 
cited costs as a negative issue. Their reasoning was on several levels. When Part 
108 was introduced, there was some confusion at the start. Some companies went 
out and purchased equipment and hired personnel at very high costs. These costs 
were un-budgeted for. The return on this capital and operational expenditure had 
taken a long time, which in turn had a negative impact on many companies. 
 
The current costs in respect of running a fully accredited regulated agent operation 
are substantial, both from the set up aspects, as well as on-going maintenance. The 
regulations requires access control measures, CCTV, background checks, screening 
of cargo, training and other security means, which cost money to set up and maintain 
at appropriate operational levels. 
 
This is coupled with the feeling of 28 percent of respondents that some companies 
are still taking ‘advantage’ or ‘short cuts’, saving costs, or applying measures that to 
some people may be inappropriate, hence having an unfair advantage in relation to 
costs. A further thirteen percent of respondents noted that a negative issue is the 
confusion or possible miscommunication, which launched or started off the 
implementation process.  
 
Some respondents felt that the way it was done was incorrect and the approach was 
wrong. This has left a bad taste and they view that as a negative issue reflecting on 
the process. 
 
Another thirteen percent of respondents also felt that the regulations cause time 
delays, not in the way it’s written but by its implementation. They felt there are areas 
that can be altered to accommodate faster transactions. 
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Question 11:  In your current position, has the introduction of air cargo 
security regulations improved air cargo security? 
 
Chart 10:  Has Part 108 improved air cargo security in South Africa? 
 
 
 
The respondents gave a unanimous ‘yes’ to this question. There was no doubt on 
anyone’s mind that Part 108 had indeed improved air cargo security in South Africa, 
with all the personal feelings, politics, competition and such other issues and 
matters. All the respondents were in total agreement that Part 108 has been a huge 
positive improvement in respect of air cargo security.  
 
There may be areas of concern, areas that can and should be corrected and 
upgraded, but the outcome was clear, Part 108’s biggest impact was improving air 
cargo security in South Africa. 
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Question 12:  From your own experience, what areas of concern can you raise 
in respect to the implementation of Part 108? 
 
Chart 11:  Respondents’ feedback in respect of concerns regarding Part 108 
 
 
 
Several concerns were raised about Part 108. It was found that 16 percent of 
respondents felt that in its current format, meaning ‘voluntary compliance’ it is less 
effective, whereas the SACAA audits and inspects only regulated already compliant 
companies and ignores all the non-regulated ones. Although the whole supply chain 
is secured, some parts are allowed to choose if they wish to participate or not, hence 
Part 108 in their opinion should become obligatory for anyone shipping cargo. Some 
respondents even suggested to link SARS application to become an exporter to a 
RA status, without which, one could not register as an exporter. 
 
A further 16 percent of respondents noted the screener training (which will be 
discussed in greater detail under the training heading) as a great concern, citing poor 
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screeners quality, insufficient ‘hands on’ and practical training, specifically in the 
cargo field, where screening of large volumes are commonplace. 
 
In relation to the above issue, 14 percent of the respondents felt that the 
remuneration of screeners was poor and not in line with their function and 
furthermore they felt that low salaries do not encourage high calibre personnel, as 
well as cannot guarantee loyalty of personnel. Where the risk of temptation is so high 
in the industry, low salaries contribute to potential collaboration with criminal or even 
terrorist elements.  
 
Another 14 percent of the respondents felt that the SACAA audit quality was of 
concern (SACAA effectiveness will be discussed in further detail in a separate 
section). Issues such as lack of manpower and the experience and expertise of 
current manpower were cited. Another issue was the inconsistency of audits, where 
one auditor is satisfied with certain aspects and in the next audit a different auditor is 
not satisfied with same aspect. 
 
Further issues noted, was the enforcement or lack thereof of sufficient enforcement. 
Ten percent of the respondents were seeking further and tougher enforcement and if 
a company does not comply, it must be corrected immediately and if it repeats the 
same error, an appropriate punishment must apply. 
 
In this respect the researcher must note that pride played a big role, as most 
companies were so proud of their set up, they wanted the SACAA to test them 
accordingly. Where they had shortcomings, they were willing to correct those, but if 
they were first-class, they expected recognition and appreciation from the SACAA 
and the industry. 
 
Seven percent of the respondents noted lack of drive by SACAA. This issue may 
lead to the above two points, where some of the respondents felt that SACAA had 
lost some interest in Part 108. It was almost as if they felt, ‘Ok, it’s in place, we can 
relax now’.  
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A further ten percent of the respondents raised the issue of transit cargo, where the 
regulation notes that all cargo must be screened. Transit cargo may have been 
screened at a different country, or not at all; also that cargo may pass on airside, 
from one aircraft to another, without passing through the RA warehouse and 
process. Such cargo may not receive the appropriate attention and may ‘slip’ through 
the system (see cartridge plot issue, where cargo was transferred on passenger 
aircraft to courier aircraft, without being discovered at all at any stage, (see Chapter 
5). 
 
Seven percent of the respondents noted road transport as a concern, where all the 
measures are applied at the end point, where the road transport may be 
manipulated. Three percent of respondents noted private airports as a concern, 
where Part 108 is mostly implemented at ACSA airports. South Africa has many 
private airports that can be used to ship any cargo without complying with Part 108 
or any other law they wish to avoid. Three percent of the respondents noted piece 
level screening, since the TSA has stipulated it as a standard, South Africa is not 
following this route, as well as many other countries, however, some people felt it 
must be noted and discussed. 
 
6.4.1 New regulations: The 2012 upgrading of Part 108 
In 2012, Part 108 was updated and upgraded, several changes were implemented, 
such as the addition of technical standards for Screening equipment such as X-Ray 
and K9s, extra requirements in respect of training, as well as some upgrade to 
procedures. 
 
The respondents were asked if the amendment had a positive or negative impact on 
the industry.  
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Question 13:  Looking ahead, and preparing for the newly approved 
amendments to Part 108; do you envisage these to have a 
positive or negative impact on the industry?  
 
Chart 12:  Respondents’ feedback in respect of the updated Part 108 (2012) 
 
 
 
It was found that 80 percent of the respondents were confident that a positive 
change is derived from the amended Part 108 regulations. The next section will 
detail the actual positive impact in more detail. The two major outcomes were: better 
security compared to the ‘pre-Part 108’ era and better awareness due to the 
regulations. 
 
A further seven percent of the respondents felt there was no change. When asked to 
explain that, they stated that companies who currently comply will continue doing so 
and those that take ‘short cuts’ will also continue doing so. It could be that they were 
looking for more enforcement from SACAA to ensure everyone to comply. A further 
13 percent felt there are both negative and positive aspects to the amended 
regulations. 
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Question 14:  From your experience, have local South African companies and 
organisations consistently and fully adopted the new ACSEC 
regulations and implemented such accordingly?  
 
Chart 13: Respondents’ feedback in respect of compliance levels in the 
industry 
 
 
 
There was a distinct feeling among the respondents and comments were made 
about some companies that choose the easy route or take ‘short cuts’ while other 
companies, mainly the large multinationals, comply and actually ‘go the extra mile’. 
 It was found that 48 percent of respondents answered, “Yes, but not in full” while 52 
percent replied “partly and more work is needed”. The sentiment is very similar and 
corresponds with the notion of the preceding paragraph. 
 
 The general sentiment was positive, that most companies do comply with Air Cargo 
Security (ACSEC) regulations and the impression was that the regulations are 
improving security. There was a ‘BUT’, however, with all the positive notions some 
negative issues were mentioned. Part 108 is not perfect; it’s a very good start but 
must be taken a step or two further, to ‘tighten the screws’ on the few companies that 
still are not fully in compliancy, was the message from the respondents.  
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One issue that was raised under the concerns section was the voluntary compliance 
nature of Part 108. While all companies handling cargo must be regulated, they must 
apply to become regulated. They can also choose not to become regulated and send 
cargo as ‘unknown cargo’. The researcher felt it was an interesting topic and 
therefore presented the question to the respondents. 
 
Question 15:  Please state, from your own experience, does the concept of 
“voluntary compliance” work for or against Part 108? 
 
Chart 14:  Respondents’ feedback in respect of ‘voluntary compliance’ 
 
 
 
Voluntary compliance in respect of Part 108 means that companies can choose to 
become regulated or not, it is a voluntary process. 
However, the regulations define clearly which entities must comply depending on the 
functions and responsibilities of such entity. 
 
The choice of some companies is to become regulated and comply with the 
regulations, or not, which means they can only send cargo as “unknown Cargo” 
which will oblige them to work through a regulated agent. In some countries the duty 
to register and be regulated is mandatory. 
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The matter of voluntary compliance versus compulsory is a matter of opinion and at 
times depended on the position of the respondents. It was found that 30 percent of 
the respondents are happy with the systems ‘as is’, while 40 percent of the 
respondents felt it must change and become compulsory. 
 
The group that felt it must change were largely the same people that felt that too 
many companies are taking ‘short cuts’ and enjoy an un-fair advantage against 
companies that fully comply as ‘short cuts’ allow some cost saving. 
 
There was also a concern about the protection of the whole supply chain, where 
some parts are allowed to be un-regulated, leaving in essence the responsibility for 
security and screening as the last link in the chain, whereby, instead of multiple 
layers of security and checks, there is only one last security check point which 
leaves the supply chain potentially vulnerable. 
 
On the other hand if the regulation becomes compulsory, it will undoubtedly place a 
huge financial burden on the smaller companies that currently just break even. It will 
also place a huge burden and responsibility on the SACAA, which according to some 
replies, at the time of the interview, suffers from limited manpower. The question 
arises, how will they be able to handle and police the whole industry? 
 
Thirty percent of respondents actually felt that a tiered system is the solution. Certain 
companies, the ‘last link’ entities, the airlines, cargo handling companies and such 
must comply, as they actually load the cargo on board the aircraft. Thereafter a 
middle tier where some companies are supporting the process, such as freight 
forwarding and consolidators that can become regulated, or are recommended to be 
regulated. As this will speed up the process, it can be regulated and lastly the rest 
that being regulated would not change the security risk of the cargo. In actual fact 
the regulated agent is tier one and the known consignor is tier two, or that appeared 
to be the idea, yet none of those are compulsory.  
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Question 16:  Please state, from your own experience, does the industry 
adopt best practice principles for air cargo security?  
 
Chart 15:   Respondents’ feedback in respect of best practice principles? 
 
 
 
On the subject of best practice methods, many respondents asked and correctly so, 
what the definition of best practice methods was? 
 
Best practices are used to sustain quality as an alternative to mandatory 
promulgated standards and can be based on self-assessment or benchmarking. 
Best practice methods should be apparent or accepted to be among those practices 
producing greater outcomes and being judged as good examples within the area of 
expertise (Began & English 1994:5). 
 
The agreement was in relation to internationally accepted best practice methods, a 
system or process that is accepted worldwide, where a majority of companies will 
choose to incorporate it into their procedures, since it works and works well. 
 
It was found that 22 percent of respondents replied ‘yes’ that the industry is using 
best practices and a further 22 percent of respondents replied ‘yes’, but only the big 
companies’, where 11 percent of respondents noted that the small ones ‘take 
chances’, meaning they do not really apply the best practice approach. 
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When asked to provide further details, it was found that the 22 percent of 
respondents that said ‘yes’ are from the bigger and more established companies. 
Most of these respondents work for large international companies and as such their 
international standards are by default defined as best practice. These same 
respondents also felt that some smaller companies do not apply the same measures 
and referred to them as ‘taking chances’. This it tied up to the voluntary compliance 
issue, the SACAA effectiveness and enforcement points raised earlier. 
 
Forty four percent of respondents also felt that many companies do not apply best 
practice standards, which ties up with the feeling that mostly it is the big companies 
that apply these standards where the rest do not. 
 
Question 17: Please state, from your own experience, does the industry adopt 
a risk-based approach in respect of air cargo security? 
 
Chart 16:  Does the industry adopt a risk-based approach in respect of 
ACSEC? 
 
 
 
It was found that 41 percent of respondents felt that companies try their best to apply 
a risk-based approach and a further 18 percent of respondent were confident that 
companies actually do apply a risk-based approach.  
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However, as per charts 39 & 40, relating to intelligence sharing, 67 percent felt that 
intelligence sharing is very poor or non-existent. The respondents raised the 
question: ‘how can one apply a risk-based approach, when one has no Intelligence 
to rely on or sufficient applicable information to do so?’  
 
The respondents that noted the lack of intelligence sharing (charts 39 & 40), felt 
stronger about the issue of companies applying a risk based approach and 41 
percent of respondents replied that there is no risk-based approach in many cases. 
 
Question 18:  Please explain, from your own experience, how effective is 
SACAA in enforcing air cargo security regulations in South 
Africa? 
 
Chart 17:  How effective is the SACAA? 
 
 
 
This was a sensitive subject and some respondents were somewhat reluctant to 
answer, worrying that their response may reach the SACAA. The researcher had to 
assure and guarantee them that all answers are completely anonymous and that no 
names will be used without specific permission from the respondents.  
 
It was encouraging to note that no respondent was completely negative. While 53 
percent of respondents felt the SACAA is effective and is executing its duties as best 
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it can, a further 47 percent of respondents felt that that SACAA has limited 
effectiveness; the researcher then asked them to expand on the reasons for said 
limited effectiveness. 
 
Even the group, which noted limited effectiveness, admitted and noted that the 
SACAA is doing its best in carrying out its mandate. At no time or stage were there 
outright negative tones to any reply. There was consensus that the SACAA 
approached the industry in a very co-operative manner, always open and willing to 
discuss matters. 
It was clear that in most cases the SACAA saw itself as a positive regulator, aiming 
to co-operate with the industry rather than be a dictatorial regulator. 
 
Question 19:  What reasons can you advance that may cause the SACAA’s 
limited effectiveness?  
 
Chart 18:   Respondents’ feedback in respect of the SACAA limited 
effectiveness? 
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It was found that 57 percent of respondents felt that the SACAA has manpower 
issues, by way of limited staff. It also emerged that there are only a handful of 
inspectors to audit the whole country in matters of cargo security and this is 
obviously insufficient to police and enforce such regulations. 
A further ten percent noted that they thought that there is some limited or a lack of 
specific knowledge amongst the SACAA staff and if they had further training and 
support, they would be able to deliver a much better service. 
 
 Thirty three percent of respondents felt that the reason for limited effectiveness is 
because of the limited number of audits. Some were so proud of their systems and 
measures that they were almost disappointed at the level and frequency of audits 
that were carried out. 
 
Question 20:  Please explain, from your own experience, whether the 
‘regulated agent’ concept under Part 108 works well?  
 
Chart 19:   Respondents’ feedback in respect of the regulated agent concept  
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There was unanimous consensus that the Regulated Agent (RA) concept was 
indeed working and working well. The requirements, implementation and application 
of the regulations in respect to RA were well accepted and in fact compared to 
international levels, even exceeding other EU countries. 
 
It was found that 100 percent of respondents supported and found that the RA 
concept to be a good concept that works well. That was excluding the issue of 
voluntary compliance, where some respondents wished it to cease and become 
obligatory. 
 
Question 21: Please explain, from your own experience, whether the ‘known 
consignor’ concept under Part 108 works well?  
 
Chart 20:  Respondents’ feedback in respect of the known consignor concept  
 
 
 
The opposite sentiment was aired about the known consignor (KC) concept. Eighty 
five percent said it was a good concept but the implementation was lacking and 15 
percent said it was not effective. 
 
The sentiment confirmed that it is a good concept, but too similar to the RA, where 
manufactures and smaller companies, simply cannot afford to get regulated and 
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maintain such accreditation thereafter. It is easier for them to pay extra and send 
their goods as ‘unknown cargo’. They have no real incentive to become regulated. 
To prove their point, some respondents were quoting figures of only 40 companies 
choosing to become regulated as a KC out of thousands of potential candidates. 
 
Question 22:  Please explain from your own experience, whether the 
‘designated official’ concept under Part 108 works well?  
 
Chart 21:   Respondents’ feedback in respect of the ‘designated official’ 
concept  
 
 
 
The Designated Official (DO) concept was supported by a vast majority at 95 
percent. Only five percent of the respondents felt it was not effective. The consensus 
was that it is a positive concept, assisting the cargo security process, however, as 
illustrated below in Chart 22, there were opposing opinions among the respondents 
and an almost 50-50 split between having an internal or an external DO as the best 
option. Fifty three percent claimed internal DO was the best way and 47 percent 
claimed that external DO is the best way. 
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Question 23: Please explain, from your own experience, should the designated 
official be an external or internal position?  
 
Chart 22:  Respondents’ feedback in respect of internal designated official 
versus external designated official  
 
 
 
Fifty-three percent claimed internal DO was the best way and 47 percent claimed 
that external DO is the best way. The opposing opinions of the respondents are 
completely different, but both have merit. Where an internal DO is part of the 
operations, he/she is part of the team, hands on and always present. He/she actually 
‘lives’ the job and this is the downside mentioned by those who oppose the internal 
DO. The internal DO is too involved, since he/she is part of the organisation. He/she 
may be too lenient and open for influence by the powers that be, or possibly hide or 
ignore issues that can harm their company. 
 
On the other hand, an external DO, while an outsider and deemed objective, is not 
on site all the time and may miss issues, or the company can hide issues they know 
are done incorrectly. At the same time, the external DO is still contracted to the RA 
Company and may feel obliged to be lenient at times. 
 
Each company had its own reasoning and choose what best suited its philosophy. 
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Question 24:  Please explain from your own experience, who should be the 
responsible party for ACS? The consignor? Regulated agent? 
Airline? Other? All together? 
 
Chart 23:  Respondents’ feedback in respect of where does the responsibility  
 rest for Part 108? 
  
 
 
It was found that 40 percent of respondents felt that the airlines are the responsible 
party, as the last link in the supply chain. The same percentage at a further 40 
percent felt every one, every party is equally responsible for the integrity of the 
supply chain. 
 
In most cases, even the respondents that commented that everyone is responsible, 
noted that the airline seems to be the most logical responsible party. 
 
The above is unique, if one compares cargo and passengers, since the airport 
authority is the responsible party for screening passengers and their hand luggage, 
as well as in most cases hold luggage, yet cargo is left out of that responsibility. 
 
Twelve percent of the respondents placed the responsibility actually with the SACAA 
directly and four percent placed the responsibility with either the RA or the GH agent. 
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6.5  CONCLUSION  
This chapter detailed the various findings, which had a direct impact on the air cargo 
industry as a result of Part 108 regulations. 
It opens with general background information about the respondents in order to 
provide sufficient understanding for the reader about their position, experience and 
expertise. 
 
It details whether the impact was positive or negative, has it actually improve air 
cargo security in South Africa? Do companies comply with the regulations? Do they 
deploy best practice and apply a risk-based approach?  
This chapter also explored the various methods or concepts as mandated by Part 
108 and how each concept was experienced by the respondents. 
 
The next chapter details further findings of a more general nature. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
RESEARCH FINDINGS IN RESPECT OF THE GENERAL IMPACT OF PART 108 
ON THE AIR CARGO INDUSTRY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter further findings will be discussed, as derived from the interviews and 
data analysis process. All the answers were collated and analysed and the total 
number of answers was calculated and a percentage was arrived at for each 
question. 
 
The findings are depicted in a graph format and each finding is then discussed and 
explained in detail. The findings were divided into two chapters (chapters 6 and 7) 
and followed the rationale of the questions asked during the interviews process. 
Chapter 6 dealt with the specific impact that Part 108 had on the air cargo industry in 
South Africa. Chapter 7 will detail the general impact on terrorist and criminal acts, 
as well as the comparison of various screening methods, amongst other factors. 
 
This chapter will also explore the difference between South African regulations and 
the USA/EU regulations. 
 
7.2  PART 108’s IMPACT ON POTENTIAL TERRORIST AND CRIMINAL 
ACTIVITIES. 
This section details the respondents’ experiences in respect of Part 108’s impact on 
potential terrorist acts and criminal activities. 
 
Aviation security’s primary function is to prevent acts of illegal interference with civil 
aviation, meaning that the main aim is the prevention of terrorist acts in the air and 
on the ground. By default, such measures also influence and limit potential criminal 
acts from taking place. 
 
This section will explore the respondents’ opinions in respect of Part 108’s potential 
impact of such activities. 
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Question 25:  Please explain from your own experience, will Part 108 
regulations change the opportunities or the modus operandi for 
potential terrorist activity?  
 
Chart 24:  Respondents’ feedback in respect of Part 108’s potential impact on 
terrorist acts – will it change their modus operandi? 
 
 
 
When asked about the impact which Part 108 may have had on potential terrorist 
acts, it was found that 63 percent of respondents considered that Part 108 will 
change the potential terrorist modus operandi, or force them to rethink their strategy. 
This could mean that Part 108 poses a hurdle to potential terrorists, possibly making 
air cargo a less attractive target.  
 
Thirty percent of the respondents believed that once a potential terrorist understands 
the regulations, he would adapt the modus operandi to counter the measures. They 
further noted that as in most criminal or terrorist operations, the attackers observed 
and studied the opponents before making a move, hence Part 108 will force them to 
adapt and reconsider their plans in order to curb any measures in place.  
 
Only seven percent of respondents deemed that Part 108 would not change a 
potential terrorist modus operandi, meaning, they know what measures are in place 
and will plan around those measures regardless.  
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A point raised by several respondents was that considering terrorists are patient and 
resourceful, what would stop any terrorist from opening a local company; become a 
regulated agent, and send any cargo in the hold if they wish? 
 
The consensus amongst many respondents was that a determined organisation, with 
sufficient resources, would always find a way to circumvent any security system, no 
matter what the industry does. If they cannot bypass it, they will ‘buy’ or bribe a 
person on the inside. If they cannot bribe, they will threaten. There are various ways 
to attack civil aviation, most are foiled due to intelligence and basic human nature, 
some unfortunately do succeed and the results can be as devastating as 9/11 or 
worst.  
 
The respondents wish or request was that more information and intelligence sharing 
must take place. This issue is discussed in segment 7.5 of this chapter. 
 
Question 26:  Please explain, from your own experience, will Part 108 
regulations change the opportunities or the modus operandi for 
potential criminal activity?  
 
Chart 25:   Respondents’ feedback in respect of Part 108’s potential impact on 
criminal activities – will it change their modus operandi? 
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The impact that Part 108 had on crime is undisputed. Unfortunately, the researcher 
could not source official information from the SAPS. However, some interviews with 
SAPS officials, both on and off the record, confirm that there has been a huge 
positive impact on crime concerning cargo security. 
 
As illustrated in Chart 25 above, it was found that 86 percent of respondents agree 
that Part 108 had positively impacted on the modus operandi of criminal elements. 
The respondents mentioned that simple measures such as access control, CCTV, 
background checks, X-ray screening and such measures as required by Part 108, 
have definitely contributed to criminals changing their modus operandi. Only 14 
percent of respondents said that criminals would adapt anyway, which in a way 
confirms that the trends in crime have undoubtedly changed. 
 
Question 27: In your environment, with background checks, access control, 
perimeter security and such, has there been any reduction in 
general crime, theft, stock loss, etc.? 
 
Chart 26:  Respondents’ feedback in respect of Part 108’s impact on criminal 
activities – will it reduce crime statistics?  
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As shown in Chart 26 above, It was found that 60 percent of respondents confirmed 
a drastic reduction in air cargo related crimes, a further 36 percent of respondents 
confirmed that there had been a reduction and only four percent said there had been 
no change in crime. In that case the respondents had zero crime beforehand, so that 
the result was an anomaly, yet a positive one.  
 
An overwhelming 96 percent of respondents corroborated that the reduction in crime 
contributed mainly to Part 108 regulations. Besides the actual measures, one of the 
main reasons mentioned by the respondents was the heightened awareness, both 
from the potential impact if the company is compromised, as well as a better 
understanding of the risks and threats. Internal employees avoided crime and 
therefore reported matters if brought to their attention. 
 
Question 28:  Please explain, from your own experience, how has the nature 
of crime changed since the introduction of Part 108?  
 
Chart 27:  Respondents’ feedback in respect of Part 108’s impact on criminal 
activities – has it changed crime trends?  
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When asked how crime has changed, 56 percent of respondents remarked that 
crime has become more sophisticated, meaning more ‘paper based’. They cited 
more fraud, more forged withdrawal documents and such being used. 
 
Changing security regulations caused criminals to adapt and instead of a ‘frontal 
assault’, or direct theft from a warehouse, since it is more difficult now, the criminals 
choose an easier route and manage to mislead and misrepresent themselves as the 
‘rightful’ owners of the goods and by way of deception and fraud, get hold of the 
goods. Hence violent robberies are less frequent. 
 
Coupled with that, a further 31 percent of respondents remarked that crime is now 
becoming more internal, with a further 13 percent of respondents stating that crime 
has actually become more external. This would depend on each company and its 
layout and in most cases it was easier to have an ‘inside man/woman’ that furnishes 
the criminals inside information used to commit crimes. In certain cases, however, 
that proved too difficult, according to the respondents, due to the various measures 
and then the criminals chose a more direct approach and used ‘old fashioned’ 
methods. 
 
7.3  FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS VERSUS OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS  
Respondents raised concerns relating to the financial constraints that Part 108 
places on Regulated Agents. This section will explore the relations between those 
financial constraints and operational requirements as per Part 108. 
 
Question 29:  Please explain, from your own experience, in the light of Part 
108 implementation, is there a good balance between financial 
costs and security? 
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Chart 28:  Respondents’ feedback in respect of costs versus security in the 
light of Part 108 implementation 
 
  
After the discussions about costs and benefits, when asked if the industry had 
reached a good balance, 67 percent of respondents agreed that there is a positive 
balance. Seventeen percent of the respondents did not agree, while a further 17 
percent of respondents were in two minds. 
 
The positive response to this question is easy to explain, because of costs spent on 
hardware, systems, screening etc. ,would balance out with the various charges 
which the RA charge the end user, resulting in costs being mostly covered and the 
company achieving greater efficiency. Several times the researcher heard a phrase 
along the lines of ‘how can we put a price on human life, as well as our reputation’? 
Meaning that whatever the costs are, they are negligible in consideration against a 
potential air disaster and its implications. 
 
Several respondents felt that compliance, when used correctly, is a valuable 
marketing tool that attracts more business and gives the company a competitive 
edge. 
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The group that commented in the negative to this question, felt that the costs are just 
too high and do not justify the investment versus the return. They felt that the same 
results could be achieved in different ways. 
 
These two groups had both sides of the argument covered, but added that since 
some companies comply with greater degree than others, the balance is skewed 
against the ones that invest more. 
 
However, there was a general feeling amongst the respondents, that the more 
superior a company’s reputation as a secure company is, the higher level it achieves 
in securing its cargo and warehouse and therefore the more marketing and prestige 
is attached to it and the more business it attracts.  
 
Question 30:  Please explain, from your own experience, is Part 108 a benefit 
or an ‘unnecessary burden’ on the industry? 
 
Chart 29:   Is Part 108 an unnecessary burden?  
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Several times the researcher heard an expression against Part 108; some termed it 
an ‘unnecessary burden’. When asked directly and allowed time to reflect and apply 
their minds, 100 percent of respondents actually said that Part 108 may be a bit of a 
burden, as it is not easy to comply and maintain, it adds a lot of responsibilities and 
higher workloads to many managers, yet it is absolutely correct and necessary. 
Not one of the respondents said he would do away with Part 108, and all 
respondents agreed that Part 108 had a huge positive effect on the industry. 
This was a very positive finding, while some respondents had reservations and 
concerns; they all supported Part 108 and wished it to succeed. 
 
7.4  FINDINGS IN RESPECT OF SCREENING METHODS  
An analysis was made of the current SACAA approved screening methods. 
 
Below are the charts and findings as based on several questions posed to the 
respondents. The desired result was to identify the effectiveness of each method, as 
well as the shortcomings and advantages, based on the personal input and 
experience of the users.  
 
Some of the respondents only use one method for screening and are more familiar 
with its function, yet they have assessed various other methods and have a good 
understanding of its pros and cons. However, this led to a very difficult analysis of 
the results, since some respondents could not answer all the questions about all 
available methods. Hence the results are analysed with only the applicable input of 
respondents per screening method. 
 
Question 31:  Please list the approved screening methods your company 
uses to screen cargo and highlight the positive attributes of 
each method.  
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Chart 30:   Screening methods: Positive notes  
 
 
 
Each screening method is discussed with its positive notes according to the 
responses of the respondents: 
 
X-ray machines 
The overall feedback in respect of the X-ray machines was conflicting at times. While 
it is probably the most commonly used screening method, it had the most concerns 
about its use, effectiveness, and implementation. Forty two percent of respondents 
noted reliability as a positive attribute with a further 42 percent of respondents noting 
speed as a positive attribute of the X-ray machine and 16 percent of respondents 
noted effectiveness as a positive note. 
 
Since an X-ray is a mechanical solution, it is highly reliable; the machine can operate 
almost around the clock. By design the X-ray solution is fast as it gives the operator 
an immediate picture of what the parcel contains, allowing the operator to make a 
determination whether there is a threat or not. 
 
Combining the above three positive attributes the X-ray is a reliable, fast and 
effective method when used correctly. 
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K9/Canine (AKA - K9 as referred to the use of sniffer dogs)  
A smaller percentage of respondents RA (Regulated Agent) are using the K9 
solution. It seemed that these respondents also thought that this was the best option. 
The K9 route was described as highly reliable and effective by 48 percent of 
respondents, as well as fast by 34 percent of respondents and cost effective by 
further 17 percent of respondents. 
 
Almost half of the companies using K9s felt it is a reliable and effective solution. The 
Canine nose is so sensitive and effective that when trained correctly it is seldom 
mistaken. The conventional free running dogs’ solution as described below is very 
fast: the dog will sniff a parcel and will immediately indicate if there is any threat by 
sitting next to the parcel. If no threat is identified the dog and his handler will 
continue to screen other cargo. The cost of such a service is usually based on 
weight or time spent and in most cases the service is sub-contracted to external 
companies, minimising capital expenditure and running costs. 
 
It was noted by the respondents that there are several K9 services companies, 
offering various services at varying levels. Two of these companies are also 
accredited by the SACAA as accreditation centres for other K9 companies. This was 
part of the updated Part 108, where technical standards were set for the K9 services, 
which till then had been wide open, leading to some companies not supplying the 
expected service levels. This has now been regulated by the SACAA.  
 
The respondents confirmed that there are two different services offered by the two 
major players. The first being ‘free running’ dogs, where the K9 arrives at the client 
and sniffs the cargo on site. This will give an immediate indication if it is positive or 
negative, therefore, safe or suspicious. Since the technical standards came into 
effect, there is a size limit on what a ‘free running’ K9 can and should screen and 
clear, being 1.3M x 1.3 M. Anything bigger than that must be cleared by another 
method. 
 
The second service or method is defined as RASCO, REST or MEDDS (as 
explained earlier in Chapter 5). This means that an air sample is drawn from a 
closed volume, usually a large container or box, it is even designed to screen 40-foot 
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sea containers. The air is passed through a filter, which absorbs all scents within the 
closed volume. That filter is then presented to the K9, which makes a determination 
by giving an indication if it is positive or negative, being safe or suspicions. There are 
only two companies offering this service, Mechem, a division of Denel and Bidvest 
Magnum, the security division of Bidvest. 
 
Hand search  
It was found that 48 percent of respondents deemed this method as a secondary 
method rather than a primary one. Issues such as identification of threats were 
mentioned amongst others. To properly identify an IED (Improvised Explosive 
Device), one must open all boxes and examine each item or object within that box, 
which is a mammoth task. 
 
The respondents however, mentioned some positive aspects, even though they did 
not use that method as a primary method. Several respondents felt that if done 
properly and by trained professional personnel, this method has merit in certain 
situations, mostly as a secondary method, or verification method. Therefore, the only 
confirmed response noted was negative, since all positive input had caveats.  
 
Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) 
Very few companies seem to use the ETD and those that do, felt it is a reliable 
method, fast and effective, yet costly. Most respondents felt though that the ETD is 
too ‘finicky’ and is too problematic to use as a primary method. Fast, effective and 
reliable was the response of 23 percent of the respondents, yet with a caveat, the 
balance of 77 percent of respondents had concerns and felt that only professionals 
must use it and the machine must be maintained to the highest level. 
 
Combination of methods 
From the various answers it appeared that the best solution is to use a combination 
of various measures or methods. Seventy five percent of the respondents felt that 
the best way is a combination of several methods. It may be costly, but it is probably 
the best route, both from the higher detection rates, flexibility and the ability to 
screen various types of cargo using different methods, as well as from the 
deterrence factor (unpredictability), since the ‘other side’ does not know what 
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screening method the company uses. They therefore cannot plan sufficiently to 
counter a specific method. 
 
The most popular combinations may be the X-ray machine and K9 or ETD, where 
one plays a lead or a primary role and the other is a verification role. Hand search 
can always be used as a secondary screening. 
 
Question 32:  Please list the approved screening methods your company 
uses to screen cargo and highlight the negative attributes of 
each method  
Chart 31:   Screening methods: Negative notes 
 
 
 
Each screening method is discussed with its negative notes according to the 
responses of the respondents: 
 
X-ray machines 
The respondents mentioned major concerns about the human factor, which was 
raised by 48 percent of respondents. Issues such as training levels, low 
remuneration and the quality of manpower were raised as a huge concern to most 
respondents and a genuine worry existed about the quality and effectiveness of 
screeners, leading to the ‘Human Factor’ concerns. 
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The conflict appeared to be between the technology and the human interaction on 
the interpretation of the images. It was understood that the technology in itself is 
sound, however, the way it is used and by whom, was the concern. Respondents 
raised issues such as low remuneration, long hours and a general low image of the 
security industry as contributing factors.  
 
These factors did not contribute to security being the first option of employment, 
which at times is the last choice and people do it when they have no other choice. 
Add to that the level of training that is based on classroom and PC based teaching 
mostly. With little practical, hands-on training, the end result is a serious concern of 
the competence of cargo screeners, leading to almost 50 percent of respondents 
worrying about the ‘human factor,’ with a further six percent of respondents stating 
that training specifically was a concern.  
 
Another downside for the use of the X-ray that was raised is the limited capacity in 
respect of size. Thirty-two percent of respondents raised this issue as a major 
drawback. Each machine has a certain opening size, from 50cm x 50cm to maybe 1 
200cm x 1 200cm, anything bigger than the opening cannot be screened. At the 
same time, depending on the type of cargo screened, the actual penetration capacity 
of the X-ray is limited and therefore threat identification is difficult. 
 
Lastly the issue of cost was raised, as 14 percent of respondents had an concern 
relating to costs, both on the capital expenditure side, as a purchase of an x-ray 
machine or machines is substantial, as well as the running costs, in the form of 
training, salaries, maintenance etc. These were major concerns to some companies. 
 
Respondents mentioned that while some costs can be recovered by charging the 
clients, this is not the main business of the freight companies or the airlines. This is a 
cost-recovery exercise, yet even a recovery over five years, places a serious 
financial burden on small and medium companies, especially when such expenditure 
is not budgeted for. 
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Trained sniffer dogs (canine/K9) 
On the negative side, the human factor and the ‘K9 factor’ were also raised as an 
issue by 38 percent of respondents. The training of the handler, as well as the 
certification and accreditation (i.e. level of required training received) of the K9 were 
a concern to the respondents as mentioned by 45 percent. 
 
The matter of training, or better-said, correct and appropriate training of the K9, their 
accreditation, as well as the handlers, was raised as a serious concern. There 
seems to be a belief amongst some respondents that some K9 companies use 
standards that do not comply with the regulations. Concerns were raised that some 
regulated agents are more concerned about the cost than the service levels they 
receive from certain K9 companies, placing passengers at risk. 
 
The size issue was raised by 18 percent of respondents, yet, since only two 
companies offer the complete solution, some of the respondents are aware of the 
size restriction on the ‘free running dogs’ and raised that as a concern. Since it is 
thought that some companies, may at times, ‘take short cuts’ and allow a K9 to 
screen a large container in strict contradiction of the regulations. 
 
Hand search  
It was found that 48 percent of respondents deemed this method as a secondary 
method rather than a primary one. Issues such as identification of threats were 
mentioned amongst others. To properly identify an IED, (Improvised Explosive 
Device), one must open all boxes and examine each item or object within that box, 
which is a mammoth task. The hand search method can be used as a verification 
method if something is suspected to pose a threat inside a container or box, or may 
be suitable for certain shipments, but certainly not as a primary method for hundreds 
or thousands of tons of container goods. 
 
A further 27 percent of respondents considered it too slow a method, as to manually 
open and inspect each object in a specific shipment. This may take many hours and 
to top it all, the risk of damage and breakage is greater, as well as the risk of theft 
and pilferage. 
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On the positive side, however, respondents felt that if done properly and by trained 
professional personnel, this method has merit in certain situations, mostly as 
secondary method, or verification method. Therefore the only confirmed response 
noted was negative, since all positive input had caveats. The issue of the ‘human 
factor’ and training issue was raised by 25 percent of respondents. To be able to find 
a concealed IED in a large shipment is akin to looking for the proverbial ‘needle in a 
hay stack’, as mentioned by several respondents. In the 2010 ‘cartridge plot’, the IED 
was not discovered by several teams, even though having passed through an X-ray 
machine, they could not identify the threat (see Chapter 5). 
 
About 50 percent of respondents also mentioned that electronic equipment is almost 
impossible to search by hand, as one would actually have to open each, printer, 
laptop and TV set to confirm that it is not concealing an IED as part of the internal set 
up. This is an impossible task for hand search, as there are other methods that can 
achieve the same output, without the human touch. 
 
Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) 
The ETD is a wonderful piece of equipment. It is literally a mechanical nose; it 
mimics the process of identifying a scent, by heating the materials introduced to it 
and comparing the chemical composition to its database. Forty Percent of 
respondents said the ETD is a ‘finicky’ machine; since it is sensitive to many aspects 
and is easily influenced by outside factors. 
 
The human factor, being the operator and his training, are concerns as well, raised 
by 18 percent of respondents. The samples taken to be introduced to the ETD must 
be taken with as little contamination as possible, which is a function of training and 
understanding of the ETD. The actual handling of the ETD itself is also an issue, 
from its location, the cleaning and various other issues. Nine percent of respondents 
did not consider the ETD to be a primary screening method, citing those issues and 
its limited capacity to screen large volumes of cargo. 
 
An ETD machine is not cheap, it may be less expensive than an X-ray machine, but 
it is still a capital expense that not many are keen to take, and hence ten percent 
raised this issue. 
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Simulation chamber  
Very few RA if any are using this method, it was found that 100 percent of 
respondents felt it’s not a primary method and can be removed as it is not really a 
viable option. There is only one such chamber at ORTIA and it cannot service all the 
cargo passing through. 
 
Maturity  
Maturity means the screening of cargo by delaying it for 24 hours. The idea behind 
this concept was to defeat a mechanical timing device, the delay will cause such 
device to detonate on the ground and not in the air. This method is no longer allowed 
as it was removed as an approved screening method in 2012. It was found that 100 
percent of respondents felt that it is not a primary method and fully agreed with the 
fact it was taken out, as it is not really a viable option. 
 
Findings from past research in respect of screening methods: 
 
Table 1:   A comparison table of various screening methods 
 
BREAKDOWN OF SCREENING METHOD CHARACTERISTICS 
 COST SCREEN 
FOR 
TIME TO 
INSPECT 
MATERIAL 
DISCOVERED 
MATERIAL 
ID’d 
INSTALLATION 
ACTIVE SYSTEMS 
X-ray $1-10 
million 
Explosives, 
stolen 
goods, 
drugs 
2-5 min No No Mobile or fixed. 
Fixed sites need 
power, road 
access, 
personnel 
facilities and 
attention to 
radiation safety. 
Vehicles need 
mobility 
Standard $1-5 
million 
2-5 min No No 
Dual view $10 
million 
2-5 min No No 
Backscatter $2-5 
million 
2-5 min No No 
Gamma ray $500 
000-3 
million 
2-5 min No No 
Pulsed Fast 
Neutron 
analysis 
$10-25 
million 
Explosives, 
drugs 
1 hr+ Yes Yes 
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Thermal 
Neutron 
activation 
$500 
000-3 
million 
Explosives 1 hr+ Yes Yes 
PASSIVE SYSTEMS 
Vapour 
detection 
$30-50 
000 
Prohibited 
gases 
30-60 sec Yes Yes Portable or 
desktop 
equipment 
operated by 
battery or 
electrical wallplug 
Trace 
detection 
$30-50 
000 
Explosives, 
drugs 
30-60 sec Yes Yes 
Radiation 
detection 
$10-50 
000 
Radiation 30-60 sec No Yes for 
radioactive 
material 
Canines 
(dogs) 
$7 000-
100 000 
per year 
per unit 
Explosives, 
drugs 
10-60 sec Limited by 
amount of 
training 
received 
Yes  Require care, 
feeding, shelter 
(Source: US Customs Services, [sa]). 
 
The above table illustrates the various available screening methods in the USA 
(some of the highlighted ones are applicable to South Africa as well). 
 
It is divided into two sections, being active and passive systems, it demonstrates the 
estimated cost of each method, what its detection capabilities are, the time it takes to 
inspect cargo and whether it is a fixed or mobile installation (Rountree & Demetsky 
2004:26). 
 
The above information is an apt comparison and can be used as a reference to 
evaluate the approved screening methods employed in South Africa, against the 
replies and input as detailed above. 
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Table 2:  Risks detected by each screening method  
 
DETECTION CAPABILITIES OF SCREENING METHODS RESEARCHED 
X-ray Explosives, stolen/mislabelled goods, illegal drugs 
Gamma Ray Explosives, stolen/mislabelled goods, illegal drugs 
Pulsed Fast Neutron analysis  Explosives, illegal drugs 
Thermal Neutron activation Explosives 
Vapour detection Dangerous gases 
Trace detection Explosives, illegal drugs 
Radiation detection Radioactive materials 
Canines (dogs) Explosives, illegal drugs 
(Source: US Customs Services, [sa]). 
 
The above Table 2 demonstrates the risks detected by each screening method, 
showing the capabilities of each method (Rountree & Demetsky 2004:53). 
 
The above information is an apt comparison and can be used as a reference to 
evaluate the approved screening methods employed in South Africa, against the 
replies and input as detailed above. 
 
7.5  COMPARING SOUTH AFRICA REGULATIONS TO UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA AND EUROPEAN UNION REGULATIONS 
This section will explore the respondents’ experience and understanding, when 
comparing South African ACSEC regulations to those of the USA and the EU. 
 
It is imperative for the country as a whole and for individual companies to comply 
with international best practices and standards. 
 
Both ICAO and foreign airlines audit states and individual companies, failure to 
comply may result in cessation of operations leading to sever financial loses. 
 
The first question was general, in order to establish the knowledge of respondents in 
respect of the USA and EU regulations. 
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Question 33: Are you familiar with similar air cargo security regulations in 
different jurisdictions like the USA and in the EU? 
 
Chart 32:  Respondents’ feedback in respect of familiarity with foreign 
regulations 
 
 
 
The vast majority, at 80 percent of respondents mentioned they are very familiar with 
international regulations from the USA and EU, as well as various other countries, 
depending on the exposure they have, the airlines they work with, and the 
destinations they fly to.  
 
These respondents in most cases had first-hand experience and knowledge in 
respect of the relevant regulations in other countries, from on-site visits, as well as 
regular contact with the airlines they work with. Moreover most foreign airlines 
actually visit South Africa and audit local regulations versus the home country 
regulations. In so doing, they ensure that their regulations are met or at times are 
exceeded. 
 
As an example, the researcher was referred to a recent visit by the American TSA to 
specifically audit the K9 capabilities and regulations in South Africa. Various airlines 
and several major regulated agents were visited and found that one company was 
providing K9 screening services. The TSA then visited this company’s premises and 
witnessed their screening process. The researcher can mention that the feedback 
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from the TSA was very positive, the auditing team was highly impressed by the 
regulations, as well as the K9 standards that they witnessed. 
 
Twenty percent of respondents were less familiar than the other respondents who 
actually worked in line with South African, as well as foreign regulations as part of 
their day-to-day duties. However, they were aware in general of the other countries’ 
regulations, mostly from off the record discussions within the industry, as well as 
their own assessments and conclusions or views in this regard. 
 
Question 34: From your experience working in an international ACSEC 
environment, how does South Africa’s regulations compare with 
the USA regulations? 
 
Chart 33: Comparing South Africa regulations with USA regulations  
 
 
 
The initial differences cited between the USA and South African regulations, were 
that actually South Africa and the EU are more similar in their approach and 
regulations. Most of the respondents, at 62 percent felt that the USA is much stricter 
in its approach and regulations than South Africa, yet they mentioned that the USA 
only focuses, or cares about cargo entering the USA, while they seem to care less 
about cargo leaving the USA.  
 
There was also a feeling that in the USA there is a compulsory or mandatory 
regulation, not like South Africa where compliance is deemed voluntary. The balance 
38% 
0% 62% 
SA on par with USA
SA ahead of USA
USA stricter than SA
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of 38 percent of the respondents actually noted that the South African regulations 
are on par with the USA regulations.  
 
A definite sense of criticism was noted towards the USA approach, where the feeling 
was that USA sets high standards and expects everyone to comply with their high 
standards in respect of cargo coming into the USA, yet their own standards in the 
USA for cargo leaving are not as strict as they make everyone else comply to. On 
the positive side, there was a definite feeling that the USA takes this seriously and 
they mean business, once they set regulations they make sure everyone complies. 
Their attitude of compulsory compliance was commended and the feeling of some of 
the respondents was that South Africa should follow suit and ensure everyone 
complies with Part 108 regulations as set in South Africa.  
 
Question 35: From your experience working in an international ACSEC 
environment, how does South Africa’s regulations compare with 
the EU regulations? 
 
Chart 34:   Comparing South Africa regulations with EU regulations 
  
 
 
It was found that 60 percent of the respondents believed that the South African 
regulations are on par with the EU regulations, while 20 percent of the respondents 
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felt South Africa is behind the EU and an equal 20 percent of respondents felt that 
South Africa is actually ahead of the EU. 
 
In this regard the level of exposure to the actual EU regulations played a part in the 
answer as most of the respondents that work closely with the EU, felt that South 
Africa is on par and both jurisdictions are at the same level more or less, where 
South Africa leads in certain areas but lack in others and vice versa. 
 
All respondents were adamant that South Africa is in line and fully comply with ICAO 
standards and many referred to the ICAO audit conducted in 2011, as well as the 
many audits conducted by various international airlines, where they are all in 
agreement that South Africa is complainant with ICAO and all RA and KC comply 
with SACAA Part 108. There was a sense of pride and confidence that the South 
Africa regulations are compliant and in line with ICAO.  
The EU’s attitude of compulsory compliance was commended and the feeling of 
most respondents was that we should follow suit and ensure everyone complies with 
our regulations as set in South Africa.  
 
7.6  QUESTIONS’ RELATING TO TRAINING MATTERS AND GENERAL 
FINDINGS AND NOTES IN RESPECT OF PART 108 
This section details with training-related matters as well as general findings in 
respect of Part 108, issues such as the level of training, state entities co-operation, 
intelligence sharing and a proposed way forward are described below.  
 
Levels of training in the air cargo industry were raised several times, in respect of 
various questions and matters. 
The human factor, which is closely related to training, was also raised, combined, 
these two factors are crucial for the correct implementation of Part 108 and the 
safeguarding of civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference. 
 
This section also explored the co-operation between state entities as experienced by 
the respondents; it also explored the level of intelligence sharing in the air cargo 
environment. 
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Questions’ relating to Training matters and general findings and notes in 
respect of Part 108 
 
Question 36:  Please explain from your own experience, the level of 
awareness training as stipulated under Part 108? 
 
Chart 35:  The respondent’s feedback in respect of Awareness Training  
 
 
 
It was found that the awareness training was viewed generally in a positive light, 
where only five percent felt that awareness training is good in its current format and 
a further 40 percent noted it has improved from the past but the majority of the 
respondents at 55 percent stated that more is needed, meaning that it is acceptable, 
but it can still be improved on. 
 
Awareness training is a basic course, designed to introduce the risks that the air 
cargo industry faces. Every person in the supply chain must undergo such training, 
as well as regular refresher training courses.  
The sentiment of the majority of respondents that more is needed must be taken into 
account and more effort must be placed on such training. This type of training must 
continue and form the basis of each employee, only when security becomes 
everybody’s business, can the industry view it as successful. 
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Question 37: Please explain from your own experience, the level of screeners’ 
training as stipulated under Part 108?  
 
Chart 36: The respondent’s feedback in respect of screeners’ training 
 
 
 
There is a difference between the training of screeners and the awareness training. 
Screeners’ training is designed specifically for screeners, teaching them to use the 
appropriate screening method and recognise explosive devices hidden within cargo. 
 
It was found that the same sentiment was expressed in respect of screeners’ 
training. Only six percent felt it is good in its current format, 49 percent felt that it has 
improved, while 45 percent felt more hands-on training was actually needed. 
 
The fact that the training is mostly computer based and the ‘On the Job Training’ 
(OJT), is left for the individual companies to decide on, was raised as a concern, as 
well as the fact that very few training institutions have the necessary skills to actually 
train and show the screeners actual simulated devices, materials etc. This was also 
viewed as a concern. 
 
Some respondents felt that a different approach must be taken in respect of 
screeners’ training. Perhaps a more outcomes based system could be used; a 
system that truly trains them to identify Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). It was 
felt and expressed that training should be more practical; allowing the screeners to 
learn about the components of an IED and see them in a live situation (within reason 
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and safety of course). The respondents felt that new and innovative threats must be 
presented as part of the curriculum. The curriculum must therefore be more dynamic 
and improve constantly. 
 
Question 38: Please explain from your own experience, the level of general 
education in the industry in respect of ACSEC 
 
Chart 37:  The respondent’s feedback in respect of general education of the 
industry in respect of ACSEC 
 
 
 
When asked about general education in the market, it was noted that 100 percent of 
the respondents felt that more education is needed within the freight industry. All the 
respondents expressed a wish that the SACAA would organise workshops and open 
days again as it did before the Part 108 implementation. They should explain the 
need for air cargo security for the immediate environment, as well as to the broader 
community. 
 
The sentiment of the respondents was that senior managers and directors in the 
various companies, even at board level, must also be educated. The need for air 
cargo security must be clear to all levels within the company, starting at the top. 
At times the security manager’s recommendation, even quoting the regulations, were 
ignored, due to ignorance and lack of understanding at the higher levels of the 
company. 
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Questions relating to state entities co-operation and intelligence sharing  
 
Question 39: From your experience working in an international ACSEC 
environment, is there sufficient co-operation between the various 
state agencies?  
 
Chart 38:   Is there sufficient co-operation between state entities? 
 
 
 
On the issue of co-operation, the position of the respondents defined their reply. The 
impression the researcher got, was that people within state apparatus are aware of 
co-operation levels as they form part of the system. They therefore felt that the level 
of co-operation is good at 27 percent. Since most of this co-operation is between 
government departments, and most of the respondents may not be aware of this, 
therefore another 23 percent felt that the co-operation between state entities is bad. 
The balance of 50 percent of respondents who are aware to various degrees of state 
entities’ co-operation, felt that there is some co-operation, yet much more could be 
done. They cited ‘turf wars’, politics, lack of knowledge and understanding as some 
of the factors leading to their comments that more is needed. An example was given 
that the SAPS is not sending its officers to undergo Part 108 training, yet the 
regulation requires every person working at the cargo environment to undergo at 
least a basic awareness course. 
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Question 40:  Please explain from your own experience, what is the level of 
intelligence sharing in respect of ACSEC? 
 
Chart 39:  What is the level of intelligence information sharing in the ACSEC 
environment? 
 
 
 
In respect of intelligence sharing, it was found that a vast majority of the 
respondents, at 60 percent felt that intelligence sharing actually is non-existent. The 
prevalent sentiments were that they have never or rarely received any intelligence 
from the SACAA or any other state entity, yet they are desperately in need and want 
to have such information, so they can set their measures and systems to curb and 
counter any potential threat or attack accordingly. A further seven percent stated that 
it is bad, while 26 percent said more is needed. The respondents all understood the 
needs of confidentiality and the ‘need to know’ basis. The intelligence that the 
companies look for is not the same as intelligence agencies. What they feel they lack 
are guidelines and threat levels, like the TSA in the USA, which informs the industry 
about imminent threats, MO’s and such. 
 
Only seven percent of respondents said that intelligence sharing was good, but 
these were mostly respondents from within the system, aware of Intelligence sharing 
at that level. The feeling on the ground, however, was such that no or little 
intelligence reaches the people working at the end of the chain. Some of the 
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respondents stated that they created informal and unofficial Information sharing 
mechanisms, one of which is the cargo crime forum. They mostly share information 
around criminal networks, modus operandi, vehicles used and such, since they all 
feel the lack of information flow and face the same challenges and if they can share 
information they can better protect themselves. 
 
Questions’ relating to other threats and the possible way forward in respect of 
a new forum  
 
Question 41: Please explain from your own experience, what other threats, 
besides terrorism and crime, does air cargo security face in South 
Africa? 
 
Chart 40:  What other threats may pose a danger to air cargo?  
 
 
 
When asked what other threats the industry faces, two main issues came up. Fifty 
five percent of the respondents mentioned ignorance as the biggest threat. This point 
is also linked to the awareness and education issue, where 100 percent of the 
respondents agreed that more is needed by way of education. This is also tied up to 
the second threats raised, which according to 45 percent of respondents are 
dangerous goods (DGR). 
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Several examples were given to highlight these dangers in the form of hypothetical 
scenarios as below:  
 
An innocent mistake, caused by ignorance and the presence of Dangerous Goods 
Regulations (DGR), such as a house contents move from Johannesburg to Sidney, 
can result in an aircraft accident in mid-air. Certain chemicals, such as pool 
chemicals mixed with certain liquids that can be found in any garage, can result in a 
fire on board an aircraft. A leaking lithium battery can also lead to fire on board, let 
alone a deliberate attack using household chemicals that are loaded on a container, 
where the screeners are not aware of what is allowed and what is not and where 
DGR are not declared. 
 
Question 42:  Is there a need for a new forum for sharing information in 
respect of air cargo security matters?  
 
Chart 41:   Respondents’ feedback in respect of the need for a new forum  
 
 
 
When discussing a new way forward, new thinking or a new approach, an idea came 
up to create a new forum. Sixty five percent of respondents agreed that they would 
gladly participate in a global forum. There seemed to be a craving for all roleplayers 
to get together at a high level forum and share information, difficulties and solutions. 
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A further 25 percent of respondents thought that there was no need for another 
forum, as the current forums are sufficient and a further ten percent of respondents 
actually felt that there are too many forums as it is. However, as the majority thought 
that a different forum was needed, the question was asked how would that take 
place and what form should it take? 
 
Question 43:  How would you suggest this forum is constituted? 
 
Chart 42:   Respondents’ feedback in respect of how they view the new forum 
 
 
It was found that 17 percent of the respondents replied that this type of forum must 
be set and run by the SACAA. A further 31 percent of the respondents said high-
level individuals, people that can make decisions, must participate. A further 14 
percent of the respondents commented that the forum should be all-inclusive, 
meaning it should have respondents from a wide variety of sectors. 
 
A further 24 percent of respondents suggested it must take place on a quarterly 
basis and an equal 14 percent of respondents felt that it only needs to take place 
twice a year and agreed with the above sentiments. 
 
 
High level participation
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All inclusive
Biennial
Quarterly
24% 31% 
17% 
14% 
14% 
  
167 
© University of South Africa 2015 
7.7  CONCLUSION 
Chapters six and seven dealt with the specific, as well as general findings of this 
research. 
 
The direct impact of Part 108, according to the respondents was discussed and 
examined. It was found that Part 108 had a profound impact on the industry by 
improving security levels and heightening awareness levels. 
 
Part 108 also changed individual duties, as well as the way companies operate, Part 
108 contributed to reduction in crime at the cargo sector and acts as a deterrent to 
potential terrorists. 
 
This chapter also dealt with training matters, which are viewed as crucial in the air 
cargo security environment. More training and education are needed, which will lead 
to a better understanding for the industry as a whole and will upgrade screeners to 
higher levels of operations. 
 
State entities co-operation and intelligence sharing were also discussed in this 
chapter, the sentiment in these respects was also similar to the training matter, more 
is needed and more is expected by the industry. 
 
Chapter 8 will detail the recommendations and conclusions derived from the findings. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
8.1  INTRODUCTION  
The body of this research deliberated and explored various issues, putting into 
perspective the international legal framework, as well as international AVSEC and air 
cargo security regulations (Chapter 3). These international regulations direct and 
influence each member state’s local regulations, as discussed in chapters Four (USA 
and EU regulations) and Five (SA local regulations). Thereafter the current threat 
was explained and further explored. 
 
Chapters six and seven are the main source of information, on which the findings are 
based upon, leading to Chapter 8, where recommendations and conclusions are 
discussed. 
 
These recommendations are linked to the main research questions as well as to the 
research aims and objectives as described in Chapter 1. 
 
The research has dealt with the main issue or the research problem, what has been 
the impact of the application of international and local air cargo security regulations?  
It also dealt with the transformation of the air cargo industry in South Africa, 
examined the approved screening methods, while comparing South Africa to other 
leading jurisdictions such as the USA and the EU.  
 
The researcher also feels that this research will greatly contribute to the industry’s 
and public’s knowledge and understanding of the different aspects which impact on 
the security of the South African air cargo industry. 
 
It was found that Part 108 has greatly changed the shape and form of the air cargo 
industry in South Africa; from changing the daily duties and responsibilities of 
security managers, to improving and overhauling the operational ways of freight 
companies and airlines. This research has shown that Part 108 has had a positive 
impact on the air cargo industry, by greatly improving the level of air cargo security in 
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South Africa. Yet it was also found that Part 108 is not entirely perfect, as several 
concerns were raised and discussed under the findings chapters, (six and seven) 
where recommendations will then be proposed accordingly in this chapter. 
 
This chapter details and explores the various recommendations and conclusions 
reached, based on the replies and input from the respondents. Each 
recommendation is explained and where applicable, a conclusion drawn accordingly. 
 
8.2  RECOMMENDATIONS  
This segment will detail general recommendations and overview of the researcher’s 
broad view in respect of recommendations. 
 
8.2.1  Overview  
It is imperative that South African air cargo security specific regulations, as well as all 
other AVSEC regulations, are in line with ICAO’s international standards. South 
Africa cannot afford to have low standards and thereby risk losing its global ranking 
as one of the world’s best tourism destinations. The risks any country faces if its 
aviation standards are brought into question are sever and can seriously and 
negatively impact on tourism and trade. Therefore, the SACAA and the air cargo 
industry must continue to make every effort to comply or exceed international 
standards. 
 
While using the SACAA approved screening methods, most respondents had 
concerns about the training levels of the operators, regardless of the actual 
screening method; the concern about the ‘human factor’ was always mentioned. If 
and when people make mistakes, the outcome can be disastrous. If one adds to the 
training levels concerns, the low salaries, long working hours and difficult working 
conditions, we may face a situation where the industry may be fooling itself into 
believing that it has a robust screening system.  
 
All it takes is a lapse in concentration, a mistaken interpretation, or a tired screener 
or dog handler working double shifts and we have a new “Lockerbie incident”. 
(Crowley & Butterworth, 2007: 1) 
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Hence the SACAA should double its current efforts to set higher training standards, 
by regulating the type and kind of training offered, as well as the desired outcomes. 
 
It may also appear that the best solution to this quandary is to use a combination of 
various screening measures or methods. Nearly 75 percent of respondents felt that 
the best way is to use a combination of several methods. It may be costly, but it is 
probably the best route, both from the higher detection rates, flexibility and the ability 
to screen various types of cargo, using different methods, as well as from the 
deterrence factor, since the ‘other side’ does not know which screening method the 
company applies at any given time. They therefore cannot plan sufficiently to counter 
a specific method. This may lead to lesser reliance on the ‘human factor’ and 
increase detection probabilities.  
 
The most popular combination may be the X-ray machine and K9 or ETD, where one 
plays a lead or a primary role and the other is a verification role. Hand search can 
always be used for secondary screening. 
 
However, there are several other areas of concern that require some work. Some 
general concerns can be mentioned such as that more information and intelligence 
sharing is needed and more consistent audits should be carried out by the SACAA. 
 
The SACAA should function at full strength, with the appropriately qualified 
personnel. It is imperative that there are sufficient inspectors and auditors to oversee 
the entire industry. It is suggested that the SACAA strive to employ people from 
within the industry, with relevant first-hand knowledge, understanding and 
experience. 
 
The upgrade of screeners’ training is another critical area. Training methods and 
curriculum should include more practical training, as the aim at the end of the 
training is to test and evaluate the actual effectiveness of screeners, not just to 
receive a certificate. 
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The industry is requesting more interaction with the SACAA as positive and negative 
feedback to and from the relevant companies will assist them in maintaining and 
improving standards where possible. 
 
The industry is also requesting more enforcement on non-compliant companies. 
Some companies feel it is unfair that smaller companies, at times, may be, or appear 
to be, bending some rules to save costs.  
 
Before Part 108 was implemented, customs and border police were mandated to 
screen cargo and look for dangerous or prohibited items, as well as drugs and 
counterfeit goods. Since Part 108 was introduced, the requirement to screen every 
export parcel actually assists customs in their fight. Most if not all cargo shipments 
these days are thoroughly examined and inspected. This is one of the major 
differences of the ‘pre-Part 108’ era and the ‘post-Part 108’ era. It is imperative that 
compliance is maintained now and the regulations continue to be consistently 
applied and audited accordingly.  
 
One of the major impacts is the positive change that Part 108 has mandated, the 
actual screening of cargo shipments that are loaded on board an aircraft, making the 
whole supply chain safer and air travel in general much more secure. Criminals and 
terrorists are aware of the strict screening requirements making air cargo a less 
attractive target.  
 
Part 108 specifically makes mention of transhipment cargo. Such cargo must be 
subjected to the same security measures and it must be made sure that it remains a 
‘known cargo’ and therefore safe to fly. All RA must ensure that their transhipment 
cargo is indeed screened or it has undergone appropriate screening at its original 
port. They must ensure that it is still ‘known cargo’ as if they were the original 
shipper. 
 
Dangerous goods could be a real danger to aircraft and, if not declared, may go 
unnoticed. X-ray screening can assist in identifying dangerous goods such as gas 
canisters, batteries etc. All RA and screening companies must remind their 
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screeners that their role is to actively look for Dangerous goods and not only IEDs or 
IIDs (Improvised Incendiary Devices). This should be an integral part of their training. 
 
The criminal element has changed its modus operandi since the new cargo security 
measures were introduced. These criminal acts have become more sophisticated 
and paper based. Information leaks are the source of the criminal’s ability to forge 
shipping documents and draw cargo under false pretences, instead of actually 
physically stealing cargo, as was common before Part 108 was implemented. It is 
imperative that these new crime trends are noticed, taken into considerations and 
counter-measures are implemented accordingly. 
 
There is still no x-ray machine large enough to screen whole containers or trucks. 
There has been made mention of purchasing a vehicle scanner, but it has not 
happened yet. The current method of remote air sampling (both RASCO and 
MEDDS) should therefore be looked at in more detail. Case in point is Air France at 
Charles de Gaulle (CDG) Airport in Paris, where whole trucks are being screened 
using the REST method. 
 
8.2.2  Specific Recommendations relating to the South African Civil Aviation 
Authority (SACAA) 
The air cargo security department must be fully staffed allowing the department to 
efficiently and effectively monitor and audit the complete supply chain countrywide. 
The air cargo security department should strive to employ appropriately qualified and 
experienced personnel. 
 
The SACAA should consider a two tiered screening method approval. The X-ray, K9 
and ETD as the primary methods with hand search as secondary method. The 
researcher recommends a combination of two screening methods at least, which 
would lead to better detection and introduce changing conditions and unpredictability 
for any potential attacker. 
 
There should be better quality audits and more frequent ones. There should be a 
yearly official and published audit schedule, with scheduled audits to all RA and KC, 
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as well as continuation and increase of surprise audits and screeners physical 
screening and interpretation tests. 
 
SACAA should further ensure strict compliance and adherence to Part 108 
regulations. There should also be better and stricter enforcement on non-compliant 
companies, with applicable penalties levied to ensure compliance is maintained. 
 
Better dissemination and sharing of information on international and local regulations 
and best practices in security measures should be ensured. Applicable intelligence 
information should be disseminated to designate persons at regulated companies; 
allowing companies to apply risk based counter measures. 
There should also be an official mechanism for intelligence and information sharing 
within the air cargo security community. 
 
Further development of practical training modules for screeners should be 
accelerated and OJT (On-the-Job-Training) programmes must be monitored by the 
SACAA. 
 
Screeners’ training should be more practical and more ‘hands on’. SACAA may 
again explore setting a separate designation such as the ‘AVSEC or ACSEC 
screener’ together with PSIRA, with better or higher remuneration. This area may 
require further research, both the higher levels of screeners’ training and its practical 
application as well as the correlation between remuneration and performance levels. 
 
There should be a re-evaluation of the Known Consignor concept, since there is low 
acceptance, a change may be necessary. 
 
A tiered system should be introduced, where one level is obliged to become 
regulated and a second level is set up where it is voluntary. This is similar to the RA 
and KC concepts, except that RA will become compulsory to certain category of 
companies. 
 
It may be practical to link all regulated agent companies to the SARS’s database, 
allowing further monitoring of export companies which are regulated or not. 
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State entities’ co-operation in respect of Part 108 and AVSEC in general, should be 
enhanced. For example, all SARS and SAPS personnel dealing with air cargo must 
undergo Part 108 training. There should also be better sharing of information 
between all industry roleplayers and relevant government departments. 
 
Wider use of information technology should be considered, conversion of all 
information, records and risk analysis to electronic systems should be implemented, 
thus allowing the industry to better monitor trends and evaluate risks. This would 
create a joint profiling system in respect of air cargo. 
 
A new all-inclusive forum should be set up, led by the SACAA, where all senior 
roleplayers are invited to from all sectors; governments, private, RA, KC, Airlines, 
service providers etc. where information is shared openly. This forum should be at a 
high level, where decision makers can make the appropriate informed decisions and 
share information. This should be on a bi-annual basis.  
 
8.2.3  General recommendations for the air cargo industry  
The industry could explore the possibility of a central screening solution, where all 
methods are available and based on a profiling system, as well as random rotation. 
All cargo should be screened using the best available method.  
 
The other possible solution is to set up an independent, central screening facility, 
where various methods are used randomly at times and specifically at others, based 
on risk profile. 
 
A national integrated database should be established, networking with all regulated 
agents and known consignors, sharing information relating to crime trends, modus 
operandi, companies and individuals identified as having malicious intent and 
various other threats. A profiling system should be created that allows the industry to 
define high-risk cargo.  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The industry, together with the relevant authorities should evaluate the threats to air 
cargo security in a South Africa, based on such aspects as capabilities, intentions 
and past activities.  
 
The industry together with the relevant authorities should then conduct an evaluation 
of vulnerabilities to those threats, which infers identifying precise weaknesses that 
may be exploited and proposing measures to address these vulnerabilities. The 
industry together with the relevant authorities should then evaluate the relative 
importance of addressing the identified vulnerabilities. 
The above process would allow the industry together with the relevant authorities to 
target their resources and efforts into specific areas with higher priorities. It should 
also ensure that international standards are adhered to and adapted according to 
actual threats and national requirements. 
 
The above can take place at a dedicated, SACAA led, ‘think tank’, specifically 
looking at AVSEC and ACSEC threats. With the right people putting their collective 
experience and knowledge, the industry can greatly improve its security levels. 
 
8.3  CONCLUSIONS 
Most respondents affirmed that the South African regulations fully complied with 
ICAO standards and recommended practices, the researcher noticed a definite 
sense of pride in the fact that South African regulations conform and adhere to 
international standards.  
 
Two principal positive themes were regularly mentioned: heightened security levels 
and heightened awareness levels. Both are critical elements in ensuring strict air 
cargo security controls. Part 108 has undoubtedly made a positive impact on the air 
cargo industry in South Africa. From its humble and at times troubled roots, to a 
world class example of regulations. Part 108 is in line with ICAO standards and is at 
least on par or exceeds many other countries regulations. 
 
The fact that South Africa has passed various international audits, by many airlines, 
as well as ICAO and the TSA, is an encouraging one. The researcher was involved 
in several such audits and can unreservedly confirm that South African standards 
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are well in line with international ones, however, the challenge the air cargo industry 
face is in maintaining good standards and improve or exceed such, where possible.  
 
Even though the industry concurs that security levels have improved, there is still a 
concern about some companies that may ‘take chances’. This term was often used 
during the interviews process. The SACAA therefore must continue to enforce the 
regulations and increase its oversight over all and any company exporting cargo. 
 
The industry is expecting tough enforcement, as it is proud of its achievements in 
respect of compliance. The SACAA should also further increase its efforts to produce 
and certify highly qualified screeners, as the ‘human factor’ concerns raised by the 
respondents are genuine concerns.  
 
Screeners’ training and their remuneration was a concern, related to the ‘human 
factor’ issue, this issue was raised consistently in relation to screening methods. The 
conclusion is simple, the technology is sound, however the quality of the people that 
use and operate it, is questioned at times. The SACAA must also increase its efforts 
to allay any concerns about the quality of screeners’ training and their accreditation 
that the SACAA oversees and regulates. 
 
It is clear that Part 108 has had a positive impact on reducing crime at the cargo 
environment. It is now more important than before to maintain high levels of 
screening and increase security where possible, as well as factor the new risks from 
sophisticated fraud and more electronic types of crime. 
 
Askew (2011:4), wrote an article titled: “Who poses the greatest risk to aviation 
security: the terrorist or the accountant?” This is a good question, as the conclusion 
so far in South Africa is that a good balance exists between operational requirements 
and financial concerns and hopefully the fact that no incident took place yet, will not 
lead the accountants to cut security costs in order to save money. 
 
Part 108 was put in place as a first step, the intention from the onset was to 
implement it and improve henceforth. Part 108 must remain a ‘live’ regulation, 
improving and advancing constantly. The SACAA and the industry must take into 
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consideration international regulations and risks, coupled with local regulations and 
risks, resulting in a targeted legislation aimed at reducing threats to air cargo security 
in South Africa. 
 
Part 108 had a major positive impact on the industry, yet the respondents raised 
some concerns, which were explored in detail under the findings chapters. The 
industry and the SACAA are awaiting this research report and the researcher has no 
doubt that some of the concerns have been addressed via various recommendations 
and suggestions, making this research project valuable to the industry and a huge 
contribution to safety of the aviation industry in South Africa.  
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ANNEXURE C: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS  
 
Title of research project: 
 
THE IMPACT OF THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL AIR CARGO 
SECURITY REGULATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Main research question:  
What has been the impact of the changing international and South African 
air cargo security regulations on the South African air cargo transport 
industry? 
 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS:  
 
General background and biographical questions (Questions 1-4) 
 
1. Please describe in brief your current position in your company? Including 
Role, duties and responsibilities. 
 
2. Please Detail how many years have you been involved in the air cargo 
industry? 
 
3. Please Detail how many years you have been in your current position at your 
company? 
 
4.  Please detail when was your first introduction/interaction with Part 108? 
 
Questions relating to what is Part 108 and how does it impact on the 
individual’s duties and companies’ operations? (Questions 5-7) 
 
5. Please detail your understanding of ‘Part 108’. 
 
6. Please explain how does ‘Part 108’ impact on your individual duties? 
 
7. Please explain how does ‘Part 108’ impact on your company operations? 
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Questions relating to what has been the direct impact of Part 108 on the air 
cargo industry in South Africa? (Questions 8-12) 
 
8. From your own experience, has Air Cargo Security (ACSEC) become an 
increasingly important issue in South Africa?  
 
9. In your position, since the introduction of the Part 108 regulations, what has 
been the greatest positive impact on the air cargo industry in South Africa,?  
 
10. In your position, since the introduction of Part 108 regulations, what has been 
the greatest negative impact on the air cargo industry in South Africa?  
 
11. In your current position, has the introduction of air cargo security regulations 
improved air cargo security? 
 
12. From your own experience, what areas of concern can you raise, in respect to 
the implementation of Part 108? 
 
Questions relating to new regulations: The 2012 upgrading of Part 108 
(Questions 13-24) 
 
13. Looking ahead, and preparing for the newly approved amendments to Part 
108; do you envisage these to have a positive or negative impact on the 
industry? 
 
14. From your experience, have local South African companies and organisations 
consistently and fully adopted the new ACSEC regulations and implemented 
such accordingly?  
 
15. Please state, from your own experience, whether the concept of “voluntary 
compliance” works for or against Part 108? 
 
16. Please state, from your own experience, does the industry adopt best practice 
principles for air cargo security? 
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17. Please state, from your own experience, do airlines and regulated agents 
apply a ‘risk-based’ approach in respect of air cargo security? 
 
18. Please explain, from your own experience, how effective is SACAA in 
enforcing air cargo security regulations in South Africa? 
 
19. What reasons can you advance that may cause the SACAA’s limited 
effectiveness? 
 
20. Please explain, from your own experience, whether the ‘regulated agent’ 
concept under Part 108 works well?  
 
21. Please explain, from your own experience, whether the ‘known consignor 
concept under Part 108 works well?  
 
22. Please explain, from your own experience, whether the ‘designated officer’ 
concept under Part 108 works well? 
 
23. Please explain, from your own experience, should the ‘designated official’ be 
an external or internal position? 
 
24. Please explain from your own experience, who should be the responsible 
party for ACS? The consignor? Regulated Agent? Airline? Other? All 
together? 
 
Questions relating to Part 108’s impact on potential terrorist and criminal 
activities (Questions 25-28) 
 
25. Please explain, from your own experience, will Part 108 regulations change 
the opportunities or the modus operandi for potential terrorist activity? 
 
26. Please explain, from your own experience, will Part 108 regulations change 
the opportunities or the modus operandi for potential criminal activity? 
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27. In your environment, with background checks, access control, perimeter 
security and such, has there been any reduction in general crime, theft, stock 
loss, etc.? 
 
28. Please explain, from your own experience, how has the nature of crime 
changed since the introduction of Part 108? 
 
Questions relating to financial constraints versus operational requirements 
(Questions 29-30) 
 
29. Please explain, from your own experience, in the light of Part 108 
implementation, is there a good balance between financial costs and security? 
 
30. Please explain, from your own experience, is Part 108 a benefit or an 
‘unnecessary burden’ on the industry, and why? 
 
Questions relating to findings in respect of screening methods (Questions 31-
32) 
 
31. Please list the approved screening methods your company uses to screen 
cargo and highlight the positive attributes of each method? 
 
32. Please list the approved screening methods your company uses to screen 
cargo and highlight the negative attributes of each method? 
 
Questions relating to comparing South Africa regulations to United States Of 
America and European Union regulations (Questions 33-35) 
 
33. Are you familiar with similar air cargo security regulations in different 
jurisdictions like the US and in the EU?  
 
34. From your experience working in the international ACSEC environment, how 
does South Africa’s regulations compare with the USA regulations? 
 
35. From your experience working in the international ACSEC environment, how 
does South Africa’s regulations compare with the EU regulations? 
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Questions relating to training matters and general findings and notes in 
respect of Part 108 (Questions 36-43) 
 
Questions relating to training matters (Questions 36-38) 
 
36. Please explain, from your own experience, the level of awareness training as 
stipulated under Part 108? 
 
37. Please explain from your own experience, the level of screeners’ training as 
stipulated under Part 108? 
 
38. Please explain, from your own experience, the level of general education in 
the industry in respect of ACSEC 
 
Questions relating to state entities co-operation and intelligence sharing 
(Questions 39-40) 
 
39. From your experience working in an international ACSEC environment, is 
there sufficient co-operation between the various state agencies? 
 
40. Please explain from your own experience, what is the level of intelligence 
sharing in respect of ACSEC? 
 
Questions relating to other threats and the possible way forward in respect of 
a new forum (Questions 41-43) 
 
41. Please explain from your own experience, what other threats, besides 
terrorism and crime does air cargo security face in South Africa? 
 
42. Is there a need for a new forum for sharing information in respect of air cargo 
security matters? 
 
43. How would you suggest this forum is constituted? 
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ANNEXURE D:  PRO FORMA CONSENT FORM  
 
[The below pro forma consent form was signed by all respondents]. 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
AGREEMENT: 
 
I, ………..………………………  hereby consent to be interviewed for the research 
project topic: “THE IMPACT OF THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL AIR 
CARGO SECURITY REGULATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA”. 
 
If necessary, I also agree to follow-up interviews being held with me; 
 
The use of data derived from these interviews by the interviewer c a n  b e  
u t i l i s e d  in a research report as he deems appropriate. 
 
I also understand that: 
 
- My participation in this study is voluntary and I can refuse to participate, or 
withdraw at any time without stating a reason; 
 
- Anonymity is guaranteed by the researcher and data will under no circumstances 
be reported in such a way as to reveal my identity; 
 
- No reimbursement will be made by the researcher for information rendered or for 
my participation in this project; 
 
- By signing this agreement I undertake to give honest answers to reasonable 
questions and not to intentionally mislead the researcher; and 
 
- I will in no way derive any personal benefit from taking part in this 
research project. 
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I hereby acknowledge that the researcher/interviewer: 
 
- Discussed the objectives, aims and goals of this research project with me; 
 
- Informed me about the contents of this agreement; and 
 
- Explained the implications of my signing this agreement. 
 
In co-signing this agreement the researcher undertakes to: 
 
- Maintain confidentiality, anonymity and privacy regarding the identity of the 
subject and information rendered by the interviewee. 
 
 
__________________    __________________  
(Interviewee signature)     (Interviewer signature) 
 
Date:______________     Date: _____________  
 
 
 
I, (interviewer signature) certify that I explained the contents of the above document 
to the interviewee. 
 
Eytan Nevo 
MTech Student 
Programme: Security Management  
Department of Criminology & Security Science  
University of South Africa 
Student Number: 4343-470-3 
Tel: 084 311 0221 
